Cease and Desist:  The History, Effect, and Scope of Clayton Act Orders of the Federal Trade Commission by Kauper, Thomas E.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 66 Issue 6 
1968 
Cease and Desist: The History, Effect, and Scope of Clayton Act 
Orders of the Federal Trade Commission 
Thomas E. Kauper 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the 
Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas E. Kauper, Cease and Desist: The History, Effect, and Scope of Clayton Act Orders of the Federal 
Trade Commission, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1095 (1968). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol66/iss6/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
CEASE AND DESIST: THE IDSTORY, EFFECT, 
AND SCOPE OF CLAYTON ACT ORDERS 
OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
Thomas E. Kauper* 
The practice of entering broad orders in the terms of the statute, 
routinely and automatically without citing need or justification 
therefor, is indefensible as a matter of law and sound administration; 
and I would assume it to be a thing of the past.1 
T HE primary focus of the present study is upon the content of cease and desist orders entered by the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) under the Clayton Act. Whether the FTC practice 
referred to above is, or should be, "a thing of the past" is not as 
clear as the quoted statement might suggest. The statement, made 
in dissent by one of the protagonists in an intra-Commission dispute 
which began in 1962, is more in the form of a challenge than a state-
ment of fact. Some re-examination of FTC practice has resulted, but 
it has not been complete.2 Fundamental questions remain unsolved. 
As more and more firms find themselves subject to FTC orders, and 
as the policing of existing orders is given increasing emphasis, these 
problems will assume greater significance both to the firms involved 
and to the public whose interest is at least ostensibly being protected. 
This study is confined to orders entered by the FTC under sec-
tions 2 and 3 of the Clayton Actll upon a finding that one or both of 
these sections have been violated. The vast majority of the orders 
discussed deal with price discrimination, condemned by section 2(a) 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1957, J.D. 1960, University 
of Michigan.-Ed. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Fred Schlegel and Michael W. 
Coffield, former students at the University of Michigan Law School, for their assistance, 
and to his colleague, Professor Stanley Siegel, for his careful review of the manuscript. 
-T.E.K. 
I. Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 568, 581 (1962) (dissenting opinion of 
Commissioner Elman), modified, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962). 
2. An extensive literature dealing with various aspects of FTC orders and their 
enforcement has begun to develop. The reader is refened to I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW § 8.19 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ch. 8 
(1965); F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON PATMAN Am: 504-24 (1962), 
142-64 (1964 Supp.); Austern, Five Thousand Dollars a Day, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST 
SECTION 285 (1962); Long, The Administrative Process: Agonizing Reappraisal in the 
FTC, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 671 (1962); Louis, The Scope and Enforcement of Robin-
son-Patman Act Cease and Desist Orders, 10 Vll.L. L. REv. 457 (1965); Shniderman, 
Federal Trade Commission Orders Under the Robinson-Patman Act: A.n Argument for 
Limiting Their Impact on Subsequent Pricing Conduct, 65 HARV. L. REv. 750 (1952); 
Comment, Permissible Scope of Cease and Desist Orders: Legislation and Adjudication 
by the FTC, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 706 (1962). 
3. Clayton Act §§ 2, 3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14 (1964). 
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of the Clayton Act if the discrimination is injurious to competition, 
or the related types of conduct (the granting of promotional allow-
ances or brokerage) covered by the balance of section 2, as amended 
by the Robinson-Patman Act.4 Orders under section 3, which pro-
hibits tie-ins and other exclusive dealing arrangements likely to have 
an anticompetitive effect, are far fewer in number.5 This study does 
not directly encompass orders under section 7 of the Clayton Act,6 
the so-called antimerger law, because of the unique problems of the 
divestiture remedy commonly employed in such cases.7 Nor is de-
tailed consideration given orders entered under section 5 of the FTC 
Act, which broadly condemns "unfair methods of competition" and 
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices."8 But section 5 orders, which 
most commonly deal with deceptive advertising or sales practices, 
cannot be ignored altogether; both the FTC and the courts have 
relied heavily on section 5 practices and precedents in Clayton Act 
cases. Whether such reliance is proper is one of the questions to be 
considered. 
A cease and desist order is not entered in a vacuum. What an 
order should say or require depends upon the effect which the order 
is to have. A substantial portion of the present study is therefore 
concerned with the array of effects which may result from the order's 
entry, and with the relationship between those effects and the order 
itself. Not all of the detailed discussion of enforcement procedures 
which follows may seem directly relevant to the content of the FTC's 
orders. There are important unresolved issues within the enforce-
ment procedures themselves which warrant examination for their 
own sake and are therefore considered in detail. But in a broad sense, 
4. Section 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § l3(a) (1964), provides in part as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person .•. either directly or indirectly, to discriminate 
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality 
. • . where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create 
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent competition 
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, that nothing herein 
contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences 
in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery resulting from the differing methods or 
quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered •••• 
Section 2(b) permits the seller to justify discriminatory pricing where the lower price 
"was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 13(b) (1964). _ 
Sections 2(c) (brokerage), 2(d) and (e) (promotional allowances and services), and 
2(f) (knowing inducement of discriminatory pricing) are set out respectively in notes 
351 and 369 infra and in the text accompanying note 395 infra. 
5. Section 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), is set out in note 407 infra. 
6. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1964). _ _ , 
7. See generally Comment, Divestiture of Illegally Held Assets: Observations on Its 
Scope, Objectives and Limitations, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1966). 
8. 15 u.s.c. § 45 (1964). 
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all aspects of the enforcement procedures bear on the ultimate ques-
tion of content. If nothing else, the complexity of the enforcement 
procedures and the difficulty of reconciling the roles of the FTC and 
the judiciary emphasize the critical role played by ~he order itself. 
The study is thus broadly divided into two parts: (I) a detailed 
consideration of enforcement and other more indirect effects of FTC 
orders; (2) examination of the content of the orders themselves. The 
array of effects emanating from an order is relatively well established 
and not easily changed. It is reasonable therefore to consider the 
procedural enforcement pattern, and so forth, as fixed, and to treat 
the content of the orders as the controllable variable. Hence the fixed 
framework is considered first. 
The discussion of direct enforcement procedures begins with 
legislative history. Some may ask why. The historical background of 
these procedures may of course illuminate their meaning and pro-
vide some insight into what an order is meant to do. But my purpose 
is somewhat broader. As enforcement procedures have changed, the 
FTC's role has changed. Why this has occurred, and whether it has 
been the result of reasoned choices, is of primary import. The legis-
lative history is followed by a detailed discussion and comparison of 
the so-called "old" and "new" enforcement procedures, and of the 
impact of FTC orders on private litigation. The succeeding portion 
of the study, dealing with the scope of the orders themselves, begins 
with an evaluation of the objections to "broad" or "vague" orders 
and the existing criteria for determining permissible scopes. A set of 
workable standards is then proposed. The final portion of the study 
consists of a detailed examination of past FTC practices, and an 
evaluation of those practices in light of the proposed standards. 
No attempt will be made to determine whether violations should 
be found or whether the statute should be changed. The Robinson-
Patman Act has been condemned by many as vague and economically 
unsound. Many have suggested its amendment or repeal.9 Obviously 
such views color arguments about what the FTC should or should 
not do. But a fair assessment of remedies should proceed,· so far as 
possible, on the assumption that the statute, as long as we have it, 
does embody valid public policy. Arguments against the statute and 
9. For three relatively recent examples of such criticism see Austem, Difficult and 
Diffusive Decades: An Historical Plaint About the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 N.Y.U.L. 
R.Ev. 897 (1966); Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time. for 
Reappraisal, 42 WASH. L. R.Ev. 1 (1966); McGee, Some Economic Issues in Robinson-
Patman Land, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 530 (1965). See also C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION LAw, 646-56 (1959); C. KAYS.EN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST Poucy 183-84 
(1959); F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 535-55. A "bibliography of criticism" appears in id. 
at 551 n.69 and 554 n.80. 
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its interpretation should be directed primarily at the statute itself, 
and not at the remedy used by the FTC. Thus while it might be 
urged that the FTC should use its remedial power in a very circum-
scribed manner because by so doing it can in effect "change" the 
requirements of a "bad" statute, such arguments are misdirected. 
The relationship between attacks on the statute and its inter-
pretation, on the one hand, and the orders, on the other, is partic-
ularly close in those cases where the FTC's order simply repeats the 
prohibition of the violated statute. The argument that in such cases 
the FTC's orders are as vague as the language of the admittedly 
vague statute is sufficiently obvious that it need not be belabored.10 
But unless such an argument is to be nothing more than an outcry 
against the statute itself, it must be cast in different terms, namely, 
that the nature of the statute and the policies which the FTC is 
charged with implementing are such as to call for the use of specific, 
carefully worded orders. 
I. EFFECTS OF A CEASE AND DESIST ORDER 
The entry of a cease and desist order entails certain clear con-
sequences: the respondent will become subject to enforcement pro-
cedures; he will be obliged to file compliance reports with the FTC; 
and he must learn to live with more intensive FTC scrutiny than 
he had suffered previously. There are, in addition, certain conse-
quences which may follow upon the entry of an order, but about 
which there is presently some doubt. Thus an order may ultimately 
be held to be within section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,11 so that it can 
be used to create a prima fade case in subsequent treble damage 
actions by private litigants. These consequences all have some bear-
ing on the more immediate question of what the FTC should or 
must do when the order is entered. 
A. Direct Enforcement 
Orders entered upon a showing of violation of one or more of 
the substantive provisions of the Clayton Act are enforced pursuant 
to procedures contained in section 11 of the Act.12 Section 5 of the 
FTC Act contains its own provisions for the enforcement of orders 
entered as a result of substantive section 5 violations.13 This divi-
IO. The classic statement concerning the vagueness of the Robinson-Patman Act is 
that of Justice Jackson, dissenting in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 483 (1952). 
See F. RoWE, supra note 2, at 535 n.4. 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). See discussion accompanying notes 193-207 infra. 
12. 15 u.s.c. § 21 (1964). 
13. 15 u.s.c. § 45 (1964). 
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sion of enforcement provisions between two different statutes con-
tributes to the disorder which now characterizes the enforcement 
machinery, but it was both logical and without particular signifi-
cance at the time both statutes were enacted in 1914.14 
As originally enacted, the FTC Act and Clayton Act enforce-
ment provisions were virtually identical.15 Both statutes called for 
entry of orders which were not in themselves final and which car~ 
ried no immediate sanctions. If the person subject to the order then 
violated it, the FTC could apply to a United States circuit court of 
appeals for enforcement. Violations of the court's order, if enforce-
ment was decreed, constituted contempt. The individual respondent 
was also entitled to seek review at any time in the circuit court of 
appeals. The incentive to seek such independent review was not 
great, however, since the respondent could safely await the filing 
of an enforcement petition before questioning the validity of the 
order. 
This is the oft-described "three bites at the apple" procedure, 
so called because no sanctions could be imposed until the respon-
dent had engaged in his third violation. Proof of violation of the 
statute was needed to secure issuance of the order in the first in-
stance. Proof of violation of the order was a condition of entry of 
the court's enforcement order. And the contempt sanction rested 
on proof of subsequent violation of the court's order. It should be 
noted at the outset, however, that in some cases, depending upon 
the terms of the FTC and court orders, these three violations were 
not violations of the same substantive provisions. Orders, whether 
those of the FTC or of the court, are not necessarily the same as 
the language of the statute. As the Supreme Court has noted, "there 
is quite a difference between proving a violation of the Clayton Act 
and a failure to obey a specific order of the Commission."16 
These procedures were changed by the Finality Act of 1959.17 
Orders now become final after expiration of the sixty-day period for 
seeking review. If review is sought, the affirmed order becomes :final 
within a specified time after completion of the review proceedings. 
If a final order is violated, civil penalties in the maximum amount 
14. While § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) could be enforced 
only by the FTC, several other agencies were given authority to enforce the Clayton 
Act under the § II enforcement procedures. Moreover, it was thought difficult, in the 
Senate, to incorporate by reference the provisions of the FTC Act when that statute 
bad not yet passed the House. See note 39 infra. 
15. FTC Act§ 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914); Clayton Act§ II, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 
16. FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., 386 U.S. 228, 236 (1967). See Kauper, FTC v. Jantzen: Bless• 
ing, Disaster or Tempest in a Teapot? 64 MICH. L. REv. 1523, 1536, 1543-47 (1966). 
17. 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). 
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of $5,000 per violation (with each day of a continuing offense de-
fined as a separate violation) may be imposed in a suit brought for 
that purpose in federal district court. 
The procedural changes wrought by the Finality Act are of suf-
ficient magnitude that the Supreme Court, in a now famous dictum 
in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.,18 suggested that the FTC's practices 
in entering orders should be changed as a result. Much more will 
be said of this after the "old" and "new" procedures have been com-
pared in detail. But first, how and why were the changes in enforce-
ment procedure made? 
I. Legislative Development 
a. The original concept. It is easy now, with the benefit of hind-
sight, to condemn the "three bites" procedures as "laborious, time 
consuming and very expensive."19 But to the Congress which estab-
lished them they were sensible and based on precedent. Moreover, 
they represented a workable compromise between conflicting views 
of the FTC's functions, views which are of relevance today in eval-
uating the FTC' s order practices. 
It i~ difficult to specify with precision the purposes which the 
Congress thought it was serving in creating the FTC. The legisla-
tive history of the Clayton and FTC Acts is difficult to evaluate. 
There are the usual problems of identifying whether a given speaker 
was speaking for or against and was informed or uninformed. Addi-
tionally, a large degree of confusion was engendered by the fact that 
the two statutes were being debated and sent back and forth between 
the two houses at the same time: in each house the two bills were 
handled by different committees;20 debate took place on one bill 
before the other was before the debating body; and speakers did 
not always know what the other body had done, or what was going 
on in committee.21 
18. 368 U.S. 360 (1962). . 
19. S. REP. No. 83, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959). One can see their defects in the 
protracted American Crayon litigation. See note 77 infra. 
20. The trade commission bill, H.R. 15,613, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), was assigned 
to the Interstate Commerce Committee in both the Senate and the House. The Clayton 
bill, H.R. 15,657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), was referred to the Judiciary Committee 
in both the Senate and the House. 
21. Senator Cummins, referring to the peculiar distribution of the two bills between 
committees, thus lamented about "this miserable tangle in which we find ourselves." 
51 CONG. REc. 11,535 (1914). At the time, he was attempting to place in the trade 
commission bill (H.R. 15,613) provisions which in substance gave the FTC Clayton 
Act enforcement powers. But while the trade commission bill was on the floor, the 
Judiciary Committee had not yet reported out the Clayton bill (H.R. 15,657). See also 
remarks of Senator Reed, 51 CoNG. REc. 12,028-30 (1914). 
Early in the Senate debate Senator Newlands indicated an intention to entrust 
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The first versions of the FTC Act and the Clayton Act were both 
passed by the House on June 5, 1914. The FTC Act, in this initial 
form, gave the FTC only investigatory, advisory, and publicity-giv-
ing powers.22 All amendments purporting to confer adjudicative or 
regulatory powers had been declared out of order.23 The Clayton 
Act, as originally passed by the House, made no mention of com-
mission enforcement, although the issue was raised by those favor-
ing creation of an agency with enforcement powers.24 Enforcement 
of the Clayton Act was to be through criminal sanctions, private 
suits, and suits by the United States for injunctive relief.25 It is clear 
that the two bills, as they stood at that point, did not reflect the de-
sires of many businessmen who, in the years immediately following 
the 1911 decision in the Standard Oil case, wanted a commission 
which would advise them of the legality of their business practices.26 
Indeed, creation of a body with such functions was deemed unwise.27 
Clayton Act enforcement in part to the FTC. He asked for prompt enactment of the 
commission bill so that the Judiciary Committee could then consider the FTC as an 
existing body. 51 CONG. REC. 11,536 (1914). Others expressed the desire that no action 
be taken on H.R. 15,613 until H.R. 15,657 was reported out. Id. (remarks of Senator 
Lippitt). 
22. H.R. 15,613, as passed by the House, appears at 51 CONG. REc. 12,795-96 (1914). 
23. A number of amendments to this effect were offered and rejected by the chair. 
See 51 CoNG. REc. 9059-67 (1914). The most significant, offered by Congressman Stevens, 
would have amended H.R. 15,613 to state that "unfair or oppressive competition in 
commerce is hereby declared unlawful.'' The Stevens amendment would have authorized 
entry of a "restraining and prohibiting order," to be enforced by order of a federal 
district court upon petition of the FTC. 51 CONG. REc. 9059-60 (1914). The Stevens 
amendment is of import as the predecessor of the FTC Act as finally enacted. In June 
1914 President Wilson became converted to the basic idea of the Stevens bill (H.R. 
15,660, from which the amendment proposed to H.R. 15,613 was taken). See G. HENDER· 
SON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 26 (1924); Austern, The Parentage and Adminis-
trative Ontogeny of the Federal Trade Commission, in N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N ANTITRUST 
LAW SYMPOSIUM 83, 85-88 (1955). 
Another amendment, offered by Congressman Morgan, would have made violation 
of an FTC order a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not to exceed $5,000. It is not, 
therefore, entirely accurate to conclude that "the first suggestion that orders should 
be final when entered was made in 1933.'' Louis, The Scope and Enforcement of Robin• 
son-Patman Act Cease and Desist Orders, IO VILL. L. REv. 457, 459 n.15 (1965). 
24. During debate, an inquiry was made as to "why the trade commission was not 
given specific power to enforce a provision like that of Section 2 .•. .'' 51 CONG. REc. 
9069 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Cooper). The reply was that the trade commission 
bill had been developed by a different committee and in any event the proposed bill 
imposed criminal sanctions. Id. at 9069 (remarks of Congressman Webb). 
25. Sections 2, 4, 8, and 9 of H.R. 15657, as it originally passed the House, were the 
predecessors of the substantive prohibitions in §§ 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act as 
finally enacted. Each of these provisions carried its own criminal sanctions. Section 13 
of the original bill provided for equitable suits under the direction of the Attorney 
General. Treble damage actions were authorized by § 5. See the description of these 
provisions in 51 CONG. REc. 9068-74 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Webb). 
26. See the discussion in G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 21-22 
(1924); W. HOLT, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 6-7 (1922). 
27, See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 8840-41 (remarks of Congressman Covington).~ 
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The trade commission bill, as reported out of committee in the 
Senate, was markedly changed. Section 5 of the bill declared "unfair 
competition" unlawful, directed the Commission to prevent the use 
of "unfair methods of competition," and empowered the Commis-
sion to enter orders "restraining and prohibiting the use of the 
same." Upon a finding that its order had not been complied with, 
the Commission was authorized to seek an enforcement order in fed-
eral district court. 28 
Much of the Senate debate concentrated on the meaning of the 
phrase "unfair methods of competition." Section 5 of the bill was 
criticized as an improper delegation of legislative and judicial 
power.29 Such attacks were generally met by drawing the compari-
son between the proposed trade commission and the existing Inter-
state Commerce Commission30 and by repeated emphasis on the 
inability of the commission itself to impose sanctions.31 Since sanc-
tions could be imposed only by a court, for violation of a court 
order, judicial power was not really delegated at all. The enforce-
ment provisions thus became an integral and necessary part of the 
argument in support of section 5. 
There was little debate over the enforcement provisions them-
selves. Those who supported the bill accepted them and relied on 
their presence. Those who attacked the bill concentrated on the 
substantive prohibitions of section 5. Congress was not blind to 
defects in the court enforcement procedure. The procedure was 
criticized;32 alternatives were suggested.33 But the general attitude 
of Congress was reflected in a significant statement by Senator New-
lands, chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, early in 
the Senate debate: 
28. The Senate substitute appears at 51 CONG. REc. 10,377-78 (1914). The accom-
panying report, S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), appears in id. at 11,086-99. 
29. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 11,113-15 (remarks of Senator Reed), 12,216 (remarks of 
Senator Sterling), 12,651-52 (remarks of Senator Sutherland) (1914). 
30. See, e.g., 11,231 (remarks of Senator Robinson), 51 CONG. REc. 12,142 (remarks 
of Senator Hollis), 12,220 (remarks of Senator Newlands), 13,004 (remarks of Senator 
Cummins) (1914). 
31. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 12,145 (remarks of Senator Hollis), 12,652 (remarks of 
Senator Cummins), 14,932 (remarks of Congressman Covington) (1914). 
32. The most scathing criticism came from Senator Reed who attacked the "three 
bites at the apple" procedure contained in the bill as finally enacted in the following 
terms: 
Who has ever heard of creating a commission to determine, first, whether a 
man has been guilty of committing burglary, then to order him to stop, then to 
give him a right to appeal to a court, and in the end if he be defeated to solemnly 
adjudge that he must now stop? Why should a man hesitate to commit burglary 
with such a law as that? If he succeeds in escaping with the goods, wares and 
chattels of his victim and is not detected he is so much the profiter. If he is de-
tected all he has to do is lay down the swag and seek other windows and other 
doors. 
51 CONG. REc. 14,790 (1914). 
33. See note 23 supra. 
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Now, I will state that throughout this bill, so far as I am indi-
vidually concerned, I have not been disposed to suggest extreme 
penalties. I thought it only fair that, inasmuch as this was a new 
provision of law, to be tested through this tribunal the parties 
brought before it, at all events in the earlier stages, should have the 
opportunity without facing the penitentiary to assert their rights, 
or what they claim to be their rights, either before the commission or 
before the courts, and that the penalty should be imposed only in 
case of disobedience to the order of the courts. Of course we could 
have put a provision in the bill that after an order was made by the 
commission every day's failure to comply with it would involve a fine 
of a thousand dollars a day or a hundred dollars a day or whatever 
else we might make it, or perhaps imprisonment.84 
The bill initially passed by the Senate declared "unfair competi-
tion in commerce" unlawful and directed the Commission, upon a 
finding of violation, to enter an order requiring that the offender 
"cease and desist from such unfair competition." If the offender 
did not cease and desist, and the order had not been set aside, the 
commission was empowered to seek an enforcement decree in fed-
eral district court. The court was to apply "the law and rules ap-
plicable to suits in equity." No penalty for violation of the court's 
order was established.35 
The Senate took up the Clayton bill after passage of the com-
mission bill. Senator Newlands had indicated during debate of the 
latter that the Clayton bill might entrust antitrust enforcement, at 
least in part, to the Commission.36 While the bill reported out of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee made few changes in the House ver-
sion,37 the Committee ultimately proposed an amendment giving 
the agency enforcement powers with respect to the substantive pro-
visions of the bill and incorporating by reference the enforcement 
provisions contained in the trade commission bill.38 Before Senate 
34. 51 CoNG. REc. ll,ll2 (1914) (emphasis added). 
35. The original Senate version of H.R. 15,613 is set out in 51 CONG. REc. 14,923-24 
(1914). Section 5 of the bill as passed by the Senate is the result of the so-called Cum-
mins amendment, adopted on the floor in preference to the Pomerene amendment, 
which had been accepted by the Interstate Commerce Committee. While there were 
a number of differences between these amendments, the most important related to the 
weight to be given FTC findings in subsequent enforcement and review proceedings. 
The Pomerene amendment simply made FTC findings "prima facie evidence." The 
Cummins amendment, by reference to the Interstate Commerce Act, purported to give 
greater weight to the FTC's findings and orders, restricting the scope of review. For 
the Pomerene amendment, see 51 CONG. REc. 12,993, 13,103 (1914). The Cummins 
amendment appears in id. at 13,045. 
36. 51 CoNG. REc. II,536, 12,028-31 (1914). 
37. H.R. 15,657, as originally reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, appears 
in 51 CoNG. REc. 13,659-61 (1914). See G. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 27-33. 
38. The amendment initially proposed by the committee, in the form of a new 
§ 9(b) in H.R. 15,657, followed the language of the Pomerene amendment to § 5 of the 
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passage, the bill was again amended to set out those provisions in 
full.s9 
Little of the tortuous history of the Clayton bill in the Senate 
is relevant to the present study. Most of the debate focused on the 
need for specific substantive prohibitions, in light of the general 
prohibition against unfair competition in the commission bill, and 
on the elimination of criminal sanctions.40 Defects in the proposed 
enforcement machinery were again pointed out, although it is not 
clear that such complaints would have been made had criminal 
sanctions not been removed from the bill.41 Significantly, in light 
of subsequent FTC practice in the drafting of orders,42 it was sug-
gested that while the proposed procedures might be a legitimate 
means of enforcing section 5 where it was "hard to distinguish 
whether [conduct] was right or ,vrong," there was no reason to 
enforce the specific prohibitions of the Clayton bill in such a man-
ner. 43 
Both bills assumed their final form in conference committee.44 
For the first time, express provision was made for review of FTC 
orders in the court of appeals on petition by the respondent. The 
forum for enforcement proceedings at the behest of the FTC was 
changed from district court to the court of appeals "in order to 
trade commission bill, which the Senate rejected when it accepted the Cummins 
amendment. See note 35 supra. The committee then immediately sought to amend the 
amendment by striking most of the detailed enforcement and review procedures and 
adding a paragraph incorporating the procedures in § 5 of the trade commission bill 
by reference. See 51 CONG. REc. 14,223-24 (1914). 
39. The final amendment appears at 51 CONG. REc. 14,321 (1914). Placing the en-
forcement provisions of H.R. 15,613 into H.R. 15,657 almost verbatim was thought 
preferable to incorporating those provisions by reference because the Senate's version 
of H.R. 15,657 had not yet passed the House. See 51 CONG. REc. 14,321 (1914) (remarks 
of Senator Walsh). It is clear, however, that the overriding concern was to insure that 
the enforcement machinery in both bills was the same. See id. at 14,225, 14,323 (re-
marks of Senator Walsh), 14,227 (remarks of Senator Cummins) (1914). 
40. H.R. 16,567, as passed by the Senate, deleted § 2 of the House bill (price dis-
crimination), and substantially modified the exclusive dealing provision, enacting 
instead a provision directed toward tie-ins involving patented articles. Criminal sanc-
tions for violations of all substantive provisions, except the provision dealing with 
tie-ins, were eliminated, and enforcement responsibility was given to the FTC. See G. 
HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 29-33. 
41. Senator Reed continued to be the most vocal critic, condemning the delay and 
general ineffectiveness of the proposed procedures. He would apparently have been 
satisfied if criminal sanctions were available as an additional or alternative remedy. 
51 CoNG. REc. 14,225-28, 14,251 (1914) (remarks of Senator Reed). See also id. at 14,262 
(remarks of Senator Borah). 
42. See text accompanying note 2'72 infra. 
43. 51 CONG. REc. 14,269 (1914) (remarks of Senator Reed). 
44. The conference version of the trade commission bill appears in 51 CONG, REc. 
14,919-21 (1914). The conference revisions of the commission enforcement procedures 
in the Clayton bill appear in id. at 15,637-40. 
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obtain the speediest settlement of disputed questions."45 While this 
change seemed reasonable and was not sufficiently controversial to 
warrant further discussion on the floor, it contributed directly to 
the over-all ineffectiveness of the enacted procedures by requiring 
an appellate court to make an original finding of fact-that the 
FTC's order had been violated-before the court could proceed 
further.46 
The FTC enforcement procedures were severely criticized as 
cumbersome and ineffective in both houses during debate on the 
two conference reports. As during the initial Senate debate, such 
criticism invariably accompanied complaints about the absence of 
criminal sanctions from the Clayton bill.47 Supporters of the legis-
lation continued to emphasize that court enforcement proceedings 
prior to the imposition of penalties were designed to eliminate con-
stitutional obstacles.48 The conference reports on both bills were 
ultimately accepted by both houses. 
The ever-present temptation to draw sweeping generalizations 
from bits and snatches of legislative history must be resisted here, 
given the chaotic nature of the reports and debates. But it is clear 
that the enforcement procedures in both statutes are compromises, 
dictated both by political and constitutional considerations. In the 
FTC Act, those who wanted a commission with regulatory and en-
forcement powers were unwilling to give a wholly new agency pow-
ers which did not rely directly on the judiciary. Opposition would 
undoubtedly have been far greater had a more summary procedure 
been part of the bill. The Clayton Act enforcement provision re-
flected both a compromise over criminal penalty and an attempt 
to synchronize enforcement. Neither statute was designed to create 
or utilize a commission for advice-giving or conduct-approving pur-
poses. 
The feature of the "three bites" procedure which ultimately 
was to prove most troublesome was the "second bite"-the provi-
sion permitting the FTC to seek enforcement only upon a showing 
that its own order had been violated. There is nothing in the his-
tory, other than references to the Interstate Commerce Act, to sug-
45. CONFERENCE REP. No. 1142, 63d Gong., 2d Sess. (1914), appearing in 51 CONG. 
REC. 14,919-24 (1914). 
46. See text accompanying notes 97-103 infra. 
47. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REv. 15,827-29 (1914) (remarks of Senators Reed and Borah), 
15,858-68 (remarks of Senator Reed), 16,045 (remarks of Senator Norris), 16,281 (re-
marks of Congressman Volstead), 16,325 (remarks of Congressman Nelson), 16,327 (re-
marks of Congressman Mondell) (1914). 
48. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 14,932 (remarks of Congressman Covington), 14,938 (re-
marks of Congressman Stevens) (1914). 
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gest why this step was thought necessary. Later legislation permit-
ting other agencies to seek enforcement without such a showing 
has worked reasonably well. One can speculate that had the enforce-
ment provisions in 1914 not contained such a requirement the legis-
lative changes of 1938 and 1959 might have been unnecessary. 
b. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938: amendment of section 5. The 
Wheeler-Lea Act of 193849 made substantial changes in both the 
substantive and procedural provisions of the FTC Act but left the 
Clayton Act untouched. From 1938 until the amendment of the 
Clayton Act in 1959, therefore, orders entered under section 5 of 
the FTC Act were enforced pursuant to the Wheeler-Lea civil pen-
. alty procedures, while Clayton Act orders remained subject to the 
procedures enacted in 1914. Under the Wheeler-Lea section 5 re-
visions, cease and desist orders became :final upon expiration of the 
sixty days allowed for seeking review, or at defined times thereafter 
if review had been sought. Persons violating orders after they had 
become final were subject to a civil penalty suit brought by the 
United States in federal district court. The maximum recovery in 
such an action was set at $5,000 for each violation. No provision 
was made in the 1938 revision for FTC enforcement actions in 
courts of appeals. Orders outstanding on Wheeler-Lea's effective 
date were made subject to the revised enforcement procedures. 
The 1938 revisions in the section 5 enforcement machinery, 
revisions made applicable to Clayton Act orders in 1959, were not 
those initially sought by the FTC. The FTC had recommended 
passage of legislation (1) eliminating proof of violation of the FTC 
order as a prerequisite to court enforcement; (2) directing the court 
of appeals to enter its mm enforcement order whenever it affirmed 
the FTC's order; and (3) making the FTC's order final, with viola-
tion thereof punishable as contempt, if the respondent did not seek 
court review.50 A bill embodying these limited recommendations 
passed the Senate in 1936, but died in committee in the House.51 
The Senate bill was subsequently re-introduced in 1937,52 and, after 
extensive amendment, was enacted as the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938. 
Somewhere between the introduction of the Senate bill and final 
49. Act of March 21, 1938, § 3, 52 Stat. lll (1938). 
50. 1935 FTC ANN. REP. 15; 1936 FTC ANN. REP. 17; 1937 FTC ANN. REP. 15. It has 
been suggested that the FTC's request was motivated by the fact that the National 
Labor Relations Board, established in 1935 with enforcement powers ostensibly pat-
terned after those of the FTC, was given authority to seek judicial enforcement with-
out proof that its own order had been violated. I.ouis, supra note 3, at 460 n.28. 
51. S. 3744, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1936). 
52. S. 1077, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. § 2 (1937). 
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passage, the nature and purpose of the now familiar civil penalty 
scheme changed and it assumed its present form. 
The bill, as introduced, reported, and passed by the Senate, did 
not eliminate court of appeals enforcement as the primary method 
of securing compliance. It authorized the FTC to seek an enforce-
ment order whenever it had "reason to believe that [respondent] 
has failed or neglected to obey, or intends or is about to disobey" 
its order, and it directed the court to enter its own enforcement 
order directing compliance with the FTC's order to the extent such 
order was affirmed.53 The bill expressly stated that proof of viola-
tion of the FTC's order was not to be a condition precedent to 
the entry of an enforcement order. If no review was sought within 
sixty days, the FTC order became "final and conclusive." Violation 
of such an order subjected the violator to a civil penalty suit by 
the United States. The penalty was set at $500 for each offense and 
$25 for each day it continued. The Senate committee reported that 
these finality and civil penalty provisions were patterned on the 
provisions of the Packers and Stockyards Act.54 
The civil penalty procedures, applying only to orders as to which 
no review was sought, were intended only to supplement and not 
to replace court of appeals enforcement. Indeed, the main thrust 
of the amendments was to facilitate court of appeals enforcement 
by elimination of "the second bite at the apple." The stated pur-
pose of the civil penalty procedure was simply "to prevent a respon-
dent playing fast and loose with the Commission's order, neither 
obeying nor asking the court to set it aside."65 
By the time the bill reached the floor of the House the enforce-
ment provisions had been changed. The bill, as reported out by 
53. The FTC's explanation of this provision was that it was necessary to resolve 
a dispute among the circuits as to whether a court of appeals could consider the basic 
validity of the FTC's order prior to the finding of violation needed to support the 
entry of an enforcement order. S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936); S. REP. 
No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1937). Compare FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 598 (1928), with FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 14 F.2d 947 (7th 
Cir. 1926). See the discussion of these cases in Kauper, supra note 16. The FTC's fur-
ther suggestion that the Second Circuit had done away with the requirement of viola-
tion as a prerequisite to entry of an enforcement order altogether, and that S. 1077 
simply reflects this position, reflects an inaccurate reading of the Balme case, as later 
decisions of the same court make clear. See, e.g., FTC v. Herzog, 150 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
54. S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. REP. No. 211, 75th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 7 (1937). The Packers and Stockyards Act then made unappealed orders final, 
and violation subjected the offender to heavy fine or imprisonment. 
55. S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. REP. No. 211, 75th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 7 (1937). See also testimony of Commissioner Davis, Hearings on H.R. 3143 To 
Amend the Federal Trade Commission Act Before the House Comm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-20, 56-58 (1937). 
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the House committee and as finally enacted into law, eliminated 
all reference to the earlier judicial enforcement procedures, except 
for an anachronistic provision directing the court of appeals to 
enter an enforcement decree to the extent it affirmed the FTC's 
order. The civil penalty procedure was made applicable to FTC 
orders which were reviewed and affirmed as well as to those which 
were never taken to the courts. The maximum penalty recoverable 
in a civil penalty action was changed to $5,000. In short, the civil 
penalty procedure became a substitute for, rather than a supplement 
to, the existing enforcement scheme. 
The House committee never gave a detailed explanation of 
these amendments to the Senate bill. 56 Substantial revision of the 
Food and Drug Act was under consideration, and extensive hear-
ings had been held before the same House committee which con-
sidered Wheeler-Lea.57 One of the critical questions throughout 
those hearings was whether responsibility for the control of false 
advertising of food, drugs, and cosmetics should be with the FTC, 
and, if so, whether it needed added powers. There was public de-
mand for severe penalties. The committee resolved this issue, in 
part, by using Wheeler-Lea as a vehicle to add a number of new 
sections dealing with the advertising of food, drugs, and cosmetics 
to the FTC Act.58 There was strong objection to these new sections 
-which relied on control through the use of section 5 cease and 
desist orders-on the grounds that the penalty was inadequate and 
the cease and desist order procedures were time-consuming and 
historically ineffective.59 There can be no doubt that the committee 
changes in the existing procedures were to some extent responsive 
to this criticism and were made primarily to deal with false adver-
tising as such.60 Yet the fact remains, as others have observed, that 
56. The Committee did continue to state that the finality and civil penalty proce-
dures were patterned upon the Packer and Stockyards Act, as well as upon the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937). The 
analogy to the Packers and Stockyards Act was no longer perfect, as that statute 
attributed finality only to orders which were not reviewed. See Austern, Five Thousand 
Dollars a Day, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 285, 290 n.17 (1962). 
57. Hearings on Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). 
58. S. 1077, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1937) (as reported by House Committee). These 
provisions became §§ 12-18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-58 (1964). See 83 CONG. 
REc. 397-99 (1938) (remarks of Congressman Reece). 
59. See, e.g., Statement of Additional Views, H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 23-28 (1937); 83 CONG. REc. 394-95 (remarks of Congressman Kenney), 399-400 (re-
marks of Congressman Chapman) (1938). 
60. Thus the House Committee itself stated, with respect to the procedural amend-
ments, that "[t]he amendments proposed further provide for a more effective preven-
tion of misleading advertisements by procedural changes under cease and desist orders 
as now practiced." H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1937) (emphasis added). 
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the procedural changes received little attention. 61 They were not 
even the changes requested by the FTC. 
c. $5,000 per day: the Oleomargarine Act of 1950. The final 
amendment to the FTC Act section 5 enforcement procedures, con-
tained in the Oleomargarine Act of 1950,62 provided that each sep-
arate violation of a final order was a separate offense (and therefore 
subject to a maximum civil penalty of $5,000), "except that in the 
case of a violation through continuing failure or neglect ... each 
day of continuance of such failure or neglect shall be deemed a 
separate offense."63 This provision, which after its embodiment in 
the Clayton Act in 1959 became the basis for much of the recent 
furor over FTC orders,64 was enacted in a most cavalier way. An 
addition to section 5(1) of the FTC Act, it was originally offered 
on the floor of the Senate during debate on the bill as originally 
passed by the House and was adopted without debate.65 The mat-
ter was the subject of debate in the House, where attention was 
called to the "sleeper" in the Senate version.66 The House debate 
reflected more concern over the propriety of the provision in a bill 
concerned with oleomargarine than over the necessity for or sig-
nificance of the provision itself.67 The FTC entered the fray in de-
fense of the amendment, with the explanation that it was needed 
because some long-continuing violations were in fact but single 
offenses under the existing provisions and could not be deterred by 
imposition of a single $5,000 penalty. Moreover, the FTC pointed 
out that the bill set only a maximum penalty; the actual amount 
of the penalty rested with the court.68 
The House accepted the bill with the Senate amendment. The 
61. Austem, supra note 56, at 289-90; Louis, supra note 23, at 460-61. 
62. 64 Stat. 20 (1950). 
63. FTC Act § 5(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(2) (1964). 
64. See text accompanying notes 91-94 infra. 
65. 96 CONG. REc. 333 (1950). 
66. After the passage of the bill in the Senate, members of both houses received 
communications from various groups protesting the inclusion of the "sleeper" in the 
bill. One such protest apparently came from the Section on Antitrust Law of the New 
York State Bar Association. See 96 CoNG. REG. 3024 (1950) (remarks of Senator Wherry). 
See also id. at 2973 (remarks of Congressman Cooley), 3019 (remarks of Senator George). 
Supporters of the legislation were by this time armed with letters from the FTC's Chief 
of Compliance and General Counsel, which were presented in full during the House 
debate. 96 CONG. REc. 2974 (1950). 
67. See 96 CoNG. REc. 2973 (remarks of Congressman Michener), 2975 (remarks of 
Congressman Halleck) (1950). 
68. See the letters referred to in note 66 supra. The FTC also explained that "the 
principal value of the amendment would be in the field of price fixing and continuing 
conspiracies in restraint of trade,'' i.e., not in connection with deceptive advertising 
at all. In such cases, a single $5,000 penalty was thought inadequate. Id. 
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Senate did likewise, after further debate on the conference report.60 
The "$5,000 per day" formula was thus enacted without hearings, 
not because the FTC asked for it but because a number of legis-
lators felt that without it oleomargarine producers might decep-
tively advertise their product as a dairy product.70 While Congress 
was aware that the provision was not limited to orders dealing in 
some way with "oleo," no serious consideration was given to its 
over-all significance.71 
d. Civil penalties under Clayton Act: Finality Act of 1959. The 
FTC began formally recommending legislation making the Wheeler-
Lea procedures applicable to Clayton Act orders in 1946.72 Its re-
quest was repeated regularly thereafter.73 The passage of the penalty 
amendment in the Oleomargarine Act of 1950 did not alter the 
FTC's request for legislation which would simply provide, for Clay-
ton Act orders, "the same degree of finality and the same penalty 
provisions that are provided for orders under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act."74 Presumably, what was good for FTC Act orders 
was therefore good for Clayton Act orders as well. 
The FTC's recommendations were finally enacted into law by 
the Finality Act of 1959.75 The net effect was to substitute the pro-
69. During the further Senate debate, Senator Aiken, who had introduced the 
provision on the Senate floor, stated that he had been concerned that an oleomargarine 
producer could advertise his product as "a butter product" for a "license" fee of $5,000. 
He had then requested the FTC's General Counsel to draft legislation to deal with 
the problem. The provision he introduced was thus prepared by the FTC and trans-
mitted to him. Senator Aiken denied that the amendment was a "sleeper," stating that 
he knew it applied to all commodities and that he himself had in mind misrepresenta-
tion of maple syrup. See 96 CONG. REc. 3025-26 (1950) (remarks of Senator Aiken). 
Supporters of the legislation also suggested that the bill would work no real hard-
ship because penalties would be imposed only on those who deliberately and "with 
their eyes open," violated a FTC order which itself was entered only after a full hear-
ing. See 96 CONG. REc. 3019 (1950) (remarks of Senator George). 
70. See note 69 supra. See also 96 CONG. REc. 2981 (remarks of Congressman Poage), 
3019 (remarks of Senator George) (1950). It was also suggested that the amendment was 
offered simply to obtain votes against the bill. See id. at 2973 (remarks of Congressman 
Michener). 
71. The legislative history of this provision is discussed in more detail in Austcrn, 
supra note 56, at 291-93. See also Louis, supra note 23, at 461; REPORT OF THE Arr'Y 
GEN. NAT'L COMM. To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 372-73 (1955). 
72. 1946 FTC ANN. REP. 12. 
73. 1958 FTC ANN. REP. 7; 1952 FTC ANN. REP. 3; 1951 FTC ANN. REP. 7-8; 1948 
FTC ANN. REP. 12; 1947 FTC ANN. REP. 13. See also Kelley, Should the Law of Sec-
tion 2 Be Revised?, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYMPOSIUM 114, 118-19 
(1948). The Attorney General's Committee recommended the passage of such legislation 
only "when the presently exorbitant Federal Trade Commission Act penalty provisions 
have been reduced and the Commission makes more specific its orders, particularly in 
Clayton Act Section 2 cases." REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. To STUDY THE 
ANTITRUST LAws 374 (1955). 
74. 1951 FTC ANN. REP. 7. 
75. 73 Stat. 243 (1959). 
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cedures of Wheeler-Lea, with the 1950 "$5,000 per day" amendment, 
for the original Clayton Act procedures. Twenty-one years after the 
revision of section 5 of the FTC Act, the symmetry contemplated 
by the Congress which initially enacted both statutes was once again 
restored, albeit with a different set of procedures. 
The Finality Act was not hastily enacted. Hearings were held 
in both houses. The opposition to the bill was well organized and 
presented.76 The FTC's position was simple. The "three bites at 
the apple" procedure was cumbersome, costly, and generally inef-
fective. The American Crayon litigation,77 referred to regularly 
throughout the hearings, was a striking illustration of the deficien-
cies of the old procedures. The Ruberoid decision78 had made the 
FTC's burden yet greater by holding that a court of appeals could 
not enter an enforcement order, absent a showing of violation, on 
the FTC's cross-petition when the case was already before the court 
on a petition for review. The best escape from these problems was 
simply to carry over the Wheeler-Lea procedures which, in the judg-
ment of the FTC, had worked well with respect to FTC Act orders. 
While questioning the necessity for change in the existing pro-
cedures,79 opponents of the legislation did not deny that the civil 
penalty procedures were more efficient or effective. Rather, they 
made three basic points: (I) it would force parties to seek review 
of orders in cases where no review had previously been sought; (2) 
76. Prepared statements in opposition were submitted by the Law Department of 
the National Association of Manufacturers, the Antitrust Section of the American Bar 
Association, and the Committee on Trade Regulation of the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York. Hearings on Finality of Clayton Act Orders Before the Antitrust 
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, 93-105 
(1959). Mr. Edgar E. Barton testified on behalf of the last-named group. Id. at 87-93. 
Hearings were held in the Senate on S. 721, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), a bill vir-
tually identical to that enacted in the next session, which passed the Senate but died 
in the House. Hearings on Legislation Afjecting Sections 7, 11 and 15 of the Clayton 
Act Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). 
77. The history of the American Crayon litigation, FTC No. 4142, is set out in 
detail in House Hearings, supra note 76, at 37-38. An order rising out of viola-
tions of §§ 2(a) and (d) of the Clayton Act, as amended, was entered in 1940. An in-
vestigation into compliance was initiated in 1948 after complaints had been received. 
A petition for enforcement was filed in 1951. The court of appeals finally entered an 
enforcement order, after two decisions on the matter by the Supreme Court, in 1957. 
Only at this point did further violation subject the company to direct sanctions. 
78. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). The legislative reports accompanying 
S. 726 (Finality Act) emphasize the difficulties ostensibly created by Ruberoid. H.R. 
REP. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959); S. REP. No. 83, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959). 
79. Opponents of the legislation were quick to point out that the FTC had brought 
but two enforcement proceedings under § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended, between 
1936 and 1959. Hearings, supra note 76, at 89. At least one additional enforcement 
proceeding was then pending. See Louis, The Scope and Enforcement of Robinson-
Patman Act Cease and Desist Orders, IO VILL. L. REv. 457, 462, n.48 (1965). 
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the penalty was too severe for the offense committed; (3) automatic 
finality and substantial civil penalties were singularly inappropriate 
with respect to the vague and overly broad orders of the type typ-
ically entered by the FTC under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act. 
While it is the last point which is of greatest concern here, the 
first point requires some explanation. Under the old procedure, a 
party subject to an order could attack its validity or propriety at 
any time. Indeed, these questions could be raised for the first time 
when the FTC sought enforcement. As a result, a party could wait 
until the order began to pinch before taking steps to have it set 
aside or modified. The new procedures, however, required review 
within sixty days. Otherwise, all chance to have the order modified 
or set aside was lost, for the district court could not consider the 
validity or propriety of the order in civil penalty proceedings. 
Critics therefore asserted that the new procedures would force re-
view on many firms who felt the order might at some future time 
be unduly inhibiting. The more broad and vague the order, the 
more likely that review would be sought. This would place un-
necessary litigation expense on small firms and add to the work 
load of the courts of appeals. But the FTC saw elimination of "de-
layed" review as one of the reasons for enactment of the legislation. 
In the words of the FTC representative, the respondent "should not 
be allowed to sit back, possibly for years, and then not only contest 
the charges of a new violation, but be in a position to challenge all 
of the aspects of the original case upon which the Commission's 
order was based, as well as that order itself."8° Congress agreed. 
Most of the objection to the Finality Act derived from the type 
of orders entered by the FTC in section 2(a) cases.81 By 1959, the 
broad Ruberoid type order had become commonplace.82 Such orders 
had all the imprecision of the statutory language which they incor-
porated. And despite the decision in Ruberoid, there was great 
uncertainty about the extent to which the statutory defenses-meet-
ing competition and cost justification-would be available in civil 
penalty proceedings. Pricing decisions by parties subject to order 
80. Hearings, supra note 76, at 19. 
81. Virtually no mention was made of orders entered under the other substantive 
provisions of the Clayton Act. This is not surprising since the FTC had not entered 
many § 3 orders, and experience with § 7, as amended in 1950, was still relatively un-
developed. There was therefore no consideration of the appropriateness of civil penalty 
enforcement procedures in connection with § 7 divestiture orders, and no suggestion 
that the enforcement of orders under one section called for analysis of factors different 
from those under another. 
82. See notes 321-22 infra and accompanying text. For the wording of the order, see 
text accompanying note 266. 
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would therefore be made at great risk, for the cost of being wrong 
was a civil penalty suit. The vagueness of orders, coupled with the 
penalty provision, created what was essentially a due process issue. 
The breadth of the orders maximized the extent of the risk. 
These same arguments are even today frequently heard in con-
tests over particular orders. The same is true of the FTC's responses. 
First, the Supreme Court had upheld the Ruberoid order without 
modification. There was therefore no basis for the claim that such 
orders were improper. (The Court had not, of course, examined 
the Ruberoid order in the setting of the new procedures). Second, 
the question of drafting of orders was to be resolved on a case-by-
case basis: the appropriateness of particular orders was not relevant 
to mode of enforcement. Third, the FTC, through informal guid-
ance and compliance procedures, would both counsel the respon-
dent who had bona fide doubts about the meaning of the order and 
forewarn those believed to be in violation. Fourth, the "$5,000 per 
day" formulation simply set a maximum penalty. The FTC and 
Department of Justice would not seek, and the courts would not 
assess, exorbitant or unreasonable penalties.83 Whether or not the 
FTC's arguments were responsive to the objections raised, they 
were accepted by Congress, which passed the bill with little debate. 
But the legislative reports did take cognizance of the asserted de-
ficiencies in FTC orders, stating that "[t]he committee intends that 
the commissions and boards affected by the bill will make a con-
tinuous effort to issue orders that are as definitive as possible."84 
The opposition to the Finality Act thus brought a congressional 
response and thereby planted the seeds which developed into the 
now famous dictum in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.85 
The Finality Act had one remarkable deficiency. It contained 
no provision making the civil penalty procedures applicable to 
orders entered before its effective date, July 23, 1959, and yet it 
seemed to repeal the existing provisions conferring jurisdiction on 
the courts of appeals to entertain FTC petitions for enforcement.86 
This deficiency is all the more remarkable because the Wheeler-
83. These assertions appear at various points in the testimony of representatives 
of the FTC. Hearings, supra note 76, at 15-35. 
84. H.R. REP. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1959). See also S. REP. No. 83, 86th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959), 
85. 368 U.S. 360 (1962). 
86. The enacting language of the Finality Act provides that "the third, fourth, fifth, 
sixth and seventh paragraphs of such section [section 11] are amended to read as fol-
lows . • •. " The questions of repeal, and the possible application of the General Sav-
ings Statute [l U.S.C. § 109 (1964)] are discussed in Kauper, FTC v. Jantzen: Blessing, 
Disaster or Tempest in a Teapot?, 64 MICH. L. Rev. 1523 (1966); Note, 34 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 939 (1966). 
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Lea Act, upon which the 1959 legislation was patterned, expressly 
provided that its civil penalty procedures were applicable to exist-
ing orders. 87 
It was quickly established that Finality Act procedures cannot 
be applied to orders entered prior to July 23, 1959,88 and in FTC 
v. Jantzen, Inc.,89 the Supreme Court concluded, on grounds that 
are unclear, that the "old" procedures were applicable to such or-
ders. But the opinion creates a new question, namely, whether 
orders entered after July 23, 1959 on FTC complaints issued before 
that date are also to be enforced through the old procedure.9° For 
most cases, however, it is enough to state that orders outstanding 
at the time of enactment of the Finality Act may be enforced only 
through the "three bites" procedure. 
2. A Comparison of the Old and New Enforcement Procedures 
The detailed consideration of the "old" and "new" procedures 
which follows sets the framework for the later examination of the 
scope of orders and also deals with some of the problems inherent 
in these procedures for their own sake. More important, however, 
such a comparison is essential to evaluation of the dictum in FTC 
v. Henry Broch & Co.,91 which underlies much of the contemporary 
debate about Clayton Act orders. 
87. Act of March 21, 1938, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 117: 
In case of an order by the Federal Trade Commission to cease and desist, served 
on or before the date of enactment of this Act, the sixty day period referred to in 
section 5(c) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended by this act, shall 
begin on the date of enactment of this Act. 
The period referred to was that provided for seeking review after the entry of an order 
by the FTC. 
88. Sperry Rand Corp. v. FTC, 288 F.2d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The Supreme Court 
has twice indicated its approval of the Sperry Rand decision. See FTC v. Henry Broch 
&: Co., 368 U.S. 360, 365 n.5 (1962); FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., 386 U.S. 228, 234 (1967). 
89. 386 U.S. 228 (1967). 
90. The Court's decision rests primarily on a strained interpretation of a savings 
clause within the statute, which provided that the new procedures were inapplicable 
and that the old procedures should be applied "to any proceedings initiated before 
the date of enactment of this Act under the third or fourth paragraph of Section 11 
of the [Clayton] Act." Finality Act of 1959, § 2, 73 Stat. 243. 
The third and fourth paragraphs referred to provide for judicial proceedings on 
petitions for enforcement or review. The Court rejected the obvious construction, 
namely that the old procedures were applicable where review or enforcement had been 
sought prior to July 23, 1959, concluding that the word "proceeding" referred to the 
proceeding as initiated by the FTC. While the Court speaks throughout its opinion 
of orders entered prior to July 1959, its construction of the saving clause makes the 
date of FTC's complaint the critical date. It is therefore unclear whether the new 
procedures, old procedures, or both are applicable to orders entered after July 23, 
1959, on complaints entered before that date. The FTC has already recovered civil 
penalties in several such cases. See Kauper, supra note 86, at 1524 n.10. 
91. 368 U.S. 360 (1962). 
April 1968] Cease and Desist 1115 
In Broch a broker violated section 2(c) of the Clayton Act by 
reducing his normal brokerage commission to induce Smucker, a 
buyer, to buy a large quantity of apple concentrate from Canada 
Foods, one of the broker's principals. The first portion of the order 
was narrowly confined to the specific conduct involved in the find-
ings of violation, although it prohibited such conduct in connection 
with the sales to "any" buyer for "any" seller principal.92 The sec-
ond portion of the order prohibited the broker "[i]n any other 
manner" from paying or allowing any buyer "anything of value as 
a commission, brokerage or other compensation or any allowance 
or discount in lieu thereof" on sales to such a buyer for its own 
account. The court of appeals limited both parts of the order to 
acts in connection with sales between Canada Foods and Smucker. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a ban against repetition 
of the broker's conduct in transactions between any buyer and any 
seller was within the FTC's discretion. 
The Court noted that the Finality Act procedures were inap-
plicable to this 1957 order, and that Broch was therefore subject 
to penalties only for violation "of an enforcement order yet to be 
entered by an appropriate Court of Appeals, to be predicated upon 
a determination that some particular practice of Broch violated the 
Commission's order." Hence, no penalty could be imposed "with-
out further administrative and judicial consideration and inter-
pretation." The Court then went on: 
Upon any future enforcement proceedings, the Commission and 
the Court of Appeals will have already at hand interpretative tools 
-the employment of which we have previously sanctioned-for use 
in tailoring the order, in the setting of specific asserted violations, so 
as to meet the legitimate needs of the case. They will be free to con-
strue the order as designed strictly to cope with the threat of future 
violations identical with or like or related to the violations which 
Broch was found to have committed, or as forbidding "no activities 
except those which if continued would directly aid in perpetuating 
the same old unlawful practices." Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement 
Institute .... They need not-as we have already made clear-read 
the order as denying to Broch the benefit of statutory defenses or 
exceptions .... Nor need the order be construed as prohibiting any-
thing as clearly lawful as a uniform reduction in commissions. And, 
92. Specifically, para. I of the order prohibited respondent from paying any allow-
ance in lieu of brokerage by selling 
at prices reflecting a reduction from the prices at which sales of such foods are 
currently being effected by respondents for [any seller principal] •.• where such 
reduction in price is accompanied by a reduction in the regular rate of commis-
sion, brokerage or other compensation currently being paid to respondents by such 
seller principal for brokerage services. 
368 U.S. at 362 n.4. 
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we repeat, these various interpretive aids will have to be brought to 
bear by a Court of Appeals upon a particular practice of Broch, and 
will have to yield the announced result that such practice violates 
the order, before Broch can be subjected to penalties because of still 
a second repetition of the violation.93 
Finally, the Court described Broch's attempt to restrict the scope 
of the order as "premature." 
The Court's statements concerning the "three bites at the apple" 
procedure and the effect of a cease and desist order are of consid-
erable import, as we shall see. But the part of the opinion which 
has received the most attention is the following gratuitous state-
ment: 
We do not wish to be understood, however, as holding that the 
generalized language of paragraph (2) would necessarily withstand 
scrutiny under th½ 1959 amendments. The severity of possible pen-
alties prescribed by the amendments for violations of orders which 
have become final underlines the necessity for fashioning orders 
which are, at the outset, sufficiently clear and precise to avoid raising 
serious questions as to their meaning and application.94 
The Court did not of course hold that the order would be invali-
dated under the 1959 amendments. It simply raised the question. 
In answering it, the "old" and "new" procedures must be com-
pared. 
a. Enforcement by contempt. The entry of a cease and desist 
order under the pre-1959 Clayton Act and pre-1938 FTC Act pro-
cedures meant little, in and of itself, to firms bent upon violation.00 
It did of course have considerable impact on firms desirous of full 
compliance. Indeed, one of the probable explanations for the fact 
that these enforcement procedures were little used, at least with 
respect to Clayton Act orders, is that many firms complied.96 But 
93. 368 U.S. at 366-67. 
94. 368 U.S. at 367-68. 
95. These procedures are still applicable to pre-1959 Clayton Act orders. FTC v. 
Jantzen, Inc., 368 U.S. 228 (1967). Moreover, since under Wheeler-Lea and the Finality 
Act the court of appeals which affirms an order of the FTC on direct review is required 
to enter its own enforcement decree, the contempt process is available for enforcement 
of all other FTC orders where respondent has sought review and lost. This differs from 
the "old" procedure, however, in that the judicial order is entered without proof that 
the FTC order has been violated. 
96. At the time hearings were held on the Finality Act, the FTC had sought en-
forcement of but three Clayton Act orders. See note 79 supra. There had been but one 
contempt proceeding in connection with a Clayton Act order at that time, and this 
was in a case where the FTC had not independently sought an enforcement order. 
FTC v. Biddle Purchasing Co., 117 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1941). Since that time, enforcement 
has been sought in connection with several other pre-1959 Clayton Act orders. FTC v. 
Jantzen, Inc., 383 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1967); FTC v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 371 
F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1967). And one violator has been convicted of criminal contempt. 
ln re Whitney&: Co., 273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959) (fined $2,000). 
April 1968] Cease and Desist 1117 
until a court enforcement order was secured, no direct sanction for 
violation was present. 
In order to secure judicial enforcement, a violation of the FTC's 
order had to be established.97 This was so even in cases where the 
respondent filed a petition for review and the FTC sought enforce-
ment by cross-petition.98 The difficulties created by this require-
ment are obvious, for the court of appeals, an appellate court, is 
not prepared or equipped to conduct hearings, take evidence, and 
make findings on this preliminary issue. 99 
The FTC's initial practice in seeking enforcement was to allege 
violation and to support the allegation with affidavits or data from 
compliance reports. If the violation was admitted, or the allegation 
of violation was not contested, the court could proceed directly to 
consideration of the validity of the order and the propriety of en-
forcement. But if the allegations of violation were denied, the issue 
was referred to a master or referee, usually the FTC itself, to con-
duct hearings and report its findings. While the FTC commonly 
sought to establish violation by affidavits filed with its enforcement 
petition, the affidavits were generally stricken and were not a basis 
for avoiding a hearing on the violation issue. However, if respon-
dent's compliance reports revealed a violation, or if the facts relat-
ing to the alleged violation were stipulated, the court could make 
its own findings on the violation issue.100 
97. Both statutes provided that the FTC could seek enforcement if the person 
against whom the order was entered "fails or neglects to obey such order." FTC Act 
§ 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914); Clayton Act § II, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). While there have been 
suggestions that a judicial enforcement order can be issued simply on proof that the 
FTC's order "was about to be violated," no enforcement orders have actually been 
issued on that basis. See FTC v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 371 F.2d 613, 615 (2d 
Cir. 1967). 
98. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). Under both Wheeler-Lea and the 
Finality Act, the court is required to enter its own enforcement order if the FTC's 
order is sustained on direct review. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2I(c), 45(c) (1964). Thus, as a "bonus" 
for seeking review, respondent subjects himself to a contempt sanction not otherwise 
present. 
99. This same difficulty will arise when the FTC, under the authority of FTC v. 
Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966), seeks preliminary injunctions under the All Writs 
Act [28 U.S.C. § 165I(a) (1964)) in the court of appeals against corporate acquisitions 
alleged to be in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. See Comment, The FTC's Power 
To Seek Preliminary Injunctions in Anti-Merger Cases, 66 MICH. L. REv. 142, 160-61 
(1967). 
100. There was disagreement among the circuits as to whether, where violation was 
alleged but denied, the court could consider the validity of the order before referring 
the question of violation to the FTC. Compare FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 14 F.2d 
947 (7th Cir. 1926) (calling for proof of violation before any consideration of the order), 
with FTC v. Whitney &: Co., 192 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1951) and FTC v. Herzog, 150 F.2d 
450 (2d Cir. 1945) (giving consideration to the validity of the order and then referring 
the matter to the FTC). 
A more extended discussion of the matters in this note and in the text, together 
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In more recent years, the FTC has conducted investigative hear-
ings on the question of compliance prior to seeking judicial en-
forcement. This ostensibly eliminates the need £or a reference back 
to the FTC. The respondent is entitled to appear, be heard, and 
present evidence. The FTC's enforcement petition has then been 
accompanied by the record of the hearing and the FTC's findings 
of violation, thus permitting the court to resolve that question 
without further hearing. While the procedure seems more efficient 
and has received judicial approval,101 it has become highly for-
malized.102 And in the process of formalization, much of its ad-
vantage over the prior procedure has been lost. In several instances, 
questions concerning the applicability of internal FTC procedures 
in these "investigative" hearings have significantly delayed enforce-
ment.103 
Before the court enters an enforcement decree, it must also 
consider the propriety of the order, just as it would if respondent 
petitioned for review.104 Assuming that violation is established and 
that the order withstands scrutiny, the court will enter its enforce-
ment order, which typically does nothing more than direct com-
with citation to relevant authorities, may be found in Kauper, supra note 86, at 
1536-38. See also C. McFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 74-77 (1933). 
IOI. FTC v. Washington Fish &: Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1959); FTC v. 
Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951). 
102. These development are discussed in detail in Kauper, supra note 86, at 1538-40. 
103. Initially, the FTC conducted "investigational" hearings, pursuant to the in-
vestigational hearing provisions of its rules of practice [now § 2.8 of the FTC Rules of 
Practice, 32 Fed. Reg. 8442, 8447 (1967)]. See FTC v. Washington Fish &: Oyster Co., 
271 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1959). 
But in Nash-Finch Co., 43 F.T.C. 297 (1947), the FTC ordered that a "public in-
vestigational hearing" be held to determine whether its order had been violated, and 
further directed the hearing e.xaminer to proceed "in accordance with the Commission's 
Rules of Practice for adjudicative proceedings insofar as such rules are applicable." 
Respondent protested, asserting that the FTC could not proceed until it clarified the 
nature and purpose of the proceeding, stated the duties of the bearing examiner, and 
promulgated more concrete rules. Ultimately respondent filed a declaratory judgment 
action, asking that the FTC be enjoined from proceeding on these same grounds. 
Relief was denied. Nash-Finch Co. v. FTC, 2!l3 F. Supp. 910 (D.C. Minn. 1964). There-
after, the FTC was required to rule on several other procedural matters. [1965-1967 
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1111 17,247 (memorandum of Commissioner Mac-
Intyre concerning a disqualification motion) (1965), 17,416 (opinion of FTC denying 
motion for production of documents) (FTC 1966). The investigation was ultimately 
closed. Id. at 1f 17,842 (1967). See also National Biscuit Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1111 
18,016, 18,100 (FTC 1967). 
I have criticized the over-formalization of these procedures elsewhere. See Kauper, 
supra note 86, at 1540. See also National Biscuit Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1f 18,016 (1967) 
(memorandum of Commissioner MacIntyre); C. H. Robinson Co., [1965-1967 Transfer 
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1f 17,247 (1965) (memorandum of Commissioner Maclnt}TC 
concerning a disqualification motion). 
104. See, e.g., FTC v. Balme, 2!l F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1928). 
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pliance with the cease and desist order, unless the court has mod-
ified the order. 
Responsibility for policing the court order remains primarily 
with the FTC.1011 If further investigation reveals noncompliance, 
the FTC may petition the court for entry of an order requiring 
the respondent to show cause why it should not be adjudged guilty 
of criminal contempt.106 In the past, the FTC's petitions or memo-
randa have alleged violations of the court decree in some detail 
and have been accompanied by affidavits and other documentary 
attachments. If the FTC's submission indicates, in the court's judg-
ment,107 that its order has been violated, an order to show cause 
will be issued and FTC attorneys will be appointed to prosecute 
on behalf of the court.108 
105. Both the Clayton Act and FTC Act originally provided, and still provide, that 
with the filing of the record the jurisdiction of the court of appeals "to enforce, set 
aside or modify orders of the commission ••• shall be exclusive." Clayton Act § 11, 
15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964); FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(d) (1964). It is equally apparent that 
the underl}ing theory of enforcement through the contempt process is that it is the 
court's order which is being violated. 
Nevertheless, the FTC remains the primary investigating body. This is made clear 
in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). The FTC had ordered Mor-
ton, which was subject to a court of appeals order compelling compliance with an 
FTC § 5 order, to file detailed extra compliance reports. Morton contended that the 
FTC lacked the authority to demand such reports on several grounds, including: (a) 
that § 6(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1964), which authorizes the FTC to re-
quire the filing of "annual" and "special" reports, is limited to general economic in-
quiries and may not be extended to investigations of compliance with § 5 orders; and 
(b) that the FTC's action was an invasion of the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the court 
of appeals. In rejecting both contentions, the Court made clear that the FTC retains 
the basic authority to determine compliance with enforced orders, and to use the "re-
port" authority of § 6(b) for this purpose. 
106, There is early and rather dubious authority indicating that contempt pro-
ceedings initiated by the FTC based upon alleged violations of enforced orders are 
necessarily "criminal" contempt proceedings since the FTC asserts no private right of 
its own. FTC v. A. McLean&: Son, 94 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1938). But in Chelf v. Schnack-
enberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), the question was regarded as open, with the Court simply 
holding that in the case before it the proceeding was criminal because there was no 
remedial, as opposed to punitive, purpose served. The parties subject to order had 
already withdrawn from the type of business covered by the order. 
Actions for violation of court-enforced NLRB orders are most commonly civil 
contempt actions, although in given cases, depending on the nature of the sanctions 
asked and the interest involved, criminal contempt may also be involved. See Note, 
The Role of Contempt Proceedings in Enforcing Orders of the NLRB, 54 COLUM. L. 
REv. 603 (1954). In any event, since McLean, contempt actions initiated by the FTC 
have been "criminal" contempt proceedings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1964). 
107. The court may, in its discretion, decline to issue a show cause order. See FTC 
v. A. McLean &: Son, 94 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1938). 
108. The court's order may direct the respondent to file a verified answer to the 
FTC's allegations. While such answers are commonly filed, the respondent may be 
unwilling to do so. This raises the question whether an individual respondent can 
satisfy the court's order by filing a general denial, or, treating this as a criminal case, 
by pleading "not guilty." The sui generis nature of criminal contempt makes these 
questions difficult. See note 116 infra. Equally difficult is the question whether an 
individual respondent could refuse to file a verified answer, if such is directed, by 
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In most of the contempt cases involving alleged violation of 
judicial enforcement decrees, the facts have either been stipulated 
or have been submitted in the form of affidavits or attachments 
to the FTC's petition and respondent's answer.100 But not all cases 
can be handled in this manner. In In re Holland Furnace Co.,11° 
the respondent corporation and eleven individual officers and di-
rectors were charged with criminal contempt in the disobedience 
of an order entered under section 5 of the FTC Act and enforced 
by the court of appeals.111 While a number of the individuals, with 
the consent of FTC attorneys, were willing to have the matter re-
solved on the basis of affidavits and other documentary submissions, 
some were not. Several of the respondents, including the president 
of the corporation, unsuccessfully demanded a jury trial. The court 
conducted a ten-day trial of all the respondents before a three-judge 
panel. Testimony was taken, and additional evidence was received. 
The corporation and three officers were adjudged guilty. 
The Holland Furnace case is a vivid demonstration of the prac-
tical difficulties of enforcement through the court of appeals. Before 
punishment can be imposed, someone must find that the court's 
order has been violated. In many cases, there may be no need to 
engage in fact finding, but if there is, a court of appeals is singularly 
ill-suited for the task. It is not of course necessary that the court 
conduct fact-finding hearings itself. It may refer the matter to a 
master, or possibly to the FTC.112 
asserting his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, on the ground that 
his conviction for criminal contempt is likely to follow if he files a detailed answer. 
And, to carry the question-asking one step further, may an individual respondent 
subject to a judicial enforcement order refuse to respond on fifth amendment grounds 
to an FTC demand for a compliance report without incurring the sanctions set out 
in § 10 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1964)? 
109. See In re Florsheim, 316 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1963) (FTC Act); In re P. Lorillard 
Co., 1959 Trade Cas. ,I 69,272 (4th Cir.) (FTC Act); In re Dolcin Corp., 247 F.2d 524 
(D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 988 (1957) (FTC Act); FTC v. Biddle Purchasing 
Co., 117 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1941) (Clayton Act); FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 
88 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1937) (FTC Act); FTC v. Hoboken White Lead&: Color Works, 
Inc., 67 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1933) (FTC Act). Apparently no hearing for the taking of 
testimony was held in In re Whitney&: Co., 273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959) (Clayton Act). 
110. 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1965). 
111. The order allegedly violated was a pendente lite enforcement order, directing 
compliance with the FTC's order during the pendency of review proceedings. Although 
an enforcement order was entered at the conclusion of review proceedings, violations 
of that order were not alleged. 
112. The ultimate power to find facts must rest with the court of appeals whose 
order is allegedly violated. In this sense, this is part of the court's "judicial'' function, 
if that label has any utility in such a case at all. On this basis, it can be argued that 
the court should refer the case, where referral is deemed necessary, to a master rather 
than to the FTC. This would in turn raise the question whether the court of appeals 
must accept the findings of its master unless "clearly erroneous." FED. R. C1v. P. 
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The job of the court of appeals would obviously be still more 
difficult if the parties charged with contempt are entitled to a jury 
trial. In that event, one might expect enforcement through the con-
tempt process to become a dead letter, for an appellate court is 
hardly equipped to call a jury. The jury trial question was raised 
in the Holland Furnace case. The Supreme Court rejected the de-
mand of the former president of the corporation for a jury trial 
on the familiar grounds that criminal contempt proceedings are not 
criminal actions within the meaning of the jury trial provisions of 
the Constitution.113 But the Court then went on to rule, in the 
exercise of its supervisory power, that "sentences exceeding six 
months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts 
absent a jury trial or waiver thereof.m This may limit the utility 
of criminal contempt proceedings as an FTC enforcement device, 
for as a practical matter it sets the maximum prison sentence which 
may be imposed at six months. Whether the FTC needs the threat 
of longer sentences is conjecture at this point.115 
It is now well established that in such criminal contempt pro-
ceedings the "ordinary criminal rules of evidence apply."116 Not 
53(e)(2) (1967) so provides, but these rules apply only to civil actions in district courts. 
Fm. R. Civ. P. 1 (1967). 
Reference to the FTC seems desirable in making use of the FTC's competence, but 
raises additional questions. Is it appropriate to have facts found by what is essentially 
the moving party? If the FTC does make findings, are they to bind the court of appeals 
if supported by "substantial evidence"? These matters are thoughtfully considered, in 
the context of NLRB orders, in L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
307-11 (1965). See also Note, The Role of Contempt Proceedings in Enforcing Orders 
of the NLRB, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 603 (1954); Note, Use of Contempt Power To Enforce 
Subpoenas and Orders of Administrative Agencies, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1541, 1545-46 
(1958). 
113. 38-! U.S. at 378-80. The Court relied primarily on United States v. Barnett, 
376 U.S. 681 (196-!), where the issue was fully explored. 
As this Article was in· final preparation, the Supreme Court, in Bloom v. Illinois, 
36 U.S.L.W. 4429 (U.S. May 20, 1968), reversed its earlier long-held position and con-
cluded that the constitutional jury trial requirements are applicable to criminal 
contempt proceedings, even in state courts. The decision will apparently not affect the 
rule already imposed on the federal courts in the Cheff case, since presumably criminal 
contempt with a sentence of six months or less will continue to be regarded as a 
"petty" offense for which jury trial is not necessary. 
114. 38-! U.S. at 380. 
115. It should be noted, however, that the president of Holland Furnace Co. is 
apparently the first individual to receive a jail sentence for violation of a court order 
enforcing an FTC cease and desist order. 
116. In re Florsheim, 316 F.2d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1963). While this may be true with 
respect to rules of evidence, it is clearly not true with respect to many of the ~usual 
rules of criminal procedure. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are applicable 
to "criminal proceedings" in the courts of appeals. FED. R. CRIM. P. I, 54(a)(l) (1966). 
But it is not clear that a criminal contempt action is a "criminal proceeding." As 
noted earlier, criminal contempt has not in the past been deemed a criminal prosecu-
tion within the constitutional jury trial provisions. See note 113 supra. Moreover, 
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only must it be established that violation was "knowing" and "will-
ful," but guilt must be established "beyond a reasonable doubt."111 
Even in civil contempt proceedings guilt must be established by 
"clear and convincing evidence." The critical point is that in all 
probability a respondent acting in good faith but guilty of what 
may later be viewed as a technical violation of the order will not 
have sanctions imposed; he will leave court with a mere forewarn• 
ing that next time the same conduct will result in the imposition 
of sanctions.118 In short, for the good faith violator the contempt 
process is likely to be little more than an additional step in de-
fining his duties.119 
It is not clear that this flexibility within the contempt process 
is the point of emphasis in the Supreme Court's discussion of the 
"old" enforcement procedures in Broch.120 The Court does em-
phasize that in later enforcement proceedings the court will be able 
to interpret and further tailor the FTC order, even though it has 
already examined the order on direct review. But this discussion 
is in the context of its earlier statement that an enforcement order 
cannot be entered without proof that a particular practice violated 
the FTC order. Broch, then, seems to be irrelevant to the court of 
appeals contempt procedure as it exists under the "new" procedures 
of Wheeler-Lea and the Finality Act, for in cases where those pro-
cedures are applicable the court is to enter an enforcement order 
rule 42, which deals with criminal contempt, appears to be self-contained and ex• 
elusive of other rules. It states little more than basic due process requirements. FED. 
R. CRillf. P. 42 (1966). It has been said that "[r]ule 42(b) prescribes the 'procedural 
regularity' for all contempts in the federal regime ••.• " Harris v. United States, 382 
U.S. 162, 167 (1965). See also Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 51 (1959); Green v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 165, 187 n.20 (1958). 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only in "the United States District 
Courts." FED. R,. CIV. P. 1 (1967). It therefore appears that criminal contempt actions 
in the courts of appeals are governed only by the general requirements of due process 
and rule 42. 
117. See, e.g., In re Florsheim, 316 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1963); In re Whitney &: Co., 
273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959); In re Dolcin Corp., 247 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. 
denied, 353 U.S. 988 (1957). In In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 873, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965), the court declined to equate 
a showing of "gross negligence" with criminal contempt, indicating that "willful" and 
"intentional" participation in the violation must be shown. 
118. This occurred in In re Florsheim, 316 F.2d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1963). Respon• 
dent's conduct was found to be in violation of a judicially enforced § 5 order. But the 
court found that he did not "intentionally, flagrantly, deliberately and recklessly vio-
late the court's order" and found him not guilty of criminal contempt. 
119. The flexibility of enforcement through contempt is carefully and extensively 
developed, primarily in the context of NLRB civil contempt procedures, in JAFFE, 
supra note 112, at 276-83. The statements in the text reflect Professor Jaffe's views to 
a considerable extent. 
120. See the discussion of the Broch case in the text accompanying notes 91-94 supra. 
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without proof of violation whenever it affirms an order of the FTC 
on direct review. 
Nevertheless, as Professor Jaffe has so carefully made clear, the 
contempt procedure in itself affords a large measure of protection 
against the seeming dangers of vague decrees.121 Vague orders pre-
sent what are essentially due process issues. Such objections to an 
order are to a large extent obviated by the nature of the contempt 
proceeding. Thus the change in the enforcement procedures may 
well call for orders formulating more precise standards of conduct. 
But the flexibility of the contempt procedure is not as helpful 
in taming the overly broad order, which prohibits in precise and 
understandable terms conduct dissimilar from or unrelated to the 
kind of conduct which formed the basis for entry of an order in 
the first instance. Violations of such an order may well be held 
to be "willful," since they contravene language which is by hypoth-
esis clear. The breadth of the order will already have been con-
sidered in an earlier proceeding, and there is not likely to be a 
disposition to re-examine it in the contempt proceeding. The fun-
damental questions raised by broad orders concern the interrela-
tionship between agency and court, questions which are likely to 
be the same whether enforcement is through contempt or civil pen-
alty. Nevertheless, the court of appeals, which has itself examined 
the underlying FTC order and issued its mvn, may well be far more 
conscious of the interrelationship than a district court which is con-
fronted with the FTC's order for the first time in a civil penalty 
suit. Moreover, in the contempt procedure, the enforcing court is 
likely to consider the respondent's conduct on the basis of the pur-
pose, rather than the language of the order. There is, in short, a 
greater probability of flexibility with the broad order when the 
court treats the order as its mvn than when a court must interpret 
an FTC order under the admonition that it is final. 
The sanctions which a court may impose for criminal contempt 
rest in its discretion.122 Fines have been imposed in most contempt 
cases arising out of FTC order violations.123 But individual viola-
tors can go to jail for extended periods of time. For this reason, it 
is difficult to assert with any confidence that the civil penalty pro-
121. See JAFFE, supra note 112, at 279. 
122. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 179-89 (1958). 
123. In all of the following cases, only fines were imposed: In re Trade Union 
Courier Publishing Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. ,I 69,642 (3d Cir.) (corporation fined 
$35,000, with two individuals fined $20,000 and $5,000 respectively): In re P. Lorillard 
Co., 1959 Trade Cas. ,r 69,272 (4th Cir.) ($40,000); In re Whitney 8e Co., 273 F.2d 211 
(9th Cir. 1959) ($2,000-1960 FTC ANN. REP. 72); In re Dolcin Corp., 247 F.2d 524 (D.C. 
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cedure, even with its "$5,000 per day" formula, is any more severe 
than the contempt procedure. Many businessmen may be far more 
fearful of jail sentences, however short, than any amount of fine. 
The very fact that the FTC itself seems inclined to use the con-
tempt procedure for deliberate and flagrant violators, even though the 
civil penalty procedure is also available, is some indication that it 
feels a contempt conviction is more effective in such cases.124 
b. Enforcement by civil penalty. Under the Wheeler-Lea and 
Finality Act procedures, an order of the FTC becomes final sixty 
days after service of the order, if no judicial review is sought, or 
at a stated time after termination of such review proceedings.126 
Thereafter violation may result in the imposition of civil penalties 
in a suit in federal district court, brought not by the FTC but by 
the United States.126 
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 988 (1957) (corporation fined $15,000 and three in-
dividuals fined total of $4,250-1956 FTC ANN. REP. 49); FTC v. Biddle Purchasing Co., 
117 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1941) ($500); FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 88 F.2d 
1009 (9th Cir. 1937) ($10,000); Louis Leavitt, 1932-39 Trade Cas. 'if 55,096 (2d Cir. 1935) 
($1,000); FTC v. Hoboken White Lead &: Color Works, Inc., 67 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1933) 
($500). In addition to the jail sentence imposed in In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 
548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 873, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965), two 
other individuals were fined $500 and the corporation was fined $100,000. Chelf v. 
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 375 (1966). 
124. Both Holland Furnace and Dolcin involved what the FTC undoubtedly felt 
to be persistent and flagrant violations. In both cases the civil penalty procedure was 
available but not used. 
125. Under both statutes, an order becomes final upon expiration of the time 
allowed for filing a petition for review. Clayton Act § ll(g), 15 U.S.C. § 21(g) (196-!); 
FTC Act § 5(g), 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1964). Both statutes permit the filing of such a 
petition within sixty days of the service of the FTC's order. Clayton Act § ll(c), 15 
U.S.C. § 2l(c) (1964); FTC Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964). Both then contain a 
number of identical provisions making orders final after termination of review. Clay-
ton Act §§ ll(g)-(k.), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2l(g)-(k.) (1964); FTC Act §§ ll(g)-(k.) 15 U.S.C. §§ 
45(g)-(k.) (1964). 
Both statutes provide that to the extent the order of the FTC is affirmed, the court 
of appeals shall "issue its own order commanding obedience to the terms of such 
order .... " Clayton Act § ll(c), 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1964); FTC Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 
45(c) (1964). Both statutes also provide, in subsection (d) of the same sections that upon 
the filing of the record with it the "jurisdiction of the court of appeals ... to affirm, 
enforce, modify or set aside orders of the Commission shall be exclusive." Despite this 
language, it has consistently been held that where an affirmed order has been violated, 
the FTC may proceed either by charging contempt of the court of appeals or by seek-
ing civil penalties. United States v. Standard Distribs., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. ill. 
1967); United States v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 55 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 19-13). See 
Testimony of William Kern, Hearings on H.R. 432, H.R. 2977, H.R. 6049, and S. 726 
Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess., ser. 3, 31 (1959). 
126. Civil penalties have been recovered for violations of a significant number of 
FTC Act § 5 orders. The 1959 hearings on the Finality Act contain an exhibit listing 
ninety-one cases in which penalties were assessed. The highest penalty assessed was 
$38,000; the lowest was $40. These ninety-one assessments totalled about $363,000. 
Hearings, supra note 125, at 28-29. At least one additional § 5 penalty suit was con-
cluded prior to June 30, 1959. 1959 FTC ANN. REP. 62. In the year ending June 30, 
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The Wheeler-Lea amendments to the FTC Act contain an ex-
press provision calling upon the FTC to "certify the facts [of vio-
lation] to the Attorney General,''127 a provision which has been 
interpreted as barring the Attorney General from initiating penalty 
proceedings independently of the FTC.128 For reasons that are not 
clear, the Finality Act contains no such provision.129 It is therefore 
possible, although hardly probable, that the Department of Justice 
may proceed independently of the FTC. While the Department 
does have concurrent responsibility for enforcement of the Clayton 
Act,130 such independent enforcement hardly seems desirable. The 
1960, eleven § 5 suits resulted in the total recovery of $39,300. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 
74-75. The figures on § 5 orders in following years are as follows: 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 
56 (four suits-total penalties of $38,000); 1962 FTC ANN. REP. 62-63 (twelve suits-
total penalties of $100,400); 1963 FTC ANN. REP. 13 (ten deceptive practice suits-total 
penalties of $86,200); 1964 FTC ANN. REP. 49 (fifteen suits, with penalties assessed in 
twelve-totalling $69,500); 1965 FTC ANN. REP. 61-62 (twelve deceptive practice suits, 
with penalties assessed in eight totalling about $40,000). The largest penalty assessed 
to date for violation of a § 5 order is a $100,000 penalty assessed against a second 
offender. United States v. Americana Corp., (D.C. Md. 1965) (unreported, FTC Docket 
No. 5058). The largest penalty sought is apparently in Columbia S. Chem Corp., 
(N.D. Ohio 1963), 1963 FTC ANN. REP. 39, where the complaint asked penalties of 
$1,000,000 for violation of a § 5 price-fixing order. 
Civil penalty assessments to date for violation of Clayton Act orders are as follows: 
United States v. Chun King Sales, Inc., No. 8093 (D. Minn. 1965) ($70,000); United 
States v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., No. 7392 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ($32,500); United 
States v. Select Magazines Inc., No. 7384 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ($30,030); United States v. 
Hearst Corp., No. 7391 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ($40,000). See 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1J 9701. These 
cases all involved orders entered under § 2(d) of the Clayton Act. The FTC has 
recently brought its first civil penalty suit for violation of a Clayton Act § 7 divestiture 
order, seeking $1,000 per day for each day divestiture is delayed. ABC Consol. Corp., 3 
TRADE REG. REP. 1J 18,046 (1967). 
127. FTC Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 56 (1964), which states more fully: 
'Whenever the Federal Trade Commission has reason to believe that any person, 
partnership, or corporation is liable to a penalty under • • . subsection (1) 
of section 5, it shall certify the facts to the Attorney General, whose duty it shall 
be to cause appropriate proceedings to be brought for the enforcement of the 
provisions of such • • • subsection. 
FTC Act § 5(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1964), is the basic civil penalty provision. 
128. United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1966); Administrative 
Law-Procedure-United States Attorney Cannot Sue to Recover Civil Penalties For 
Violation of FTC Order Without Prior FTC Certification, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1347 
(1967). In St. Regis, the Department had secured FTC consent to the civil penalty 
suit, and had proceeded on the basis of information obtained from an independent 
grand jury investigation. The facts were not certified by the FTC. The court 
held that the certification requirements of § 16 of the Act were jurisdictional, and 
dismissed the penalty suit. 
129. Most likely, the omission was simply not recognized. The Finality Act simply 
incorporated, virtually verbatim, the procedures of § 5 of the FTC Act as they existed 
in 1959. The certification provision, § 16, was separate and perhaps therefore not con-
sidered. 
130. The court in St. Regis (See note 128 supra) placed heavy emphasis on the fact 
that the FTC was exclusively responsible for the enforcement of § 5 of the FTC Act. 
The Department shares responsibility for Clayton Act enforcement. Clayton Act § 15, 
15 u.s.c. § 25 (1964). 
But in some cases the argument that the FTC has sole responsibility for § 5 is some-
what illusory, although technically correct, for the FTC may deem conduct in violation 
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FTC is given a broad discretion in formulating policy and in fram-
ing its orders, based in part upon recognition of its particular com-
petence and in part on its continuing role as enforcing agency. 
Independent Department enforcement of orders so entered is in-
consistent with the role assigned to the FTC.131 Moreover, much 
of the FTC's success rests on its ability to secure voluntary com-
pliance after an order has been issued. Firms are much less likely to 
work out detailed compliance procedures with the FTC if it does 
not have ultimate control of the enforcement machinery. Nor are 
firms as likely to agree to the issuance of consent orders if the De-
partment, which was not privy to the negotiations, is free to proceed 
without FTC approval.132 It is difficult to see any affirmative reason 
for permitting the Department to proceed independently.133 Inde-
pendent Department enforcement should not be permitted in the 
absence of proof that the FTC has been consulted and has con-
sented, even though the statute requires no such consent.134 
Although, as noted above, the statutory requirements differ, the 
FTC in most instances is likely to proceed under the Clayton Act as 
it has done under the FTC Act. An order, once entered, requires 
of § 5 because it violates the Sherman Act, which is enforced by the Department. In 
such cases, orders of the FTC may simply be implementing policies for which the 
Department is primarily or concurrently responsible. See P . .Alu:EDA, .ANTITRUST .ANALYSIS 
33 (1967). 
131. It is true that the Department in essence has a veto over FTC requests for 
initiation of penalty proceedings. But it hardly follows from this that on some principle 
of mutuality the Department should be able to proceed on its own. For example, 
knowledge that the Department may not proceed although the FTC desires to do so is 
not likely to have any impact on voluntary compliance procedures. 
132. See the discussion of these matters in United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 
F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1966). 
133. The most plausible reason is that in some instances the Department either has, 
or can obtain, information which is not available to the FTC. Two kinds of cases 
suggest themselves. First, the Department may obtain information as an incident to 
another investigation which cannot be made available to the FTC. This was the case in 
St. Regis. The data obtained from the grand jury could not be obtained by the FTC. 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962). While most of the same 
information could be obtained through the Commission's subpoena and report powers, 
FTC Act §§ 6(a), (b), 9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(a), (b), 49 (1964), duplication of effort in 
such a case is undesirable. If the FTC consents to initiation of penalty proceedings, the 
Department should be able to proceed. 
Second, the Department may have more effective tools for precomplaint investiga• 
tion. This, however, seems unlikely. The Department cannot convene a grand jury to 
consider violations of an FTC order, for no criminal violation is involved. See United 
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). Nor is it clear that the Depart-
ment may use the civil investigative demand for this purpose. Use of the investigative 
demand is limited to "civil antitrust investigation." This may include investigation of 
violation of an "antitrust order," which in turn is limited to orders "of any court of 
the United States." Antitrust Civil Process Act §§ 2, 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1311, 1312(a) (1964). 
134. This does not mean courts should insist upon certification of facts, as re-
quired by the court in St. Regis, under § 16 of the FTC Act. If the FTC approves the 
initiation of the proceeding, most objections are obviated. 
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respondent to file a compliance report. If that report or supplemental 
reports are insufficient, and if further investigation reveals conduct 
which appears to violate the order, certification to the Attorney 
General will be considered. This is of course equally true if follow-up 
investigations reveal noncompliance. In the past, certification has 
been deemed an internal FTC matter. The FTC has not generally 
conducted investigational hearings as a preliminary to certification 
and initiation of penalty proceedings, although this can be done in 
appropriate cases.135 However, before the Compliance Division 
recommends certification, the respondent is advised of the alleged 
violations and permitted to prepare a statement of his position for 
submission to the FTC along with the recommendation of the Com-
pliance Division.136 In most instances, this action by the Compliance 
Division has been preceded by full discussion and negotiation 
directed toward voluntary compliance.137 The FTC may of course 
still refuse to initiate proceedings. 
Once the complaint is filed, the litigation is controlled by the 
Department of Justice.138 It is now accepted doctrine that the only 
question to be resolved in a penalty proceeding, apart from matters 
relating to relief, is whether respondent has violated the FTC's order. 
Because the order has become final, the respondent may not in the 
penalty proceeding raise questions going to the validity or permis-
135. The FTC does, on occasion, use investigational hearings to secure information 
on compliance matters. See 1962 FTC ANN. REP. 52. 
1!16. Testimony of PGad Morehouse, Hearings on H.R. 432, H.R. 2977, H.R. 6049 
and S. 726 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th 
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, 21-22 (1959); Anderson, Settlement and Compliance Procedures, 
14 ABA ANTITRUST SEcrION 60, 65 (1959). The procedures described in the text are 
discussed in these sources. Since this Article was prepared, a district court has indicated 
that no civil penalties may be assessed until the FTC has made a "finding" of violation 
and advised the respondent of that fact. Penalties may then be ~essed only from that 
date forward. The decision purports to rest on due process grounds. What kind of 
finding is to be made, and by whom, is not indicated. Continental Baking Co. v. Dixon, 
28!1 F. Supp. 285 (D. Dela. 1968). 
137. If the Compliance Division believes as a result of its negotiation that the 
respondent is now in full compliance with the order despite past violations, it is not 
likely to seek FTC certification on the basis of such violations. Testimony of PGad 
Morehouse, Hearings, supra note 136, at 23. 
138. See Anderson, supra note 136, at 65. However, the FTC participates to a 
considerable extent in the proceedings: 
In forwarding civil penalty cases to the Attorney General for filing in the U.S. 
District Court, the [Compliance] Division prepares all the necessary pleadings and 
a trial memorandum, and attorneys of the Division usually participate in and often 
conduct the trials. They usually prepare any needed further pleadings and briefs 
for filing with the court, which include requests for admissions, interrogatories, 
objections, motions and court findings, and arrange and take oral depositions. 
1962 FTC ANN. REP. 62. 
Similarly, while settlement of penalty suits is controlled by the Department of 
Justice, the Department "extends to the Commission the courtesy of ascertaining the 
Commission's views prior to any settlement •••• " Anderson, supra note 136, at 65. 
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sible scope of the order itself; these matters are to be raised on direct 
review or not at all, unless the FTC itself can be induced to modify 
its own order.139 This puts a premium on a full understanding of the 
impact of the order at a time when review can still be sought, as well 
as on the review process itself. And this is undoubtedly what the 
courts have in mind, as well as what Congress intended. It makes for 
a neater, more compartmentalized set of procedures, where issues 
can be finally resolved. Evasion is more difficult, given the severity 
and simplicity of enforcement. Such procedures are also likely to be 
much more flexible, and therein lies the danger. 
But in fact the penalty procedures cannot be adjudged within 
such a simple framework. First, in many penalty cases questions of 
interpretation of the order must be resolved.140 Just as courts have 
been agile in probate cases by "interpreting" wills, and thereby 
avoiding collision with the age old doctrine that a will cannot be 
reformed,141 courts in penalty cases have the ability to moderate the 
apparent harshness of some FTC orders through interpretation.142 
Yet such powers are obviously limited to cases where there is some 
flexibility in the language of the order itself. Moreover, in interpret-
ing an FTC order there will be a strong and natural tendency to place 
heavy weight on the FTC's interpretation of its own order. In a 
probate proceeding, the draftsman is dead; in a penalty proceeding, 
it is not.143 
139. United States v. Karns, 1963 Trade Cas. 1 70,950 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. 
Post-Graduate School of Nursing, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 1 70,911 (N.D. Ill.); United 
States v. Wilson Chem. Co., 1962 Trade Cas. ~ 70,478 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 319 F.2d 133 
(3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Piuma, 40 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal. 1941), afj'd, 126 F.2d 
601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942). 
140. See, e.g., United States v. Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp., 1965 Trade Cas. 
~ 71,378 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Post-Graduate School of Nursing, Inc., 1963 Trade 
Cas. ~ 70,911 (N.D. Ill.); United States v. Hindman, 179 F. Supp. 926 (D.N.J. 1960). 
141. See generally Henderson, Mistake and Fraud in Wills-Part I: A Comparative 
Analysis of Existing Law, 47 B.U.L. R.Ev. 303, 356-63 (1967). 
142. In a penalty proceeding, a jury trial may be demanded. This raises troublesome 
questions concerning which matters must be submitted to the jury. Obviously the jury 
must resolve disputed factual questions, e.g., did the respondent in fact charge Buyer X 
a lower price than Buyer Y, as alleged by the government? And interpretation of the 
ordei:, on the other hand, is the proper function of the court. But determination of the 
applicability of the order to a particular set of facts may involve both fact-finding and 
interpretation. E.g., if the order prohibits sales at different prices to "competing" 
purchasers, must the jury determine whether the purchasers in fact compete? On a 
somewhat similar problem involving § 5 orders, compare United States v. Hindman, 179 
F. Supp. 926 (D.N.J. 1960), with United States v. Vulcanized Rubber &: Plastics Co., 288 
F.2d 257, 258 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961). See the discussion of these 
cases in L. JAFFE, supra note 112, at 319 n.237 (1965). 
143. While it is difficult to generalize, there certainly appears to be a tendency 
towards literalism in penalty proceedings. In a number of § 5 cases, the general 
approach of the court seems to have been to read the order, examine the facts, and 
determine whether the latter precisely fits the former. The prime example is United 
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Second, the language of the order is not necessarily dispositive; 
some things are "implicit" in the order. Thus, for example, in an 
order entered under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act the "meeting 
competition" defense is "read into" the order, whether the order 
makes provision for it or not.144 Adequate guidelines with respect 
to matters "implicit" in Clayton Act orders have not yet been estab-
lished, but the opportunity exists through this means to interject 
additional flexibility into penalty proceedings. 
Finally, the courts have tempered the severity of the penalty 
procedures through their control over the amount of penalty to be 
assessed once violation is found.145 Thus, a respondent's good faith 
and the absence of any willful intent to violate the order, while not 
defenses, have often been taken into account in determining the 
penalty.146 Similarly, the courts have imposed light, indeed almost 
nominal penalties in cases of technical violations, or where there has 
been a long history of compliance.147 Penalties have also been 
States v. Vulcanized Rubber &: Plastics Co., 288 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1961), discussed in 
more detail in note 151 infra. See also United States v. Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp., 
1965 Trade Cas. ,i 71,378 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Wilson Chem. Co., 1962 Trade 
Cas. 11 70,478 (W.D. Pa.), afj'd, 319 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. American 
Greetings Corp., 168 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1958), afj'd, 272 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1959). 
I do not mean to be critical of the analysis used in these cases. But they demonstrate an 
approach which requires most precise drafting of orders. 
144. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). See discussion in text accompanying 
notes 297-304 infra. 
145. Even in civil penalty cases before a jury, the practice has been for the judge 
to determine the amount of the penalty. See L. JAFFE, supra note 112, at 318-19; Louis, 
The Scope and Enforcement of Robinson-Patman Act Cease and Desist Orders, 10 VILL. 
L. REv. 457, 465 n.65 for discussion. 
The FTC, as a matter of practice, generally demands the ma.ximum penalty of $5,000 
per violation. See Louis, supra at 464; Austern, Five Thousand Dollars a Day, 21 ABA 
ANTITRUST SECTION 293, 297 (1962). But cf. ABC Consolidated Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 
1J 18,046 (1967). This, of course, leaves open the question of what constitutes a separate 
violation and, more particularly, of what constitutes "continuing failure or neglect to 
obey," for in such violations "each day of continuance" is a separate offense. 
In the Finality Act hearings, the FTC asserted that as of 1959 it had not "yet 
brought any suits on the basis of a continuing offense day by day," and that "[i]t is 
hard to get a continuing offense." A continuing price-fixing conspiracy was suggested 
as an illustration of such an offense. Testimony of PGad Morehouse, Hearings, supra 
note 136, at 21. While no Clayton Act cases have dealt with the problem, one might 
suggest that pricing pursuant to an established, but violative, discount schedule might 
be such an offense. In other instances, each discriminatory price or allowance might be 
a separate offense. Cf. United States v. Wilson Chem. Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 11 70,478 
(W.D. Pa.), afj'd, 319 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1963). 
146. United States v. H. M. Prince Textiles, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 
United States v. Karns, 1963 Trade Cas. 11 70,950 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Vitasafe 
Corp., 212 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (opinion), 234 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) 
(order), afj'd 352 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Home Diathermy Co., 1960 
Trade Cas. 11 69,601 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Proof of intent to violate is of course essential to 
establish violation if the_ order itself so requires. Cf. United States v. Elliot Knitwear 
Co., 1966 Trade Cas. 11 71,885 (S.D.N.Y.). 
147. E.g., United States v. Home Diathermy Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69,601 (S.D.N.Y. 
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mitigated where the conduct complained of was divulged in a com-
pliance report and was not questioned at the time by the FTC.148 
One court has suggested that the extent of injury to the public 
should be a factor considered.149 
Recognition of such factors in determining a penalty contributes 
an important degree of flexibility to the penalty procedures. But it 
is the threat of a penalty, more than the actual amount of penalty 
assessed, which is significant in enforcement. The threat of a penalty 
may not be mitigated at all by the fact that the respondent will not 
ultimately be assessed "too much." As Professor Jaffe has observed, 
"the penalty procedures, whatever the modes of mitigation, create 
a large uncertainty as to the dimension of their threat."150 Moreover, 
the "good faith" standard may in fact be a trap for the unwary. The 
courts in mitigating penalties have emphasized (I) factors going to 
the magnitude of, and injury caused by, the violation, or (2) factors 
demonstrating that the violation was not "deliberate" or "willful." 
The very emphasis on deliberateness may make mitigation unavail-
able to persons subject to vague orders, or orders which are unduly 
broad. For if the respondent seeks FTC guidance and is informed 
that his conduct is in violation, his persistence in the conduct in the 
belief that the FTC was wrong has all the hallmarks of being de-
liberate.151 If he does not seek FTC guidance, he proceeds entirely 
1959). Conversely, an extended pattern of violations is a basis for imposition of much 
higher penalties. United States v. Wilson Chem. Co., 1962 Trade Cas. ,i 70,478 (W .D. 
Pa.), aff d, 319 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1963). 
148. In two § 5 cases, respondents in civil penalty proceedings have asserted as a 
defense that the conduct was fully disclosed in compliance reports filed with the FTC 
and was either accepted or not objected to for an extended period of time. In both 
cases it was held that such allegations were not a defense, although they were relevant 
in determining the penalty to be assessed. United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 212 F. Supp. 
397 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff d, 352 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. American Greet-
ings Corp., 168 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1958), affd, 272 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1959). But cf. 
Vanity Fair Paper Mills v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1962). Professor Jaffe is 
sharply critical of the result in American Greetings, suggesting that no penalty should 
have been imposed. L. JAFFE, supra note 112, at 319 n.37. 
149. United States v. Karns, 1963 Trade Cas. ,I 70,950 (S.D.N.Y.). 
150. L. JAFFE, supra note 112, at 319. 
151. Cf. Joseph A. Kaplan &: Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785, 790-91 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). The classic demonstration of respondent's dilemma is the Vulcanized Rubber 
litigation. Respondent was prohibited by FTC order from advertising combs as "rubber" 
or "hard rubber." In a compliance report, it informed the FTC that it would advertise 
its combs as "rubber-resin." The FTC advised, by letter, that this would violate the 
order. Respondent amended its existing review petition, contending that the order as 
interpreted was too broad. The court declined to consider the "interpretation," on the 
ground that it might be changed or not enforced and there was therefore no con-
troversy to be reviewed, upholding the order as written. Vulcanized Rubber &: Plastics 
Co. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Respondent continued to assert the right to 
use "rubber-resin." In a subsequent civil penalty proceeding, respondent was assessed 
$6,000 in penalties. The court did not allude to the fact that respondent obviously had 
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at his own risk and may indeed be deemed in bad faith for not going 
to the FTC. 
The assessment of penalties is of course the primary focus of a 
civil penalty suit. But the relief granted may not be so limited. It has 
now become common practice in section 5 cases for the court, upon 
a finding of violation, to enter its own mandatory injunction com-
pelling obedience to the FTC's order.152 The violator is thus placed 
in much the same position it would have been in under the old pro-
cedure, where the first violation would have formed the basis of a 
judicial enforcement order, except that here a contempt action 
would be brought in district court and, in addition, the penalty suit 
remains available. Why such an injunction is requested is not al-
together clear. It has been suggested that this is done so that in a 
subsequent contempt action based upon further violation the respon-
dent cannot demand a jury trial, as he could in a penalty suit.153 The 
more obvious explanation is that upon violation of the court's order 
criminal sanctions, including jail sentences, might be imposed,154 
thereby more effectively deterring hard-core violators. 
The issuance of mandatory injunctions in penalty suits presents 
a number of difficult questions. First, the injunction invariably 
compels obedience to the order as written by the FTC. Indeed, since 
the order is final, and the district court lacks the authority to review 
or modify it, it is not clear that the injunction could do anything 
else. It is of course true that the respondent has had an opportunity 
been frustrated in his efforts to secure a judicial ruling prior to the penalty suit. United 
States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 288 F.2d 257 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 821 (1961). Judge Hastie dissented, on the ground that the prior ruling of another 
court had established that the conduct was not within the language of the order. 
152. See Louis, supra note 145, at 464 n.64; Hearings, supra note 136, at 24; 3 TRADE 
REG. REP. 11 9711.40. In most instances where such injunctions have been issued, the 
penalty suits have been settled and the issuance of the injunction has been with 
respondent's consent. However, such injunctions have also been issued in litigated cases 
over the objection of the respondent. United States v. Herbold Laboratory, Inc., 267 F. 
Supp. 53 (C.D. Cal. 1967); United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 234 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964), afj'd, 352 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1965). 
Such injunctions are not issued as a matter of course, In United States v. Universal 
Wool Batting Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. 11 70,168 (S.D.N.Y.), the request for an injunction 
was refused because of the limited nature of the violations and because the judgment 
was by default. 
153. Louis, supra note 145, at 464 n.64. 
154. In United States v. Herbold Laboratory, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 53 (C.D. Cal. 1967), 
the court suggested that an injunction was warranted because (1) the respondent might 
find it financially desirable to risk another penalty suit, suggesting therefore that the 
maximum penalty assessment might be insufficient to deter further violation, and 
(2) because of the time and effort involved in bringing another penalty suit. The court 
also felt that the respondent could not be prejudiced, because it was under order 
anyway. 
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to seek review and may in fact have done so.155 Nevertheless, it hardly 
seems proper for the court to issue its own in junction on the basis 
of administrative findings over which it has no control, and the court 
may not be justified in issuing an injunction in the words of the 
FTC order on the basis of the evidence in district court establishing 
violation of the FTC's order. The violation of the order may be of 
such a nature that standing alone it does not justify entry of an 
injunction as broad as the FTC's order.156 Therefore, if the district 
courts are to issue such injunctions at all, they should be limited to 
the prohibition of conduct similar to that held violative of the FTC's 
order by the court. The deliberate violator who repeats the same 
conduct thus might be held in contempt; a dissimilar violation 
would still result in the imposition of civil penalties, but not criminal 
sanctions. 
A more serious question is whether such injunctions may be 
issued at all. In seeking injunctions, the government has relied on 
section 9 of the FTC Act,157 which authorizes district courts to issue 
writs of mandamus on application of the United States at the request 
of the FTC, to compel obedience to orders of the FTC entered 
pursuant to a number of sections of the FTC Act, including section 
5. Section 9 has been held to authorize the issuance of such injunc-
tions,158 although it has been used primarily to compel obedience 
to subpoenas and other investigatory orders. Professor Louis has 
suggested that if section 9 is to be read in this literal manner, the 
FTC since 1914 has had the authority to seek enforcement of its 
cease and desist orders in district court.159 This does not necessarily 
follow, but the argument to the contrary is sufficiently strained160 
155. If he has in fact done so, the issuance of an injunction by the district court will 
now provide three possible sanctions for a subsequent violation, as follows: (1) a second 
civil penalty suit; (2) an action for contempt of the district court; or (3) an action for 
contempt of the court of appeals, which was required to enter its own enforcement 
order upon affirmance. Such multiplicity ought in itself to be the basis for denial of 
injunctive relief by the district court. 
156. To make the issue more concrete, assume that the FTC's order prohibits three 
types of conduct, referred to here as A, B and C. Further assume that in the penalty 
suit it is found that respondent violated the order by engaging in conduct A. Should 
the court's injunction prohibit only conduct A, or should it compel compliance with 
the order of the FTC as such, thereby prohibiting conduct B and C as well? 
157. 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964). During the Finality Act hearings, the FTC representative 
stated that it secured such injunctions under § 10 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1964). 
Hearings, supra note 136, at 24. This was clearly an error. 
158. United States v. Herbold Laboratory, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 53 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 
See United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 352 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Universal 
Wool Batting Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. ,I 70,168 (S.D.N.Y.). 
159. Louis, supra note 145, at 464 n.64. 
160. It might be argued that this portion of § 9 was intended to permit district 
court enforcement of all types of FTC orders whose validity the court had authority to 
April 1968] Cease and Desist 1133 
to warrant the conclusion that the specific enforcement provisions 
of section 5, which do not authorize recourse to the equity jurisdic-
tion of the federal district courts, were intended to be exclusive. The 
multiplicity of sanctions which may come into play, and the obvious 
problems in permitting a court to compel obedience to an adminis-
trative order which it lacks authority to review or modify, also suggest 
that the issuance of such injunctions was never intended. 
Even if such injunctions are authorized by section 9 of the FTC 
Act, it does not follow that they may be issued in civil penalty suits 
based upon violations of Clayton Act orders. For section 9 autho-
rizes only writs of mandamus to compel obedience with FTC orders 
entered pursuant to provisions of the FTC Act.161 
It should now be apparent that the differences between the "old" 
and "new" procedures for enforcement are both real and significant. 
The mere presence of a maximum penalty of $5,000 per day may 
create some additional in terrorem effect, which has particular signif-
icance when the FTC is trying to induce "voluntary" compliance. 
But the fundamental differences are more subtle. The elimination of 
the "second bite," while it assures a more effective response against 
the deliberate violator, also deprives the firm acting in good faith of a 
judicial determination of the legality of its conduct before that 
conduct will result in the imposition of sanctions. Quite apart from 
the flexibility inherent in the contempt process itself, enforcement 
by the court which had itself reviewed the administrative record 
review prior to the entry of its own order or which had otherwise become "final." Prior 
to Wheeler-Lea, § 5 cease and desist orders were not within this category, with the 
possible exception of those orders which has been reviewed by the court of appeals (in 
which event the use of § 9 as device for enforcing cease and desist orders might be barred 
by the provision giving the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to modify or enforce, 
etc.). With the passage of Wheeler-Lea, an opportunity for review was provided and, if 
not taken, the order became final. On this basis, it could be argued that while the 
FTC could not seek enforcement in district court prior to 1938, it could thereafter. 
But such an argument, while it recognizes some of the conceptual difficulties of per-
mitting a court to issue an injunction enforcing an order when authority to review the 
validity of the order is in another court, bears little relationship to the language of 
the statute. 
161. Section 9 is expressly limited to orders entered pursuant to §§ 41-46 and 47-58 
of Title 15. 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964). These are all provisions of the FTC Act. It should 
be noted, however, that the FTC's right to access and subpoena powers, also conferred 
by § 9, are also granted "[f]or the purposes of sections 41-46 and 47-58 of this title." 
and are not therefore literally applicable to FTC Clayton Act investigations and pro-
ceedings. Despite this fact, and although the Clayton Act is silent on the question, it 
has been consistently held that the FTC's § 9 investigatory powers may be used in 
connection with possible Clayton Act violations. See Withrow, Investigatory Powers of 
the Federal Trade Commission-Constitutional and Statutory Limitations, 24 FED. 
B.J. 456, 477-78 (1964). This same approach might be used to secure mandatory injunc-
tions under § 9 in Clayton Act civil penalty suits. 
1134 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:1095 
was likely to reflect better the basic purpose of the order. The danger 
of undue literalism was not as great under the old procedures. 
These differences do call for a re-examination of the standards 
applied in drafting and reviewing FTC orders. Some of that re-
examination has taken place, and the results will be discussed at a 
later point. The changes in enforcement machinery have also created 
new interest in the availability of modification and advisory guid-
ance. 
c. Modification) advisory opinions) and voluntary compliance. 
Section 11 of the Clayton Act authorizes the FTC to reopen and 
modify orders which have become final upon expiration of the 
period for review, if no petition has been filed, whenever, in its 
opinion, "conditions of fact or law have so changed as to require 
such action or if the public interest shall so require."162 The FTC's 
Rules of Practice embody the same standards.163 Such modification 
may occur only after notice and opportunity for hearing. The FTC 
has interpreted this provision to mean that such reopening may be 
upon its own motion, or upon motion of the respondent.164 
The Rules of Practice also permit reopening and modification 
where the order has been affirmed by a court of appeals,165 although 
there is no specific statutory authorization for such a practice.166 
Despite this peculiar gap in the statutory language, the courts have 
permitted the FTC to modify such orders.167 Modification of en-
forced orders once again presents difficult questions of court-agency 
interrelationship, for the order is now technically the court's; the 
court has been described as the "senior partner" in what is now a 
162. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964). The FTC is also authorized to modify its orders, for 
any reason, prior to expiration of the time for review, if no review has been sought, or, 
if it has, prior to the filing of the administrative record with the court of appeals. The 
FTC Act provisions are identical. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964). 
163. 16 C.F.R. § 3.28(b) (1968). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. The statute expressly confers authority to modify final orders only if no review 
petition has been filed. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964). 
167. American Chain &: Cable Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 909, 911-12 (4th Cir. 1944). See 
Dolcin Corp. v. FTC, 219 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 981 (1955). 
Cf. Standard Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1954). In American Chain, 
respondent, which was subject to an order enforced by the court of appeals, filed a 
mandamus action to compel the FTC to consider its petition for modification. The 
FTC asserted that because a review petition had been filed it was powerless to modify. 
In granting the requested relief, the court found it "not reasonable" to believe that 
Congress intended that no such authority should exist. The court also stated that 
since it had inherent authority to modify its own enforcement order, it also could <lirect 
the FTC to entertain the petition to assist through the use of its administrative ex• 
pertise. See discussion in L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, at 
312-13. 
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cooperative enterprise.168 I question the aptness of this description, 
however, in connection with orders subject to civil penalty enforce-
ment procedures. In a penalty suit the order is simply that of the 
FTC, as affirmed by the court. The presence of a judicial enforce-
ment order is virtually irrelevant. The primary responsibility for 
modification should now rest with the FTC. In most cases, reopening 
and modification should be sought initially at the FTC level, and 
the court should decline to modify its own order (and thereby 
presumably the FTC's order) until the FTC has considered the 
matter.169 Nevertheless, the question is not one which should be 
resolved in terms of "power" or "jurisdiction" to modify. Rather, 
each case must be handled individually. If some degree of adminis-
trative competence is called for, as for example when the alleged 
basis for modification is a change in industry structure or respon-
dent's market position, the matter should be deferred to the FTC. If 
not, as might be the case where the issues are primarily legal, the 
court should not consider itself helpless to act without FTC findings. 
It is sometimes suggested that the hardship imposed on a respon-
dent by a vague or unduly broad order is at least in part illusory 
because a modification of the order can be obtained upon a showing 
of such hardship;170 the ability of the good-faith respondent to secure 
modification inserts back into the civil penalty procedures much of 
the flexibility which was inherent in the old "three bites at the apple" 
procedure. Such an argument can be carried to absurd extremes, 
permitting an order to say virtually anything because it can be 
modified later. But the argument is generally made within narrower 
confines: that the language of the order, though broad or vague, is 
necessary in order to anticipate future violations of the kind already 
engaged in by respondent. If the order should prohibit some future 
168. L. JAFFE, supra note 167, at 312. Professor Jaffe concludes that "the court is 
the senior partner in enforcement, free to use or not the agency's services." 
169. This presents little difficulty if the order is modified by the FTC. The court 
may then consider the modification on direct review. 15 U.S.C. § 2l(b) (1964). The more 
difficult question is whether there is any recourse to the reviewing court when the 
FTC has rejected respondent's request for modification. It has been held that the 
court of appeals cannot review such action, since review is limited to the order entered 
after reopening. Review then is limited to the modifying order, and not to the original 
order, which has become final. Martin Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 376 F.2d 430 (7th Cir.), 
· cert, denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967). It should be noted, however, that the order in 
that case was a consent order. 
Even so, however, in those cases where the original FTC order has been affirmed by 
the court of appeals, the respondent should be able to secure a court ruling on the 
propriety of the FTC's failure to modify. The court has inherent power to modify its 
own decree apart from its direct review powers. See note 167 supra. Cf. Indiana 
Quartered Oak Co. v. FTC, 58 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1932). 
170. See, e.g., Chain Institute, Inc. v. FTC, 246 F.2d 231, 239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
ll55 U.S. 895 (1957); cf. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957). 
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conduct, presently unforeseeable, which ought not be prohibited, 
modification may be obtained when such conduct is actually con-
templated.171 
Modification by the FTC can eliminate hardships or uncertainties 
which are likely to arise with the passage of time, although many of 
the matters which are most commonly asserted as a basis for modifica-
tion can probably be asserted in defense in a civil penalty action 
anyway. Proof of changed conditions of fact, may, for example, enable 
a respondent to assert as a defense that a particular price discrimina-
tion did not injure competition, even though the order on its face 
prohibits such conduct irrespective of its effect on competition.172 
Changed rules of law may automatically be incorporated into the 
terms of the order.173 In such cases, modification serves only to enable 
the respondent to proceed on the basis of prior approval rather than 
proceeding at his own risk. But the possible availability of modifica• 
tion is not an excuse for the issuance of unduly broad or vague 
orders in the first instance. The FTC may not modify the order. It is 
natural for it to be chary about doing so. But it may be wrong. At 
the present time, there is authority holding that an FTC decision 
refusing modification is not subject to review.174 Thus, the good 
faith respondent denied a modification is in the difficult position 
of either forgoing the conduct in question or risking a civil penalty 
suit where his very inability to secure modification may work to his 
prejudice. Moreover, the very difficulties of securing modification 
make it of little value where business decisions must be arrived at 
rapidly, as is often the case in pricing matters, or where the loss by 
forgoing the conduct in question is less than the cost and time of 
seeking modification. Yet the decision to forgo the conduct, partic-
ularly if pricing is involved, may work to the detriment of the con-
suming public.175 
171. See, e.g., In re Foremost Dairies, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1344, 1364 (196!1), aff'd, !148 
F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, !182 U.S. 959 (1965). 
172. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 475-77 (1952). See discussion in text accom-
panying note 302 infra. 
173. In Russell-Ward Co., Inc., 62 F.T.C. 156!1 (196!1), the respondent sought 
modification of a consent order entered in the language of § 2(c) (brokerage) on the 
ground that the FTC had recently found in another proceeding that conduct of the 
type with which it was charged did not violate the statute. The FTC declined modifica-
tion, in part on the ground that the order itself would of course be construed on the 
basis of current standards in any event. This is the likely result where statutory 
standards are set out in the order. See also Southern Fruit Distribs., Inc., [196!1-1965 
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1J 17,191 (FTC 1965). 
174. Martin Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 376 F.2d 430 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
923 (1967). 
175. The modification of consent orders might be thought to present additional 
difficulties. There has been some suggestion, for example, that the standards for modifi-
cation of judicial consent decrees are more difficult to meet than those for litigated ju-
dicial decrees. See generally Note, Requests by the Government for Modification of 
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The FTC's Rules of Practice now also provide that the FTC will 
advise a respondent, at his request, as to whether conduct proposed by 
him is in compliance with the order to which he is subject,176 and that 
upon the filing of a compliance report the FTC will review the report 
and advise respondent whether the conduct revealed complies with 
the order.177 Such "advisory opinions" may be revoked by the FTC 
at any time, although prior to revocation notice and an opportunity 
to be heard will be given respondent.178 The Rules further provide 
that the FTC will not proceed against a respondent who has in good 
faith relied upon the FTC's advice, if full disclosure was initially 
made in the request for advice and if the conduct "was promptly dis-
continued upon notification of rescission or revocation of the Com-
mission's approval."179 Moreover, such advice is commonly given 
informally by members of the FTC's compliance staff whenever 
questions of compliance are raised.180 The relationship between FTC 
and respondent created by the entry of an order thus has been 
described as a " 'marriage' under which the Commission is obliged to 
afford the respondent definitive advice as to whether proposed con-
duct would meet the requirements of the order."181 Perhaps I am 
unduly pessimistic, but my observations have always been that 
marriages involving a reluctant partner either do not last long or 
result in the coercion of the partner who was reluctant. And if a 
"marriage" does exist here, it is abundantly clear that the respondent 
is reluctant. 
It is now common for courts sustaining FTC orders attacked on 
the grounds of undue breadth or vagueness to suggest that the order 
will work no real hardship because the respondent can secure advice 
from the FTC in advance.182 The next step is to suggest that failure 
to seek such advice demonstrates bad faith.183 
Consent Decrees, 75 YALE L.J. 657 (1966); Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust 
Consent Decrees, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1303, 1314-17 (1967). However, the FTC's rules clearly 
contemplate that the standards for modification of both litigated and consent orders 
shall be the same. 16 C.F.R. § 2.3 (1967). 
176. 16 C.F.R. § 3.26(b) (1968). 
177. 16 C.F.R. § 3.26(a) (1968). 
178. 16 C.F.R. § 3.26(c) (1968). 
179. Id. 
180. See Testimony of PGad Morehouse, Hearings, supra note 136, at 21-22 (1959); 
Anderson, Settlement and Compliance Procedures, 14 A.B.A. ANTITRusr SEcrioN 60, 
64-65 (1959). 
181. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1344, 1363-64 (1963), afj'd, 348 F.2d 674 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965). 
182. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394 (1965); Purolator 
Prods. Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 886 (7th Cir. 1965); cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). 
The classic statement of this position is that of Judge Friendly in Vanity Fair Paper 
Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1962). But see Joseph A. Kaplan &: Sons, 
Inc. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785, 790,91 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
183. Cf. Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1962). 
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The advisory opinion procedure is of greatest value to the 
respondent who is uncertain about the meaning of the order. For this 
purpose, it has marked advantages over more formal modification 
procedures. Rulings can be secured far more rapidly, and with con-
siderably less effort. But these advisory procedures have far less 
relevance to the order which, although unduly broad, clearly pro-
hibits the conduct in question. While the FTC could use its advisory 
role to exempt conduct which the order clearly but improperly pro-
hibits, it is not likely to do so. If these procedures have any relevance 
to the propriety of an order in the first instance, it is with respect 
to vagueness, not overbreadth. But the availability of FTC advice, 
however desirable it might be, provides little more excuse for the 
issuance of imprecise orders than does the fact that an order once 
issued can be modified. 
In some instances, as with modification, FTC advice cannot be 
obtained before a decision can be made. This is particularly true of 
many pricing decisions. Moreover, many businessmen view the FTC 
as a prosecutor. They are therefore naturally reluctant to divulge 
facts about their operations to the FTC and are likely to feel that 
seeking advice is a futile gesture. Finally, as Professor Auerbach has 
noted, the difficulty with reliance on FTC guidance to justify other-
wise objectionable orders "is highlighted by not assuming ... that 
the respondent proposes a method of compliance which the Commis-
sion accepts, but instead, a method of compliance which the Com-
mission rejects."184 The FTC is after all not likely to be generous 
toward respondent: it has a certain vested interest in its order. The 
respondent who in good faith believes his conduct lawful must either 
proceed at his own risk, seek an advisory opinion and proceed at 
possibly greater risk if he disagrees, or capitulate when perhaps he 
ought not.185 The respondent acting in good faith may be well ad-
vised in some cases not to seek FTC "advice." 
184. Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organizational and Pro-
cedure, 48 MINN. L. R.Ev. 383, 513 (1964). 
185. See Joseph A. Kaplan &: Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785, 790·91 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
In the past, it has appeared unlikely that the respondent could obtain judicial review 
of the FTC's informal "interpretation" of a cease and desist order. See Rettinger v. 
FTC, 392 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Vulcanized Rubber &: Plastics Co. v. FTC, 258 
F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In the Vulcanized Rubber case, the FTC notified respondent 
of its "interpretation" of the order, and the court refused to consider the validity of the 
order as interpreted on direct review of the order itself. It has seemed even more un-
likely that an informal advisory opinion would be reviewed when the time for seeking 
review of the order itself has expired. The antipathy toward judicial review of advisory 
or interpretive administrative rulings, whether such review is direct or by action for 
declaratory judgment, is discussed in 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §§ 21.01-21.02, 
21.06-21.08 (1958). In considering the developments discussed by Professor Davis, the 
reader should give particular attention to the textual material in the pocket supple-
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The greatest danger of the vague or unduly broad order is that 
legitimate conduct will be forestalled. Price discrimination, for ex-
ample, may not only be legitimate but economically desirable. Such 
conduct, if it is arguably prohibited by an order which is unclear 
or unduly broad, may be forgone simply because the anticipated 
benefit to the respondent is offset by the prospect of a dispute with 
the FTC. Harm to the public interest may well result. The tendency 
to forgo is made greater when the FTC makes its view known in-
formally through voluntary compliance procedures, where consider-
able pressure can be brought to bear through the threat of violation 
proceedings.186 A formal advisory opinion may aggravate this ten-
dency still further.187 The entry of a broad order may thus become a 
kind of jurisdictional incident which serves as a basis for the assump-
tion of a quasi-regulatory role by the FTC.188 
B. FTC Orders and Private Litigation 
The FTC and the courts seem to operate on the assumption that 
unless the FTC's order proscribes all the ways to violate a statute 
which the respondent has already violated once, he is left free to 
violate the statute in ways not prohibited by the order.189 This is 
undoubtedly true with respect to the FTC: where subsequent con-
duct violates the underlying statute but not the order, the FTC must 
initiate new proceedings which can result only in modification of the 
existing order or entry of another order. But the assumption is un-
ment to § 21.08 of the Davis treatise. See also L. JAFFE, supra note 168, at 412-18 (1965). 
The question whether the formalization of the advisory opinion procedures taken 
with the fact that the ITC has bound itself not to revoke its advice retroactively should 
be deemed to make such rulings "declaratory orders" within § 5(d) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, now 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (Supp. II, 1964), has not yet arisen. If these 
advisory opinions are within § 5(d), they are clearly reviewable. The ability to obtain 
judicial review would make the advisory opinion procedures far more attractive to the 
respondent who is acting in good faith but feels he will be substantially prejudiced 
in the judicial forum by an adverse FTC opinion. Professor Davis has stated, correctly 
in my judgment, that ITC "advisory opinions" are declaratory orders. I K. DAVIS, 
supra, § 4.09 (Supp. 1965). Accord, Reilly, Declaratory Orders Under the APA-The 
Need for Legislation, 52 IOWA L. REv. 657, 666 (1967). 
186. See Louis, supra note 145, at 465, 473. 
187. This is not of course to suggest that voluntary compliance procedures, includ-
ing negotiations with the underlying threat of violation proceedings, and the advisory 
opinion procedure are not useful. They are obviously essential if compliance is ever 
to be secured in many cases. But the presence of such procedures ought not be used to 
justify orders which prohibit more than they ought to, or which are unclear in their 
coverage. 
188. See F. Row£, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac::r (Supp. 
196'1) 157. 
189. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. ITC, 311 F.2d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 1962): 
"Respondent's first proposal would leave it free to repeat the very practice here found 
to violate § 2(d) if only it substituted radio or television for newspaper advertising •••• " 
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warranted at least as to Clayton Act orders, for statutory violations 
may result in treble damage liability to injured private parties.100 
To be sure, such actions are perhaps not as likely to be initiated as 
FTC enforcement proceedings, if for no other reason than that 
private litigants are not as likely to be aware of such violations. More-
over, if the order does cover the conduct in question, the pressures 
by the FTC through compliance procedures are more likely to be 
effective in assuring obedience to the statute than the threat of 
potential treble damage liability. Nevertheless, the threat of private 
action does remain, and is often very real. Such potential liability 
may be a most effective deterrent to statutory violation irrespective of 
the coverage of the FTC's order. 
The very fact that such potential liability to private parties does 
exist under the Clayton Act raises questions concerning the relation-
ship of Clayton Act cease and desist orders to private treble damage 
actions. It is not the purpose of the present study to consider these 
questions in detail. Yet there are points at which consideration of 
this relationship may be relevant to the language of the order itself. 
If this is so, the impact of the order on private litigants is one of the 
factors to be considered in the issuance of the order in the first 
instance. 
There is no private cause of action for injury caused by violation 
of the FTC's order as such.191 A treble damage action must be pred-
icated upon proof of violation of one of the "antitrust laws."192 But 
if the treble damage suit seeks recovery for injury caused by conduct 
which the FTC has found to be in violation of such a statute, the 
plaintiff may, and likely will, assert that the FTC proceedings and 
order establish that the statute has been violated and that all he 
need prove in addition is the damage to himself. And in some cases, 
the order may be used by the defendant for the opposite purpose, 
claiming that the order expressly directs or authorizes the conduct 
190. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Treble damage actions have long been 
common in connection with Robinson-Patman violations. While some doubt may once 
have existed, it is now quite clear that such actions may be brought for violations of 
§ 3. See Buxbaum, Boycotts and Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
671, 688 (1966). But there is presently conflict over the availability to private litigants 
of treble damage actions charging violations of § 7. See cases and authorities cited in 
s. OPPENHEIM &: G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 881-82 (3d ed. 1968); J. Scorr 
&: E. ROCKEFELLER, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION TODAY: 1967, at 340-42 (1967). 
191. See, e.g., Steel v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 1961 Trade 
Cas. 11 70,175 (S.D.N.Y.); Paul M. Harrod Co. v. A. B. Dick Co., 194 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. 
Ohio 1961); Ida Amusement Corp. v. RKO Pictures Corp., 1954 Trade Cas. 11 67,837 
. (S.D.N.Y.). While these cases all deal with judicial decrees, there is no reason to 
distinguish FTC orders. 
192. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). "Antitrust laws" include the Sherman 
Act and Clayton :Act, but not the FTC Act. Clayton Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964). 
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complained of, or reflects a determination that such conduct does 
not violate the statute, thereby establishing the absence of violation. 
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act permits the introduction in private 
treble damage actions of any "final judgment or decree" entered in 
any "civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the 
United States under the antitrust laws" as prima facie evidence 
against the defendant "as to all matters respecting which said judg-
ment or decree would be an estoppel between the parties thereto."198 
Most FTC consent orders, and most orders under section 5 of the 
FTC Act, are clearly not admissible under section 5(a).194 
But nonconsent orders entered under the Clayton Act may be. It 
had long seemed clear, although the Supreme Court had never passed 
on the question, that the FTC's Clayton Act orders did not fall within 
section 5(a).195 Two early decisions had held FTC orders inadmis-
193. Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964), which, in more complete form, 
provides: 
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or 
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the anti-
trust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie 
evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other 
party against such defendant under said laws . • • • as to all matters respecting 
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties 
thereto: Provided, that this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees 
entered before any testimony has been taken . • • • 
194. Most FTC consent orders are entered prior to the taking of testimony, and fall 
within the excepting proviso of § 5(a); see note 193 supra. In the case where testimony 
has been taken, a consent order is admissible to the extent any FTC order is admissible, 
although there may be considerable difficulty in determining the estoppel effect of 
such an order, which contains no admissions or findings of violation. See Y & Y 
Popcorn Supply Co. v. ABC Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1967), where 
the court was apparently willing to admit a Clayton Act § 7 consent order entered after 
the taking of testimony but expressed doubts whether the matters as to which there 
would be an estoppel could be delineated. 
FTC orders entered under § 5 of the FTC Act are normally inadmissible because 
the FTC Act is not one of the "antitrust laws." See note 192 supra; 'Wilson, Federal 
Trade Commission Orders and the Clayton Act § 5: A Reexamination, 12 .ANTl'I'RUST 
BuLL. 27, 42-47 (1967). In some cases, however, the FTC proceeds under § 5 against 
conduct on the basis of Sherman or Clayton Act standards. See P. AREE:l>A, .ANTITRUST 
.ANALYSIS 33 (1967). If the FTC finds conduct in violation of § 5 because it violates the 
Sherman or Clayton Act, a persuasive argument can be made that such an order should 
be treated as one "under the antitrust laws." See J. Scou & E. Rockefeller, supra note 
190, at 327, 330 (1967). In the Y 6- Y Popcorn case, supra, the consent order was entered 
on a complaint alleging a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act and, on the same basic 
facts, a violation of § 5 of the FTC Act. The court held that if the order rested on the 
latter, the FTC might ultimately have entered an order on the basis of "unfair methods 
of competition" short of an "antitrust" violation. Since this was a consent order, it 
was impossible to tell whether the order was to the effect that the "antitrust laws" 
were violated. The order was therefore held inadmissible. But this case may have no 
relevance where the FTC clearly finds a § 5 violation applying "antitrust law" standards. 
195. The application of § 5(a) to FTC proceedings is discussed in greater detail in 
Wilson, supra note 194; Matteoni, An Antitrust Argument: Whether a Federal Trade 
Commission Order Is Within the Ambit of the Clayton Act's Section 5, 40 NOTRE 
DAME LA.w. 158 (1965); Note, Federal Trade Commission Proceedings and Section 5 of 
the Clayton Act: Application and Implications, 64 Mica. L. REv. 1156 (1966). 
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sible, primarily on the ground that such orders were not "final."100 
The enactment of the Finality Act has made this position untenable 
with respect to Clayton Act orders. Nevertheless, such orders do not 
come within the literal language of section 5(a). First, FTC proceed-
ings are not brought "by or on behalf of the United States." These 
are normally thought to be words of art, referring to suits by the 
Department of Justice.197 But in a broader sense, the action of any 
federal agency can perhaps be deemed action of the United States, 
and the statutory requirement can perhaps be met on this basis.108 
However, the greatest textual barriers to the inclusion of FTC orders 
within section 5(a) are the requirements that there be a final "judg-
ment or decree" rendered in a "civil proceeding";199 whether final or 
not, there are marked differences between administrative orders and 
judicial decrees which have long been recognized and which afford a 
logical basis for the exclusion of FTC orders in subsequent treble 
damage litigation.200 The arguments for admissibility rest primarily 
on the desirability of facilitating actions by injured private litigants 
and the unfairness and inequality inherent in making the availability 
196. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling &: Billiard Corp., 150 F.2d 
69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945); Proper v. John Bene &: Sons, 295 F. 729 
(E.D.N.Y. 1923). Brunswick involved a Clayton Act order. Proper dealt with an order 
entered under § 5 of the FTC Act. The court in Proper gave a number of reasons in 
support of its conclusion of nonadmissibility, including the fact that § 5 was not an 
"antitrust law." On the latter point, Proper is precedent for nonadmissibility of FTC 
Act orders even if Clayton Act orders are ultimately deemed admissible. See Wilson, 
supra note 194, at 42-47. 
197. See Proper v. John Bene &: Sons, 295 F. 729, 732 (E.D.N.Y. 1923). This same 
reasoning had been relied upon in holding FTC orders beyond the scope of § 5(b) of 
the Clayton Act, which tolls the statute of limitations on private actions during govern-
ment proceedings, for that statute applies to actions "instituted by the United States." 
See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. 712, 713 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1963). However, the decision in Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey 
Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965), holding FTC orders within § 5(b), may be 
taken as implicit rejection, for the purposes of both § 5(a) and 5(b), of the argument 
that an FTC action is not an action "by the United States." See text accompanying 
note 203 infra; Wilson, supra note 194, at 41-42. 
198. Cf. Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 
311 (1965). 
199. On the interpretation of "civil proceedings,'' the decision in id. seem determina-
tive, for § 5(b), like § 5(a), is limited to a government "civil or criminal proceeding." See 
note 203 infra. 
200. The primary objection to the use of FTC orders as prima facie evidence in 
judicial proceedings relates to the less restrictive evidentiary standards applied in 
administrative proceedings. See Matteoni, supra note 195, at 1165; Note, supra note 195, 
at 1161-62. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, 35, Minnesota 
Mining&: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965). 
While it might be argued that an FTC order becomes a "judicial decree" once it 
is affirmed and enforced by the court of appeals, and that such orders fall within § 5(a) 
while orders which become final without review do not, this cannot be so. First, simple 
affirmance of an FTC order does not make it something other than the administrative 
order, based upon administrative findings. Second, to put the respondent at yet another 
disadvantage because he exercises his right to review seems very undesirable. 
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of the benefits of government litigation dependent upon which of 
two government agencies with concurrent enforcement responsibility 
brings suit.201 
The status of FTC Clayton Act orders under section 5(a) is now 
unclear. The decision of the Supreme Court in New Jersey Wood 
Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.,202 hold-
ing that under section 5(b) of the Clayton Act the pendency of FTC 
proceedings will toll the statute of limitations on treble damage 
actions based "in whole or in part on any matter complained of" by 
the FTC, may suggest the admissibility of FTC orders under section 
5(a). Like section 5(a), section 5(b) applies only to "civil or criminal" 
proceedings "instituted by the United States."203 The court of ap-
peals in Minnesota Mining, apparently accepting the now rejected 
proposition that sections 5(a) and 5(b) were interdependent-that 
section 5(b) should toll the statute of limitations only in those cases 
where a judgment favorable to the government would be admissible 
under section 5(a)-did hold that FTC orders are so admissible.204 
But the Supreme Court held that the two provisions are not "co-
extensive" and "venture[d] no opinion" on the section 5(a) ques-
tion.205 The Solicitor General, appearing amicus, expressed the view 
201. See Note, supra note 195, at 1163-64. 
202. 381 U.S. 311 (1965). 
203. Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964), reads in part: 
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to 
prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, ••. the running 
of the statute of limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under 
said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said pro-
ceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year there-
after •••• 
The Court reached its result by emphasizing the strong policy in favor of private 
litigants, without any explanation as to the meaning of the statutory language, which 
does not seem to encompass FTC orders any more than the language of § 5(a) does. 
See P. AllEEDA, ANrrmusr .ANALYSIS 42 n.97 (1967). The Court's only statement about 
the statutory language was that it "does not clearly encompass Commission proceed-
ings." 381 U.S. at 321 (1965). 
Even if .Minnesota Mining is taken as determining that FTC proceedings are "civil 
proceedings" brought "by the United States" within the meaning of § 5(a) as well as 
§ 5(b), the question remains whether the presence of the words "judgment or decree" 
in § 5(a) still affords a basis for holding FTC orders outside that section. One com-
mentator has expressed the view that these words afford no grounds for differentiation 
once it has been held that FTC proceedings are "civil proceedings." Wilson, supra 
note 194, at 50 n.33. But see Note, supra note 195, at 1161-62. The Solicitor General, 
appearing as amicus in .Minnesota Mining, took the position that "[t]he words 'final 
judgment or decree' ••. are the most persuasive textual arguments for excluding Federal 
Trade Commission proceedings from Section 5(a) .•• .'' Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 35, Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 
381 U.S. 311 (1965). 
204. 332 F.2d 346, 357-59 (3d Cir. 1964). 
205. 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965). The Court's holding that the two subsections of § 5 
are not coextensive was reaffirmed in Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 
(1965). 
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that FTC orders were within section 5(b) but might not be covered 
by 5(a), pointing out that the critical language "final judgment or 
decree" does not appear in 5(b).206 It can therefore hardly be said that 
the Supreme Court has resolved the section 5(a) question. Neverthe-
less, at least three lower court decisions after lviinnesota Mining have 
held FTC Clayton Act orders admissible.207 
The question for this study, assuming the admissibility of Clayton 
Act orders, is whether the actual terms of the order have any partic-
ular relevance as prima fade evidence. More particularly, where the 
terms of the order prohibit conduct other than conduct of the same 
type found illegal by the FTC, does the order itself constitute prima 
facie evidence that all conduct falling within the terms of the orde1 
has been held violative of the antitrust laws? Clearly it should not. 
Under the principles of collateral estoppel, which determine the 
evidentiary effect of a decree under section 5(a), the decree is prima 
fade evidence only as to matters distinctly put in issue and necessarily 
decided in finding a violation by the defendant.208 The prospective 
features of the decree are a result of the violation, but are not matters 
put in issue in determining whether a violation has occurred. More-
over, any plaintiff asserting that an order, by its terms, is prima facie 
evidence of a violation other than that specifically adjudicated by the 
FTC will presumably have no specific findings to rely upon and will 
not be able to establish the necessary relationship between the viola-
tion and his particular injury.209 Determination of the effect to be 
given a prior decree under section 5(a) is to be made by the court, 
which is then to instruct the jury.210 Judicial control of this question 
is in itself some safeguard against the danger described above. 
A somewhat different question is presented where the party 
206. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 35, Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co. 
v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965). The Solicitor General also 
observed that the legislative history supports the view that FTC orders are not covered 
by § 5(a). Id. at 32. 
207. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 1967 Trade Cas. ,i 72,262 
(D. Me.); Y &: Y Popcorn Supply Co. v. ABC Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 
1967); Carpenter v. Central Ark. Milk Producers Ass'n, 1966 Trade Cas. ,i 71,817 (W.D. 
Ark.). The Y & Y Popcorn case rests in part on the fact that the court of appeals 
decision in Minnesota Mining so held (text accompanying note 204 supra), and this 
holding governs within the Third Circuit. 263 F. Supp. at 711. 
208. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 567-72 (1951). 
209. E.g., suppose the respondent violated the Robinson-Patman Act in selling milk, 
and that the FTC's order extends to all "dairy" products. The plaintiff in a subsequent 
treble damage action alleges injury from discrimination in the price of butter. It seems 
clear that unless the FTC actually found a violation in the sale of butter, the order 
itself is irrelevant on this question in the subsequent action. Moreover, even if the 
order did have some relevance, it establishes no specific violation to which plaintiff's 
injury can be connected. 
210. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 571-72 (1951). 
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subject to an FTC Clayton Act order has violated the order, and 
that fact has been determined in a civil penalty or contempt action. 
May a private litigant who is allegedly injured by the conduct 
violating the order maintain a treble damage action charging a 
violation of the Clayton Act and introduce the civil penalty or 
contempt judgment under section 5(a) as prima fade evidence of 
that fact? In the civil penalty case, at least, the action is literally 
a civil proceeding brought by the United States under an "anti-
trust law."211 This is so even if FTC orders themselves are not 
covered by section 5(a). A contempt action is somewhat more dif-
ficult to bring within the coverage of section 5(a), for contempt 
actions are neither specifically authorized by the Clayton Act nor 
brought by the Department of Justice. Admissibility of a contempt 
judgment may then rest upon recognition that the contempt pro-
ceeding is ancillary to and part of the initial proceeding under the 
antitrust laws, and, in turn, upon the admissibility of the FTC's 
order.212 Whatever the conceptual difficulties, sound reasons exist 
for granting the injured party the benefits of either the penalty or 
contempt action, if those judgments establish statutory violations. 
The basic difficulty with admitting judgments based upon order 
violations is that they do not necessarily establish the violation of 
the underlying antitrust statute which is necessary to the maintenance 
of plaintiff's action. The question may be put in terms of whether 
such a judgment is "to the effect that the defendant has violated 
[one of the 'antitrust'] laws" within the meaning of section 5(a),213 
but it is more fundamental than whether the literal language of 
the statute has been satisfied. Permitting a plaintiff to establish an 
antitrust violation by reliance on a previous determination that an 
antitrust decree or order has been violated places undue weight 
211. Civil penalty suits are expressly provided for in the Clayton Act, and are to 
be brought by the "United States." Clayton Act § ll(l), 15 U.S.C. § 2l(l) (1964). 
212. In Simco Sales Serv. of Pa., Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., 213 F. Supp. 505, 507 
(E.D. Pa. 1963), the plaintiff asserted that a plea of guilty to a charge of criminal con-
tempt based upon violations of a judicial consent decree was admissible under § 5(a) 
of the Clayton Act. The court stated that if the contempt judgment was instituted to 
compel compliance, or to punish violation, it was "ancillary to and, therefore, a 'pro-
ceeding under' the laws for the enforcement of which the decree was entered." See 
Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private Action: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 CALIF. 
L. REv. 627, 644 (1965). 
In Simco, the contempt judgment was ancillary to a consent judgment, which was 
not itself admissible under § 5(a). The court concluded that the admissibility of the 
contempt judgment was not dependent upon the admissibility of the underlying decree, 
as the congressional policy reflected in the exclusion of consent judgments was not 
contravened by admission of the guilty plea in the contempt proceedings. A similar 
argument may be advanced in the case of FTC orders, if such orders are ultimately held 
inadmissible. 
213. Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). 
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upon the remedial aspects of the decree.214 Yet there is no simple 
resolution of the issue, for in some cases, either because of the lan-
guage of the order or the nature of the violating conduct, the pen-
alty or contempt judgment does represent a finding of statutory 
violation.215 In such cases, the judgment ought not be deemed in-
admissible simply on the facile assertion that the enforcement ac-
tion was not literally brought to establish a statutory violation. 
The effect of a FTC order on subsequent treble damage litiga-
tion has been considered to this point in terms of a plaintiff who 
desires to use the order to establish violation. There may also be 
occasions when the defendant will attempt to assert the order in 
defense. For example, the FTC might enter an order prohibiting 
a type of conduct (such as, discriminating in price between com-
peting purchasers) but exempting certain acts which would other-
wise be proscribed (for instance, "nothing contained herein shall 
prohibit price differentials of five per cent or less"). In a subsequent 
proceeding, the plaintiff may allege that conduct within the ex-
empting proviso violates the Robinson-Patman Act. Such an alle-
gation might be based either (1) on some of the very conduct which 
was considered in the proceedings leading to the issuance of the 
order, or (2) on conduct by the defendant after the order has been 
issued. In the former case, the exempting clause is likely to pre-
clude plaintiff's use of the order as prima facie evidence.216 In both 
cases, the determination of the FTC reflected in the order will have 
at least some impact as precedent for a finding of no violation. But 
in neither case should the exempting clause be considered a com-
plete bar to the private plaintiff attacking conduct within it. Apart 
from the difficulty of binding a plaintiff in a judicial proceeding 
by the use of administrative findings made in a proceeding to which 
he was not a party, an exempting clause of the type described above 
is neither an authorization for the exempted conduct nor, at least 
in some cases, a finding that the conduct in question does not vio-
late the statute. The clause is simply recognition that such conduct 
ought not be prohibited, either because it does not violate the stat-
214. This question was raised in Simco Sales Serv. of Pa., Inc. v. Air Reduction 
Co., 213 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D. Pa. 1963), discussed in note 235 supra. The court felt 
that the issue could not be resolved without full consideration of the terms of the order 
and of the facts involved in the contempt proceedings. See Comment, supra note 212, 
at 644-47. 
215. The most obvious case is where the order is in the language of the underlying 
statute. 
216. This might not be the case if the FTC's findings indicate that the conduct 
within the exempting clause did in fact violate the underlying statute. In such a case, 
the proceeding might still be prima fade evidence of violation even though the FTC 
did not, for reasons related only to the remedy, prohibit such conduct. 
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ute or because as a remedial matter the conduct does not seem sig-
nificant enough to warrant the cost of enforcement. It is difficult 
to see how this type of clause differs in any very substantial way 
from outright dismissal of the case by the FTC, insofar as the ex-
empted conduct is concerned. And the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that dismissal of a case by the FTC on findings of no violation 
would not bar a private plaintiff from maintaining a cause of ac-
tion under the same statute on the same facts.217 Finally, private 
litigation attacking the legality of the conduct exempted from the 
FTC's order is not likely to result in any undue interference with 
the FTC's enforcement of the balance of the order. 
More difficult questions arise when a private plaintiff attacks, 
as a violation of the antitrust laws, conduct by the defendant which 
is either required by the mandatory provisions of a FTC order, or 
is fully in accord with a detailed compliance program set forth in 
the order. In such a case, the order will undoubtedly have strong 
precedential effect. The court is likely to resolve questions of pos-
sible violations in favor of the defendant, to the extent that this is 
possible, simply to avoid creating a conflict with the order.218 But 
if such a conflict does exist, the court must either disrupt the en-
forcement efforts of the FTC or, in essence, bind the plaintiff 
through administrative action to which he was not a party.219 Al-
though the present study is already far too long to consider this 
question in detail, it should be noted that such conflicts may arise 
when affirmative orders are entered. 
II. THE ScoPE OF CLAYTON Acr CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS 
A. Introduction: The Problem in Focus 
The present study began with the proposition that what an or-
der says cannot be evaluated without understanding what an order 
does. Nor can the variant array of effects which may follow upon 
entry of the order be fully considered without an examination of 
217. See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961) (" ••• 
just as the Government is not bound by private antitrust litigation to which it is a 
stranger, so private parties, similarly situated, are not bound by government litigation."). 
218. This may be done by determining that although the defendant's conduct 
would, in the absence of the FTC order, constitute a violation, the fact that it is 
done pursuant to order removes defendant's responsibility for the conduct. In 
short, the presence of the decree means that defendant is no longer a responsible 
actor. See K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d I, 4 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). 
219. The court in id., avoided the question by finding that conduct by the Amer-
ican Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) pursuant to judicial 
decree did not in fact violate the antitrust laws, thereby avoiding what it described 
as "a very perplexing problem long existing in federal antitrust law." Id. at 3. 
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why they are what they are. Most important for our purposes, what-
ever the complexities of legislative history and procedural detail, 
is recognition that through "bits and pieces" legislation and the 
judicial struggles with the legislative product the role of the FTC, 
both as to the courts and the respondents, has almost imperceptibly 
changed. The reviewing court no longer plays a major role in en-
forcement: the FTC's order is more likely to be literally applied 
in enforcement proceedings. At the same time, the threat of pen-
alties and the formalization of compliance and "advice-giving" pro-
cedures have increased the FTC's bargaining strength. In short, the 
FTC is perhaps on the threshold of becoming a full-blown regu-
latory agency. Examination of the scope of FTC orders goes, then, 
to more than the simple question of what is "fair" to a given re-
spondent, although this is surely a relevant question. The order 
itself becomes the critical element in the FTC's continuing enforce-
ment role. 
The dilemma is clear enough. A guilty respondent must be pre-
vented from repeating the same violation. But prohibitions must 
be written in words, and words are slippery and imprecise things. 
The difficulties of prohibiting particularized forms of human con-
duct in understandable terms are compounded when the statutory 
standards which govern the respondent's acts are themselves unduly 
vague. 
If words are slippery, so indeed are some respondents. It is easy 
to repeat the same basic violation, and to achieve the same goals, 
in a somewhat different form. If the order is not to be evaded, it 
must in at least some cases prohibit conduct which is different from, 
but simply a variant of, the original violative conduct.220 The need 
for at least some degree of clarity may in such cases call for orders 
which incidentally prohibit conduct which does perhaps violate the 
statute but is basically dissimilar from the original violation. Indeed, 
in some cases an effective order cannot be entered without a pro-
hibition of some conduct which is in fact lawful; the desirability 
of the lawful conduct must then be weighed against the dangers 
created by evasion of the order.221 This may not be ideal, but it is 
the best we can expect. 
220. E.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); All-Luminum Prods., 
Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ~ 16,665 (FTC 1963). See FTC v. 
Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 392 (1959). 
221. See Separate Statement of Commissioner Elman in Ace Books, Inc., [1965-
1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ~ 17,273 at 22,380-81 (FTC 1965). It has been 
stated that the "Commission .•. apparently may not enjoin lawful activity related to 
the violation in order to assure a return to competitive conditions." Louis, The Scope 
and Enforcement of Robinson-Patman Act Cease and Desist Orders, 10 VU.L. L. REv. 
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But the benefit derived from effectively prohibiting renewed 
violations must not be overborne by injury to the public, funda-
mental unfairness to the respondent, or the disruption of admin-
istrative and judicial machinery. These are strong countervailing 
considerations which determine the boundaries within which the 
FTC operates, considerations which are not banished by asserting 
that a violator should expect to be "fenced in" or that the respon-
dent who objects to the breadth of an order is simply seeking a 
chance to violate the underlying statute without imposition of sanc-
tions. 
The unfairness of subjecting a respondent to a penalty for vio-
lation of an order whose terms he cannot understand need not be 
belabored, other than to note that such unfairness was the primary 
concern in Broch.222 It is as a device for ameliorating such unfair-
ness that the availability of advisory rulings is most pertinent. Fre-
quently orders objected to as unduly vague are in statutory language, 
leading to the suggestion that respondent is not prejudiced by the 
order because he is subject to damage actions based on the same 
vague standards anyway. But more uncertainty can be tolerated 
when the sanction rests on proof of individual damage in a civil 
action than when violation may result in a penalty of $5,000 per 
day. Nor is this suggestion responsive to the argument that the FTC 
is under a duty to formulate standards more precise than those of 
the statute. 
Apart from such unfairness to the individual respondent, the 
vague or ambiguous order may also run counter to the same policies 
which should determine an order's breadth. To the extent uncer-
tainty is present, an order becomes more or less broad depending 
on its ultimate construction. The respondent's conduct is likely to 
be governed as much by what the order might say as what it does 
say, at least if he believes that the FTC adheres to a broad inter-
pretation. Broad orders-orders prohibiting conduct that in vary-
ing degrees differs from that on which the order is based-may effec-
tively prohibit repetition of the initial violation. Moreover, they 
need not be overly vague, for such orders may be precise and easily 
understood. But a broad order may forestall legitimate conduct to 
a degree that the damage caused to the public more than offsets 
457, 484 (1965). But there is no basis for distinguishing between the FTC Act and Clayton 
Act on this question, and the power of the FTC under § 5 of the FTC Act to prohibit 
lawful conduct, in at least some circumstances where effective enforcement requires, 
seems established. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429-31 (1957); Vanity Fair 
Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962). 
222. See text accompanying note 94. 
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whatever is gained by the effectiveness of the prohibition. This is 
of particular concern with Robinson-Patman Act orders, where the 
public interest often demands that the respondent be encouraged 
to walk close to the line of illegality.223 The tendency of broad or-
ders to restrict lawful activity is aggravated when the FTC, armed 
with a broad order, is able to bring great pressure to hear with its 
demands for compliance. The cost and likelihood of success in con-
testing with the FTC may become controlling elements in pricing 
decisions. A rational business judgment resting on these factors may 
work to the detriment of the public. 
In some cases broad orders simply state statutory standards, so 
that one may assume that even the conduct prohibited which differs 
from the initial violation would in fact also violate the statute. The 
FTC, for example, upon finding a violation of section 2(a) in the 
use of a quantity discount schedule, may simply order respondent to 
comply with section 2(a).224 Arguably no lawful conduct is restrained. 
But the question of violation will now he determined in a civil 
penalty suit. The primary responsibility for making findings and 
formulating standards should rest in the first instance on the FTC, 
not the courts: sanctions are to be imposed at the behest of the FTC 
on the basis of its initial findings of violations. Whether or not the 
FTC is in fact peculiarly competent to deal administratively with 
these matters, it must carry out the role assigned to it. The entry 
of a broad order of the type described above transfers the FTC's 
role as the "court of first instance" to the court hearing the civil 
penalty suit. If the conduct before that court is unrelated to the 
conduct initially examined by the FTC, the court must proceed 
without the benefit of prior administrative adjudication.225 
Obviously one cannot carry this "administrative-judicial func-
tion" analysis too far. Some conduct cannot effectively be prohibited 
without requiring the court to make determinations of the kind 
which are appropriate for administrative adjudication, and if the 
system is to work at all it must do so. And the argument that some 
determinations under the Clayton Act are peculiarly administrative 
is belied by the fact that district courts constantly make precisely 
223. See Louis, supra note 221, at 463; Shniderman, The Impact of Robinson-
Patman Act on Pricing Flexibility, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 173 (1962). See generally F. 
ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER TilE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, 543-47, 549-51 (1962). 
224. The FTC has been known ta enter such an order. See Samuel H. Moss, Inc., 
36 F.T.C. 640, 649-50 (1943), affd, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945). 
225. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 185, at 607-11; L. JAFFE, JUDICtAL CON-
TROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcnoN 274-83 (1965); Shniderman, Federal Trade Commission 
Orders Under the Robinson-Patman Act: An Argument for Limiting Their Impact 
on Subsequent Pricing Conduct, 65 HARv. L. REv. 750 (1952). 
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the same determinations, without any administrative involvement, 
in treble damage actions. Nevertheless, courts should not assume 
such responsibilities without some demonstration that effective en-
forcement demands it.226 
B. General Standards on Permissible Scope of Administrative 
Orders: NLRB and FTC Compared 
The Clayton Act simply provides that if the FTC "shall be of 
the opinion that any of the provisions of said sections have been or 
are being violated, it . . . shall issue . . . an order requiring such 
person to cease and desist from such violations .... "227 The basic 
purpose of the order is therefore to prevent repetition of the kind 
of violation found by the FTC in the first instance. But the gen-
erality of the statute offers little assistance in determining the bound-
aries to the FTC's discretion in achieving this goal. 
Any examination of the permissible scope of FTC orders neces-
sarily begins with NLRB v. Express Publishing Co.228 While the case 
involves an order of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
the standards set forth have been accepted as applicable to admin-
istrative orders generally and, more particularly, to Clayton Act 
orders of the FTC.229 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
at the time condemned the following acts as unfair labor practices: 
(1) refusal to bargain in good faith-section 8(a)(5); (2) employer 
domination of, interference with, or financial support of a union-
section 8(a)(2); (3) discrimination in hiring or in connection with 
tenure of employment on the basis of union membership--section 
8(a)(3).230 Section 8(a)(l) made it an unfair labor practice "to inter-
226. A broad order may work yet another kind of hardship in cases where re-
spondent is subject to such an order but his competitors are not. Such inequality 
may not only be unfair, but may work competitive damage to respondent. The bal-
ance of the firms in the industry, aware that the FTC cannot seek direct sanctions 
against them, can be more flexible than respondent. See generally L. JAFFE, supra 
note 225, at 272-73; Comment, Permissible Scope of Cease and Desist Orders: Legis-
lation and Adjudication by the FTC, 29 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 706, 723 (1962). See also 
Rabiner &: Jontow, Inc., (1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1J 17,709 
(FTC 1966) (dissenting opinion). 
The FTC has typically denied requests that its order be stayed pending the entry 
of similar orders against competitors, and it has been upheld by the courts. See FTC 
v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 
U.S. 411 (1958); Rabiner &: Jontow, Inc., supra, affd, 386 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3390 (U.S. April 8, 1968). 
227. 15 U.S.C. § 2l(b) (1964) (emphasis added). 
228. 312 U.S. 426 (1941). 
229. See, e.g., FTC v. Henry Broch &: Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1962); FTC v. Morton Salt 
Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc., 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962). 
230. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964). 
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£ere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in Section 7."231 Section 7, in turn, provided: 
[E]mployees shall have the right to self-organization to form, join or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion.232 
The NLRB concluded that respondent had violated section 8(5) 
of the NLRA by refusing to bargain in good faith, and that the re-
fusal to bargain, together with statements made to employees during 
the dispute, constituted a violation of section 8(1). No other anti-
union activities were found. The first portion of the NLRB's order 
specifically directed the employer to bargain in good faith. The 
second part of the order, attacked on review, directed the employer to 
cease and desist from 
[i]n any manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, 
join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their ~own choosing, and to engage in concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.233 
In short, all forms of infringement of section 7 rights were pro-
hibited, including conduct declared to be unfair labor practices in 
section 8(2) and 8(3). 
The Supreme Court struck virtually all of the "catchall" pro-
vision. The NLRA permitted the NLRB, upon the finding of an 
unfair labor practice, to direct respondent to cease and desist "from 
such unfair labor practice"234 and authorized the court of appeals 
to enforce, modify, or set aside NLRB orders. Because the statute 
specified judicial enforcement, the Court indicated that NLRB or-
ders should be governed by judicial injunction standards. A federal 
court may "restrain acts which are of the same type or class as un-
lawful acts which the court has found to have been committed or 
whose commission in the future, unless enjoined, may fairly be 
anticipated from the defendant's conduct in the past," but it is not 
authorized, upon finding a statutory violation, to issue "an injunc-
tion broadly to obey the statute and thus subject the defendant to 
contempt proceedings if he shall at any time in the future commit 
231. NLRA § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § I58(a)(l) (1964). 
232. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). 
233. Quoted at 312 U.S. 430. 
234. NLRA § lO(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). 
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some new violation unlike and unrelated to that with which he 
was originally charged."235 So too the authority conferred on the 
NLRB to restrain the illegal practice found "is not an authority 
to restrain generally all other unlawful practices which it has neither 
found to have been pursued nor persuasively to be related to the 
proven unlawful conduct.''236 The Court concluded that "[t]o justify 
an order restraining other violations it must appear that they bear 
some resemblance to that which the employer has committed or 
that danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated 
from the course of his conduct in the past."237 
The decision in Express Publishing does not rest on any fear 
that the order would restrain legitimate conduct. Presumably, any 
violation of the order would violate the underlying statute. The 
opinion is therefore not directly concerned with the agency's ability 
to restrain legitimate conduct in order effectively to prohibit repeti-
tion of the basic violation. The decision rests primarily on the 
ground that a contempt proceeding is an inappropriate forum for 
determining questions of statutory violation in the first instance, 
not because of anything peculiar about contempt proceedings as 
such, but because Congress has vested the primary responsibility 
for making such determinations elsewhere.238 
The Court did not hold that an order like the one which was 
before it is always impermissible. In several earlier cases the Court 
had upheld orders in terms similar to those it was now striking. 
It did not suggest that those cases were wrongly decided, but dis-
tinguished them on the ground that they did not involve 
isolated acts in violation of the right of self-organization, like the 
refusal to bargain here, but ... persistent attempts by varying 
methods to interfere with the right of self-organization in circum-
stances from which the Board or the court found or could have 
found the threat of continuing and varying efforts to attain the same 
end in the future.230 
The Court's distinction pointed the direction that subsequent cases 
involving attacks on broad orders would take. 
The restrictive standards of Express Publishing, as applied to 
the FTC, must be weighed against repeated judicial emphasis on 
the FTC's broad discretion in determining the appropriate remedy 
against future violations. Time and again the courts have stated that 
235. 312 U.S. at 435-36. 
236. 312 U.S. at 433. 
237. 312 U.S. at 437. 
238. See L. JAFFE, supra note 225, at 277, 281 (1965). 
239. 312 U.S. at 437-38. 
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the FTC is an adn1inistrative agency with developed expertise in 
the matters which it administers.240 Its judgment with respect to 
remedy must be accepted except in those cases where it has clearly 
abused its discretion. The classic statement, invariably cited when-
ever an FTC order is upheld, appears in FTC v. Jacob Siegel Co.241 
There respondent violated section 5 of the FTC Act by selling coats 
under the name "Alpacuna," which, the FTC held, suggested that 
they contained vicuna when in fact they did not. Among other things, 
the FTC's order prohibited the use of the name "Alpacuna." Re-
spondent contended that the order should have required only that 
use of the trade name be coupled with qualifying language indi-
cating the absence of vicuna. The Court actually held that because 
there was no FTC consideration of this less restrictive alternative, 
it could not determine whether the FTC's "discretion" had been 
"abused."242 The case was therefore remanded for FTC reconsidera-
tion. This specific holding, requiring the FTC to employ less re-
strictive prohibitions if they are adequate to remedy the violation, 
is of considerable significance. But it has had less impact than the 
Court's statements that judicial review "extends no further than to 
ascertain whether the Commission made an allowable judgment in 
its choice of remedy" and that the FTC "has wide latitude for 
judgment and the courts will not interfere except where the remedy 
selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to 
exist."243 Such statements may not resolve particular cases, especially 
when the FTC routinely enters broad orders in statutory language 
without apparent use of its "expertise," but they do create in re-
viewing judges a state of mind receptive to the FTC's order which 
may, in an area of uncertain standards, be determinative. 
Siegel and Express Publishing are the two leading early cases 
on the scope of administrative orders. Neither involved orders under 
the Clayton Act; indeed, the latter did not involve the FTC at all. 
Yet both cases are persistently relied upon in Clayton Act cases.244 
Should NLRB orders, FTC Act orders, and FTC Clayton Act or-
ders be adjudged under the same standards? Should the agency have 
greater discretion in one case than another? 
240. See generally Austern, Five Thousand Dollars a Day, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST 
SECTION 285, 312 (1962). 
241. 327 U.S. 608 (1946). 
242. On reconsideration, the FTC entered an order permitting respondent to use 
the name "Alpacuna" in conjunction with language stating actual fiber and material 
content. Jacob Siegel Co., 43 F.T.C. 256 (1946). 
243. 327 U.S. at 612, 613. 
244. E.g., heavy reliance was placed on Siegel in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 
470 (1952). For reliance on Express Publishing, see cases cited in note 229 supra. 
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No detailed comparison of NLRB and FTC orders can be made 
at this point. But although Express Publishing has been said to be 
applicable to both, the courts have imposed stricter limitations in 
terms of parties, geographic area, and type of conduct prohibited 
on orders of the NLRB.245 While the courts have either not ob-
served these differences or have not felt called upon to explain them, 
they have not escaped notice. It has been suggested that the disparity 
may be attributable to the historic suspicion of the injunction in 
labor disputes, particularly when aimed at a union. But this ex-
planation is not entirely satisfactory, as Professor Jaffe has pointed 
out, for the NLRB order does no more than create a different sanc-
tion for violation: in many cases, a private cause of action may be 
based on the same violation anyway.246 It has also been suggested 
that FTC orders are more likely to be "legislative" in character 
than NLRB orders, which, because of the specificity of the statutory 
provision defining unfair labor practices, are primarily "adjudica-
tive.''247 Put another way, the FTC is charged with a greater duty 
to fill in the precise details and formulate standards for the legis-
lation which it enforces than is the NLRB. And to the extent this 
function is performed by an order, the agency must be given a 
broader range of discretion than when its order is purely remedial. 
While one may doubt the utility of "legislative-adjudicative" labels 
in this setting,248 there is merit in this explanation, insofar as it 
deals with NLRB orders and FTC Act orders. I do not find it a 
basis for distinguishing NLRB orders and Clayton Act orders, for 
reasons that appear below. However, little attention has been paid 
to what seems to me a strong argument for restricting FTC orders 
to a greater degree than those of the NLRB. NLRB orders are en-
forced through the contempt process. If the concerns expressed in 
Broch over the effect of the Finality Act on the permissible scope 
of orders are legitimate, do they not also suggest a basis for dis-
tinguishing FTC orders from those of the NLRB?249 
245. Compare cases cited in note 363 infra with cases cited in note 436, infra. 
246. See L. JAFFE, supra note 225, at 278-79. 
247, This analysis is a very brief restatement of that in Comment, supra note 226, 
particularly at 7II-13. The fundamental iclea here expressed by the author of the 
comment is sound to a point. The comment draws distinctions for permissible scope 
purposes between FTC orders and NLRB orders, treating FTC Act and Clayton Act 
orders alike for this purpose. It is on the latter point that I cannot agree. 
248. See L. JAFFE, supra note 225, at 264. 
249. The only court which has directly confronted the relationship between FTC 
and NLRB orders relied on the difference in enforcement procedures to restrict the 
FTC to a greater degree. In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FTC, 192 F.2d 535 
(7th Cir. 1951), the court concluded that an FTC Act § 5 order could not be directed 
against respondent's "officers, agents, representatives and employees," although vir-
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Whatever the relationship between Clayton Act orders and or-
ders of the NLRB, the same basic standards have been applied to 
FTC and Clayton Act orders.250 But in my judgment the FTC 
should have a narrower range of permissible discretion in Clayton 
Act cases. Section 5 of the FTC Act contains only a broad condem-
nation of "unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices."251 Congress made no attempt specifically 
to define unlawful trade practices. This task was given to the FTC, 
and to the FTC alone. Its broad discretion in determining what 
practices are "unfair" has long been recognized.252 The FTC's role 
in formulating substantive standards is carried out, in part, by its 
section 5 orders. To a considerable degree, such orders are defini-
tional; they simply contain a statement that a particular practice is 
in fact "unfair." To the extent that an order carries out this function, 
it should be judicially restricted only if the FTC has gone beyond 
the limits of its authorization to establish substantive standards.2~3 
Such orders also perform remedial functions. Once the unfair prac-
tice is defined, its repetition must be prohibited. In determining 
whether the remedy is appropriate to the stated unfair practice, the 
courts need not and should not be as deferential toward the FTC. 
But the FTC's role with respect to the Clayton Act is markedly dif-
ferent. Of course the statute, particularly with the Robinson-Pat-
man Act amendments, is vague. But no one would suggest that it 
tually every FTC order is so drafted and although the court recognized that such 
provisions in NLRB orders had been upheld. But because of the differences in enforce-
ment procedures, the court concluded that the FTC was subject to more restrictive 
standards. In Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954), the same 
court in a perfectly consistent manner upheld the inclusion of such language in a 
Clayton Act § 3 order, pointing out that (at the time) Clayton Act orders, like NLRB 
orders, were enforced through contempt. Reynolds was later overruled on this point, 
however. Mandel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 254 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 385 
(1959). 
250. This is most tlearly demonstrated by the continuing reliance on Jacob Siegel 
Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946), in Clayton Act cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 
343 U.S. 470 (1952); FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1962). 
Moreover, the Broch dictum, suggesting a closer scrutiny of Clayton Act orders 
subject to Finality Act procedures,· has also had an impact on FTC Act orders, even 
though such orders have been subject to similar enforcement procedures since 1938 
and courts had apparently not thought the change in procedures relevant to the con-
tent of orders from 1938 through 1962. See, e.g., Country Tweeds, Inc. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 
144 (1964); Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1962); Korber Hats, Inc. v. 
FTC, 311 F.2d 358 (1st Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court itself has indicated that its ob-
servations in Broch are relevant to FTC Act orders. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 
U.S. 374, 392 (1965). 
251. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1964). 
252. The most recent and perhaps most su·iking example is FTC v. Brown Shoe 
Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). 
253. See Comment, supra note 226, at 711-14, 717-21, with the caveat expressed in 
note 247 supra. 
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is as broad, or the violations as ill-defined, as the FTC Act. It has 
never been suggested, for example, that section 5 orders may simply 
prohibit "unfair methods of competition."254 The very fact that 
Clayton Act orders in statutory form are common, and thought 
necessary on occasion, is indicative of the differences between the 
two statutes. Because the prohibitions of the Clayton Act are more 
narrowly defined, the FTC does not have the same broad defini-
tional authority which it has under section 5. Its function under 
the Clayton Act is primarily remedial. Moreover, Congress did not 
give the FTC sole responsibility for the development of Clayton 
Act standards. The judiciary has a concurrent role, for it must 
apply such standards, without administrative assistance, at the be-
hest of the Department of Justice or private litigants.255 Since FTC 
and judicial standards must be coordinated the FTC cannot be 
given as broad a range of discretion in defining illegal practices 
under the Clayton Act. 
Moreover, the dangers of restraining lawful conduct are signifi-
cantly greater in Clayton Act cases than in at least those section 5 
cases dealing with deceptive practices. Particularly where pricing 
conduct is involved, it is often desirable that firms approach the 
line of illegality. By contrast, the public loses little when an order 
prevents conduct which comes close to being deceptive, but is not. 
C. Permissible and Desirable Scope of Clayton Act Orders 
I. General Standards: l\forton Salt Through Broch, et seq. 
Specific standards governing the permissible scope of Clayton 
Act orders were slow to develop. This is attributable in part to the 
fact that few respondents sought review, because prior to the Finality 
Act the respondent could wait to question the FTC's order until 
the FTC sought enforcement.2.;6 Moreover, most orders entered by 
the FTC prior to 1945 were narrowly drawn. Seldom could they 
be read to prohibit legitimate conduct. Nor are the early standards 
applied by the FTC readily discernible, for its orders and findings 
254. "I can not conceive of an order being issued simply commanding a cor-
poration to cease and desist from unfair methods of competition, saying nothing 
more. The defendant could not know what he was ordered to desist from. The order, 
I assume, by necessity must specify the thing which he must desist from." 51 CONG. 
REc. 12,791 (1914) (remarks of Senator Sutherland). 
255. Clayton Act §§ 4, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 25 (1964). The Department of Justice 
has very rarely attempted to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act, leaving that role to 
the FTC. Sec F. ROWE, supra note 223, at 40 (1962); EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINA· 
TION LAW 682-84 (1959). 
256. See text accompanying note 104 supra. 
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of fact were not regularly accompanied by opinions until 1955.257 
The FTC's practices in entering Clayton Act orders, and the judi-
cial response to these practices, will be discussed in detail in suc-
ceeding sections. But some general standards have now developed, 
and a brief discussion of several leading cases at this point will give 
direction to what follows. 
In its first major decision on the scope of Clayton Act orders, 
FTC v. 11-:forton Salt Go.,258 the Supreme Court applied the stan-
dards of Express Publishing. Respondent had violated section 2(a) 
by regular use of an established quantity discount schedule, ad-
versely affecting competition on the purchaser (secondary) level. 
The FTC's order prohibited any discrimination between competing 
wholesalers, and between competing retailers, with the proviso that 
differentials of less than five cents per case which did not adversely 
affect secondary line competition were not prohibited.259 The 11for-
ton Salt order was significantly broader, in its flat prohibition of all 
discrimination between competing purchasers, than most section 
2(a) orders previously issued. With the exception of the exempting 
proviso, the order was upheld by the Court, which stated that the 
order was confined to the precise practices adjudged illegal and was 
therefore within the Express Publishing standards. This was ob-
viously not literally so. For example, the language of the Morton 
Salt order clearly prohibited all discriminatory functional discounts 
between competing wholesalers. While such discounts may be il-
legal, the use of such discounts could hardly be said to be reasonably 
related to Morton's use of a quantity discount schedule.200 Never-
257. 2 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 486 (1958). 
258. 334 U.S. 37 (1948). 
259. The order prohibited respondent 
from discriminating directly or indirectly in the price of [table salt] products of 
like grade and quality as among wholesale or retail dealers purchasing said salt 
when the differences in price are not justified by differences in the cost of manu-
facture, sale or quantities in which such products are sold or delivered: 
(a) By selling such products to some wholesalers thereof at prices different 
from the prices charged others, who in fact compete in the sale and distribu• 
tion of such products; provided, however, that this shall not prevent price 
differences of less than 5 cents per case which do not tend to lessen, injure 
or destroy competition among such wholesalers. 
(b) By selling such products to some retailers thereof at prices different 
from the prices charged other retailers, who in fact compete in the sale and 
distribution of such products; provided, however, that this shall not prevent 
price differences of less than 5 cents per case which do not tend to lessen, 
injure or destroy competition among such rettailers. 
(c) By selling such products to any retailer at prices lower than prices 
charged wholesalers whose customers compete with such retailer. 
For the purposes of comparison, the term "price" so used in this order takes into 
account discounts, rebates, allowances, and other terms and conditions of sale. 
Morton Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35, 45 (1944), modified, 40 F.T.C. 388, 398 (1945). 
260. A bona fide functional discount is simply a price concession designed to com• 
pensate the buyer for the performance of certain distribution functions. The simplest 
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theless, the Court may have felt that a more precisely drafted order 
could too easily be evaded. The Court also observed that the basic 
prohibitions did not forbid "noninjurious differentials."261 Why this 
was so is not clear, for apart from the narrowly limited exempting 
proviso the prohibitions in the order were not qualified by the 
statutory requirements of anticompetitive effect. The only explana-
tion for the Court's statement is that the order was limited to com-
peting purchasers. Earlier in its opinion, when dealing with the 
case on the merits, the Court had held that an injury to competi-
tion at the secondary level was established within the meaning of 
the statute whenever a seller sold goods to some customers "substan-
tially cheaper" than to their competitors.262 Assuming the correct-
ness of this standard, it would follow that any substantial discrim-
ination between competing purchasers would injure competition. 
The Court directed that the exempting proviso be modified. 
While it did not deny that the FTC could exempt all differentials 
of less than five cents, the order could not make the exemption turn 
on the absence of the statutory anticompetitive effect, for this did 
nothing more "than shift to the courts in subsequent contempt pro-
ceedings ... the very fact questions of injury to competition, etc., 
which the Act requires the Commission to determine as the basis 
for its order."263 In a fumbling way, the Court was beginning to 
see the difficult questions of agency-court relationship inherent in 
the enforcement process. 
The decision in Morton Salt brought about a dispute within the 
case is the sale of goods to wholesalers at a price lower than that charged retailers. 
Such a case presents no threat to secondary line competition, since the wholesaler and 
retailer do not compete, and has not therefore been held unlawful. Nor is such a 
functional discount covered by the Morton Salt order. 
The more difficult cases, literally covered by the Morton Salt order, involve (1) 
functional discounts to vertically integrated concerns which do compete, at one level, 
with firms not receiving such discounts (e.g., the wholesaler who also sells to some 
extent at the retail level, where he competes with a nonfavored retailer, or (2) func-
tional discounts between purchasers at the same level who perform different distributive 
functions but compete for the same buyers (e.g., the wholesaler who performs a ware-
housing function, for which he is compensated, and the wholesaler who does not). 
The FTC has generally relied on the simple proposition that substantial discriminations 
between competing purchasers injures competition in attacking such arrangements, and 
has to a considerable extent been upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Purolator Prods., 
Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); Mueller Co. 
v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963). Yet the fact that the discount received may simply 
offset additional assumed costs makes the legality of such discounts turn on considera-
tions markedly different from those reflected in .Morton Salt. See F. RowE, supra note 
223, at 174-78, 188-93 (1962); Austern, Presumption and Percipience About Competitive 
Effect Under Section 2 of tlze Clayton Act, 81 HARv. L. REV .. 773, 799-809 (1968). 
261. 334 U.S. at 54. 
262. 334 U.S. at 50. 
263. 334 U.S. at 54. 
ll60 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:1095 
FTC which culminated in the development of the so-called Ruber-
oid order,264 upheld by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Ruberoid 
Co.265 Respondent had violated section 2(a) by discriminating in 
price between competing purchasers, apparently on the basis of an 
established discount schedule. The FTC's order was simplicity it-
itself, prohibiting respondent from discriminating in price "[b]y 
selling such products of like grade and quality to any purchaser at 
prices lower than those granted other purchasers who in fact com-
pete with the favored purchaser in the resale or distribution of such 
products.' '266 
Even though Ruberoid orders have been constantly referred to 
as vague,261 the order in Ruberoid was not attacked on vagueness 
grounds. It is hard to see how it could have been, for on its face its 
meaning is perfectly clear: respondent shall not charge competing 
purchasers different prices. The meaning of the order becomes 
uncertain only if one assumes that the order does not mean what 
it says. In fact it does not, as we shall see. But this is hardly due to 
any ambiguity of the language used. Nor, it should be pointed out, 
is the Ruberoid order simply a recitation of statutory language, al-
though critics of orders cast in statutory terms often refer to the 
Ruberoid order by way of example.268 
The order was attacked on three grounds. First, it was claimed 
that since all differentials found illegal were in excess of five per cent, 
differentials of a lesser amount should have been exempted. In re-
jecting this contention, the Court emphasized that the FTC had 
found that "very small differences in price were material factors" in 
competition at the secondary (purchaser) level.260 Unless there was 
evidence that lesser differentials would not have an adverse impact 
on competition, the FTC was under no duty to exempt them.270 
Second, the violations involved discriminations between competing 
retailers, and between competing roofing contractors. The FTC had 
expressly found the evidence of discrimination among competing 
wholesalers insufficient. For this reason, respondent asserted that 
the order should not cover sales to wholesalers. The Court noted 
264. These developments are set forth in detail in Shniderman, supra note 225, at 
757-58. 
265. 343 U.S. 470 (1952). 
266. Ruberoid Co., 46 F.T.C. 379, 387 (1950). 
267. See, e.g., Long, The Administrative Process: Agonizing Reappraisal in the 
FTC, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 671, 674 (1965); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 
NATIONAL COMM. To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 168 (1955). 
268. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 226, at 706, 718 (1962). 
269. 343 U.S. at 473-74. 
270. This raises the question whether the respondent who requests exempting 
provisos in the order must carry the burden of establishing that the exempted conduct 
will not injure competition or otherwise violate the underlying statute. 
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evidence that respondent's classification of customers was ambiguous 
and did not always reflect functional differences. If evasion were to 
be blocked, discrimination among all competing purchasers had to 
be prohibited. Third, respondent objected that because the statutory 
defenses were not set out in the order, it prohibited lawful con-
duct. The Court responded that the "provisos are necessarily im-
plicit in every order" issued.271 More will be said of this ruling sub-
sequently. But it should be noted that the very vagueness in the 
Ruberoid order of which many complain was created in large part 
by the Court's efforts to assure that lawful conduct would not be 
restrained. Here is a lesson to be learned. The more carefully we try 
to prohibit only conduct which violates the statute, the more vague 
the order may become. 
The opinion in Ruberoid placed heavy emphasis on the broad 
discretion given the FTC in formulating remedies. As to this the 
Court relied primarily on its opinion in Siegel. Justice Jackson, in a 
ringing dissent,272 saw in this very discretion a correlative duty. 
Congress directed enforcement by the FTC precisely because it 
wanted "effective rules of conduct," within the broad outlines es-
tablished by legislation. The order should embody such rules and 
clarify the duties of the party subject to it. Otherwise, the whole 
administrative process is pointless. One need not accept all of this 
analysis, which suggests that the FTC's duties for formulating Clay-
ton Act standards are the same as under the FTC Act, to recognize 
that the FTC is under some affirmative duty to formulate its orders 
in workable terms related to the conduct before it. But Justice Jack-
son's standards were unworkably high, as anyone who has tried 
drafting an effective order within the confines of the underlying 
statute will readily attest. 
Justice Jackson's dissent was only that. The critical fact to the 
FTC and the lower courts was that the order was sustained. In the 
interval between the decisions in Ruberoid and FTC v. Henry Broch 
b Co.273 virtually all FTC orders entered under section 2(a) in cases 
where the violation was predicated upon a showing or allegation of 
injury at the purchaser level were in the form approved in Ruber-
oid.214 No such order was held improper by a reviewing court.275 
271. 343 U.S. at 476. 
272. 343 U.S. at 480. See discussion of the dissent in I K. DAVIS, supra note 257, at 
611 (1958); L. JAFFE, supra note 225, at 291; Comment, supra note 226, at 717-19. 
273. 368 U.S. 360 (1962). 
274. A partial listing of such orders appears in F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 507 nn.144-46. 
275. Typically, the order was upheld with the observation that it was the same 
as that upheld in Ruberoid. E.g., E. Edelmann 8: Co., 239 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1956), 
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Consent orders were in the same form. Contested and consent orders 
entered under the brokerage provision, section 2(c), continued 
simply to recite the language of that section. This was equally true of 
orders under section 2(d) and (e), dealing with the furnishing of 
promotional and advertising services or facilities, or the paying of 
allowances for them. The same pattern is discernible with respect 
to orders against exclusive dealing arrangements under section 3 of 
the Act. During this period, only two FTC orders under section 2 or 
3 were modified by reviewing courts. 276 
The dictum in the Broch case,277 calling for closer scrutiny of 
orders subject to civil penalty procedures, has brought a confused 
response. The confusion arises in part from the fact that in Broch an 
order in statutory language was in fact upheld. While the Court 
questioned the propriety of such an order under the "new" pro-
cedures, it did not indicate that it would direct its modification. Thus 
when an order virtually identical to that in Broch but subject to civil 
penalty procedures was attacked on review, the court took cognizance 
of Broch but upheld the order anyway.278 Moreover, while Broch 
was primarily concerned with vagueness, most recent orders have 
been attacked as too broad. Whether Broch is relevant has tended 
to obscure the basic question whether the change in enforcement 
procedures calls for changes in the orders themselves.279 
Nevertheless, a number of changes have appeared since 1962. 
Counsel have attacked orders with far greater frequency.28° Courts 
have been increasingly willing to confine orders more closely to the 
practices adjudged illegal. The FTC, under the constant prodding of 
Commissioner Elman,281 has begun to experiment with its orders and 
to develop defined standards with respect to permissible breadth. The 
FTC has not acceded to the demand of Commissioner Elman for 
affirmative orders, which would require the respondent to establish 
and follow particularized programs to insure that the violation could 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Moog Indus., Inc. 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), a/J'd, 
355 U.S. 411 (1958). 
276. Swanee Paper Corp. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961) (modification of 
§ 2(d) order, noting passage of Finality Act); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 
(4th Cir. 1957) (modification of § 2(a) order entered in area price discrimination case). 
277. See text accompanying note 94 supra. 
278. Western Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1963). The 
court did attempt to distinguish Broch on completely spurious grounds. 
279. Cf. United Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615, 623 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
383 U.S. 926 (1966). 
280. See Long, supra note 267, at 688. 
281. While Commissioner Elman has written a number of opinions for the FTC 
dealing with orders, most of his opinions on these questions are either dissenting or 
concurring separately. See note 309 infra. 
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not be repeated,282 on the ground that such orders would constitute 
an unwarranted interference with day-to-day business decisions.283 
There is also doubt about the FTC's power to enter such an order.284 
But the FTC's unwillingness to experiment in this direction should 
not obscure the changes which have occurred. 
In determining how closely an order should be confined to the 
practice originally held illegal, the FTC has followed the path sug-
gested in Express Publishing, where the Court emphasized that the 
violation was "isolated" and did not reveal "persistent attempts" to 
reach the same end "by varying methods."285 In recent cases, 
the FTC, and the courts, have placed emphasis on similar factors. 
If the practice was in clear violation of existing standards and 
was not simply a reflection of accepted industry practice or a mis-
judgment about legality in areas where legality is uncertain, the 
FTC has been unwilling to confine its order to the specific prac-
tice before it.286 Similarly, broad orders have been deemed justified 
where the record demonstrates that respondent has engaged in vary-
ing forms of violating conduct, or where he has a past history of 
violations.287 Conversely, if respondent acted in good faith, if his 
violation was such that he could legitimately assert that the govern-
ing law was unclear, or if his violation was technical or isolated, his 
conduct affords little basis for believing that he will repeat his 
violation or attempt to evade the order,288 and narrower orders have 
been entered. Precisely how these standards have been applied will 
soon appear. It is enough now to recognize that these various factors 
all relate to the same questions: How likely is it that respondent will 
282. Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 568, 581 (1962) (dissenting opinion); 
modified, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962); Quaker Oats Co., 60 F.T.C. 798, 812 (1962) (dis• 
senting opinion). 
283. Quaker Oats Co., 60 F.T.C. 798, 809-10. See generally Auerbach, The Federal 
Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383, 508-12 
(1964). 
284. See Louis, The Scope and Enforcement of Robinson-Patman Act Cease and 
Desist Orders, 10 VILL. L. REv. 457, 478 n.147 (1965). But see Auerbach, supra note 
283, at 511-12. 
285. See text accompanying note 239 supra. 
286. Compare, e.g., Foremost Dairies, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1344, 1363 (1963), affd, 348 
F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965) (respondent demonstrated a 
"bland disregard" for the Act) and Nuarc Co., 61 F.T.C. 375 (1962) with Clairol, Inc., 
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1J 17,594 (FTC 1966) (order appears at 
31 Fed. Reg. 10,262). Also compare Swanee Paper Corp. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 
1961) with William H. Rorer, Inc. v. FTC, 374 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1967). 
287. See, e.g., Purolator Prods., Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. 
REP. 1J 16,877 at 21,891 (FTC 1964). Cf. FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 
393 (1959). 
288. These factors are all thoughtfully analyzed in detail in Louis, supra note 284, 
at 479•84. See also Comment, Permissible Scope of Cease and Desist Orders: Legisla-
tion and Adjudication by the FTC, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 706, 719-20 (1962). 
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repeat the same conduct? How likely is it that respondent will use 
variant forms to reach the same end? The emphasis has been on the 
''anticipated recidivism of the ·wrongdoer,"289 as disclosed by the 
record. 
It is not enough, however, to inquire only whether respondent 
is likely to engage in particular conduct in the future. For once it 
is determined that respondent is likely to repeat his original conduct, 
or to engage in conduct bearing a family resemblance to the original 
violation, the question remains whether such conduct will violate 
the underlying statute. Suppose Company X has violated section 
2(a) by charging a lower price to purchasers in Philadelphia than it 
charges to purchasers in New York, thereby injuring competition at 
the seller level (primary line) in Philadelphia. Further assume that 
the FTC may properly find that such conduct is likely to be repeated 
in other sections of the country. Should the FTC enter a nationwide 
order unless it is reasonably clear that the charging of discriminatory 
lower prices in other areas will injure competition and thus violate 
the underlying statute? When a broad order is entered, must the 
FTC not determine whether all the conduct which is encompassed 
by the order will in fact violate the statute? 
The FTC has not clearly articulated such standards, although 
many of its orders are fully consistent with such an approach. It is the 
failure of the FTC and courts to consider these questions adequately 
in the past that is the primary point of my criticism. This is attribut-
able, in part, to the fact that the relationship beween the underlying 
statute and the FTC order has never really been understood. 
2. The Ruberoid Principle-A Proposed Set of Standards 
What does the so-called Ruberoid order really mean? If it liter-
ally means what it says, any future discrimination between competing 
purchasers will violate the order290 irrespective of any demonstration 
that it has the adverse competitive effects which are the hallmark of 
illegality under section 2(a), and even though the discrimination is 
cost-justified or is made in good faith to meet competition wit~in the 
meaning of the statutory defenses. Similar questions might be asked 
when a company which has acquired a competing corporation in 
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act is directed not to acquire 
any competing corporation for ten years.291 Does this mean that 
289. The phrase is that of Professor Louis. Louis, supra note 284, at 483. 
290. The Ruberoid order appears in the text accompanying note 266 supra. 
291. See, e.g., International Paper Co.:-53 F.T.C. 1192 (1957); Automatic_ Canteen 
Co., 54 F.T.C.-1831 (1958). · · 
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such acquisitions violate the order, even though they might not 
adversely affect competition and might not, therefore, violate section 
7?292 Until these questions are resolved, the FTC is entering orders in 
a vacuum, without knowledge of their ultimate effect. 
1\fany early orders entered for section 2(a) violations did not 
present these difficulties. It was common practice to condition all 
prohibitions on a showing of the statutory anticompetitive effect, 
and statutory defenses were recited as provisos in the order.293 In 
short, the FTC's orders directly enforced the underlying statute as 
such. If conduct did not violate statutory standards, it did not violate 
the order. But then came Morton Salt,294 holding that the FTC 
could not condition exempting provisos on the absence of adverse 
competitive effect, since this had the effect of "shifting" to the courts 
"the very fact questions of injury to competition, etc." entrusted to 
the FTC.205 
11forton Salt could have been a case of limited significance. Re-
spondent objected to the provisos only because the presence of an 
anticompetitive effect standard in the provisos suggested that the 
fundamental prohibitions were absolute. This was denied by the 
FTC, which pointed to the fact that the order expressly permitted 
any differential which was cost-justified and further asserted that 
proof of violation of the order would require proof of practices 
"forbidden by the Act.''296 But the ground relied upon by the Court 
ultimately led the FTC to the position, which it took in the Ruberoid 
case, that Morton Salt prevented any conditioning of the prohibi-
tions of its orders on a showing of adverse competitive effect and any 
provisos recognizing statutory defenses. In an enforcement proceed-
ing, respondent was foreclosed from raising any matter which was 
litigated, or could have been litigated, in the original FTC proceed-
ing. If circumstances changed, respondent's only recourse was to seek 
modification. 
The decision in Ruberoid291 was a rejection of the FTC's posi-
292. Section 7 forbids corporate acquisitions only "where in any line of commerce 
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 
(1964). 
293. See, e.g., orders cited at F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON· 
PATMAN Ac:r 506 n.140, and in notes 354-58 infra. Such orders did not generally refer 
to the meeting competition defense, presumably because its status as an absolute de-
fense was not clear until Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). 
294. 334 U.S. 37 (1948). 
295. 334 U.S. at 54. 
296. See Shnidcrman, Federal Trade Commission Orders Under the Robinson-
Patman Act: An Argument for Limiting Their Impact on Subsequent Pricing Con-
duct, 65 HARV. L. REv. 750, 756-57 (1952). 
297. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). 
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tion and a retreat from Jl,,forton Salt. In rejecting respondent's 
argument that the order condemned lawful conduct because it con-
tained no provisos recognizing the availability of the cost justification 
and meeting competition defenses, the Court held that such provisos 
"are necessarily implicit in every order issued under the authority 
of the Act, just as if the order set them out in extenso."298 The seller 
need not seek modification, but "in a new competitive situation, in-
volving different circumstances" he may discriminate in price if he 
can justify his conduct in accord with the statutory defenses.299 The 
statutory defenses would not always be available: matters which had 
already been litigated in proceedings resulting in an order affirmed 
by the courts,300 or which could have been litigated on available 
evidence in such proceedings, are finally decided, and the same de-
fense "upon substantially similar facts" cannot be raised again. "In 
short, the seller, in contesting enforcement or contempt proceedings, 
may plead only those facts constituting statutory justification which 
it has not had a previous opportunity to present."301 
Ruberoid is, for all practical purposes, the last word on these 
questions. But it raises more questions than it answers. Most im-
portant is the question assiduously avoided by the Court: whether 
in any circumstances respondent may successfully defend against a 
charge of order violation by asserting that conduct which on its face 
violates the order does not injure competition. Throughout the 
opinion, the Court speaks only of the implicit availability of the 
statutory defenses, and more particularly, the meeting competition 
and cost justification defenses. Its recognition that factual determina-
tions involved in such defenses must in some cases be made by the 
enforcing court is a clear rejection of the broad implications which 
can be drawn from Morton Salt. But Morton Salt dealt expressly only 
with the statutory anticompetitive effect requirements. Ruberoid 
says nothing about them. Are we then to say that Morton Salt con-
tinues to preclude any examination into anticompetitive effect by 
the enforcing court? Such a result would be nonsensical. As Profes-
sor Davis has pointed out, factual determinations with respect to 
competitive effect are no more peculiarly entrusted to the FTC than 
are those concerning meeting competition or cost justification.302 
298. 343 U.S. at 476. 
299. 343 U.S. at 476. 
300. Presumably, the Court's discussion is equally applicable to any order which is 
final under the Finality Act, whether affirmed or not. 
301. 343 U.S. at 477. 
302. I K. DAVIS, supra note 257, at 608-11; accord, L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CON· 
TROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 289-90 (1965). 
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Assuming, then, that upon a proper showing of "change of 
circumstances" the enforcing court must determine whether con-
duct violating the order violates statutory anticompetitive require-
ments as well, who has the burden of proof with respect to the latter? 
Under Ruberoid, the respondent must establish the requisite change 
of circumstances to avoid the preclusive effect of the order, but having 
done so, must he also establish that his conduct does not have adverse 
competitive effects? Unlike the statutory defenses, where the burden 
of proof is always on respondent, the FTC normally bears the 
burden of establishing adverse competitive effects.303 In a penalty 
proceeding, once the requisite changed conditions are demonstrated, 
there is no apparent reason why the FTC should not bear the burden 
of establishing that respondent's conduct is anticompetitive despite 
such changes. If competitive effect is to be put in issue at all, in cases 
where because of changed circumstances the FTC's initial findings 
are no longer determinative, the FTC ought once again to bear the 
burden of establishing competitive injury.304 
In determining whether there has been a sufficient change of 
circumstances to permit the respondent to rely upon statutory de-
fenses, or to assert the absence of competitive injury, the basic ques-
tion is whether the conduct violating the order is sufficiently different 
from that which originally violated the order that the original FTC 
findings are no longer determinative of legality.305 This might come 
about either because of factual differences, or because of changes in 
or clarifications of governing legal standards. What constitutes a 
"change of circumstances" depends on the issue the respondent is 
trying to raise. For example, he may assert changes in competitive 
conditions, either throughout the industry or in his own position 
within the industry. He may have gone through an extended period 
of declining sales, or even be on the verge of bankruptcy. Proof of 
such changes should be sufficient to permit the respondent to assert 
the lack of anticompetitive effect, even where his conduct is precisely 
303. F. RowE, supra note 293, at 274. 
204. Accord, id. at 510. 
305. This presents obvious difficulties where the order is a consent order. Under 
the FTC's present consent order procedure, in effect since 1954, the order is to have 
the same effect as a litigated order, but the agreement contains no admissions of guilt 
or findings of fact. FTC Rules of Practice § 2.33, 16 C.F.R. § 2.33 (1968). What, then, 
constitutes proof of "change of circumstances" when there are no findings to deter-
mine what was litigated or what might have been at issue? The consent order repre-
sents an agreement not to engage in particular conduct. Having made such a bargain, 
respondent cannot simply be freed of it by raising matters which could have been 
raised originally. At the same time, barring a respondent from raising matters which 
it now appears he might have raised, without knowing why he did not, may work great 
hardship. See Shniderman, supra note 296, at 769-71. 
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the same as that previously adjudged illegal, if such changes have 
been recognized as significant under developed statutory standards, 
At the same time, this has little to do with the cost justification ox 
meeting competition defenses. Changed circumstances, to warrant 
the reliance on the cost justification defense in enforcement proceed-
ings, must relate either to altered legal standards or changes directly 
relevant to that defense, such as changes in cost arising from differing 
methods of delivery or manufacture, or changes in the amount of 
differential which must be justified. Much the same thing may be 
said of the meeting competition defense. A simple change in industry 
structure may not be particularly relevant to determining the avail-
ability of the defense, but changes in the manner or method of re-
sponse to the offer of another seller, or in the identity or behavior of 
the competing seller, may well be. 
Changes in legal standards or in the business environment in 
which the respondent's conduct takes place may permit a successful 
defense to a penalty suit, where the respondent's conduct violates the 
order but is not unlawful in terms of statutory standards, even 
though the order is narrowly drawn and respondent's conduct is 
precisely the same as that originally found to be in violation. But the 
Ruberoid rationale is also relevant where the respondent's own 
conduct changes. If respondent engages in conduct which is signifi-
cantly different, in terms of governing legal standards, from that 
upon which the order is based, this fact alone should permit respon-
dent to assert in penalty proceedings either the absence of injury to 
competition or the statutory defenses. Assume, for example, that the 
meeting competition defense was unavailable at the time of the FTC 
proceedings because respondent's prices undercut those offered by a 
competitor. While subject to a Ruberoid order, respondent again 
discriminates in price, but this time his low prices meet those of a 
competitor. This is a significant difference under existing statutory 
standards,306 and such proof should enable respondent to avoid the 
preclusive effect of the order itself. This does not of course mean 
that respondent will win, for other requirements of the defense may 
not be satisfied. It only means that the defense should be considered. 
The use of the "changed circumstances" standard to determine 
the applicability in enforcement proceedings of statutory anticom-
petitive requirements presents an additional difficulty. Most section 
2(a) orders are wholly silent about statutory defenses. But when the 
FTC prohibits discrimination among "competing" purchasers, it is 
306. See F. RoWE, supra note 293, at 241-42. 
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actually reformulating anticompetitive effect standards in different 
terms.307 Based on the findings before it and on existing statutory 
standards, the order represents a determination that such discrimina-
tion will injure competition. To some extent, such reformulation is 
precisely what we expect the FTC to do. If the FTC's reformula-
tion is clearly not in accord with existing statutory standards, that 
is, if the FTC is not warranted in finding that most discrimina-
tions between competing purchasers will injure competition, the 
order should be modified on review. If the order does accurately 
restate statutory standards for most conduct which it covers, it should 
not be modified simply because not every conceivable discrimination 
between competing purchasers can be said to injure competition 
(unless these cases can be eliminated from the order through exempt-
ing clauses). Effective enforcement may demand an order based upon 
probabilities. Nevertheless, if respondent can demonstrate in a sub-
sequent penalty proceeding for violation of the order that his conduct 
differs from that as to which the FTC's reformulation does represent 
existing statutory standards, the FTC should be put to proof of 
competitive injury. 
Does all this have any relevance to the permissible scope of orders 
in the first instance? The implicit availability in enforcement pro-
ceedings of the statutory defenses, and perhaps the statutory anti-
competitive requirements, clearly add flexibility to the enforcement 
process. But it should not be assumed that the FTC may enter 
broader or more uncertain orders because under Ruberoid the 
respondent is protected from unwarranted applications of the order. 
Ruberoid not only does not remedy the problems created by vague-
ness in orders, but may in fact increase them, for the insertion of 
statutory defenses, and so forth, while making orders less prohibitive, 
also adds to their uncertainty. While Ruberoid does reduce the 
danger that an overbroad order can be used to impose sanctions on 
lawful conduct, it does so only after the conduct has taken place. 
The standards set out in Ruberoid are themselves so uncertain that 
the seller operating under a broad order is not likely to determine his 
courses of conduct in reliance upon them. Finally, Ruberoid does 
no more than recognize that in some cases enforcing courts must 
resolve factual questions under statutory standards if the enforcement 
307. See Forster Mfg. Co., Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 
17,304 at 22,455 (FTC 1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 340 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
1003 (1967) ("Hence this provision of the order is not, as respondents contend, a 
'substitution' of another and arbitrary 'standard' of competitive injury for the stan-
dard set forth in the Act; it is, instead, an express embodiment of that statutory stan-
dard into an order narrowly tailored to the facts of this particular case."). 
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system is to work at all. This does not mean that "shifting" of such 
questions from the FTC to the courts is desirable, and that the FTC, 
through the use of broad orders, may do so with impunity. Ruberoid 
simply reflects practical necessity. To prohibit evasion, such orders 
may need to encompass conduct which is either flatly lawful or which 
is sufficiently different from the original conduct that inferences of 
illegality cannot legitimately be drawn. Ruberoid simply provides a 
safety valve in such cases. But unless necessity demands, the responsi-
bility given the FTC should not be "shifted." 
Ruberoid is relevant to the formulation of standards governing 
the scope of orders in a quite different way. First, by emphasizing 
that the FTC is to operate within statutory standards, it focuses 
attention on the undesirability of prohibiting conduct which does 
not, in fact, violate the statute. Second, by giving some indication of 
what an order really means, it makes possible more meaningful eval-
uation of existing standards. Third, understanding of the "changed 
circumstances" requirements of Ruberoid affords guidance in assign-
ing particular roles to the FTC, reviewing court, and enforcing court 
in a coordinated manner. 
What Ruberoid implicitly holds is that the FTC, having found 
certain conduct unlawful, may prohibit only conduct the legality of 
which can reasonably be said, on the basis of its original findings, to 
violate statutory standards. Obviously, then, it can prohibit conduct 
which is precisely the same as that adjudged illegal. If factual circum-
stances or legal standards change sufficiently, the original findings of 
illegality are no longer determinative and the question must be 
examined anew by the enforcing court.308 The FTC's order is proper, 
however, for the FTC can neither anticipate nor assume such changes. 
The same principle applies to broad orders-orders prohibiting con-
duct differing in varying degrees from that determined unlawful. 
Ideally, the order should condemn no more than conduct which, al-
though differing from the original, is sufficiently similar that its 
legality is controlled by the FTC's findings. Put another way, the FTC 
should prohibit factually different conduct, if this is deemed neces-
sary to prevent recurrence of the violation already found by it, only 
where the differences are without legal significance. But ideals are 
rarely attainable. The FTC must have the ability to prevent evasion, 
where evasion is likely. Its order must be simple and understandable 
and cannot make exceptions for all conceivable factual variants, just 
308. While respondent may not have a duty in such cases to seek modification of 
the order by the FTC, as Ruberoid makes clear, it does not follow that he should not 
do so, if time permits and some reiief can reasonably be expected. Modification of the 
order in many cases will still be preferable to the gamble involved in waiting to raise 
ibese matters in a penalty suit, 
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as it cannot anticipate future changes of circumstances. This, too, 
was recognized in Ruberoid. 
These standards can be applied by the FTC and reviewing courts 
in considering the scope of the order, recognizing a subsidiary duty 
to apply statutory standards in the enforcing court as follows. If the 
violation found by the FTC is in an uncertain area of the law or is 
unintentional or inadvertent, and if respondent has not engaged in 
other forms of conduct of a similar or related nature, the order should 
be closely confined to the original violating practice. In such a case; 
there is no demonstrated need for a more broadly dra1vn order, and 
no basis for burdening the enforcing court with the prospect of ap-
plying statutory standards under the Ruberoid formula. But in many 
cases "recidivism" in variant forms may be anticipated. Respondent 
may already have used variant means to accomplish the same ends. 
Or the violation may be flagrant, in clear violation of the under-
1 ying statute. On the basis of such factors of record, the FTC may 
enter an order barring the variant forms of conduct which the record 
demonstrates may reasonably be anticipated and which may be 
deemed illegal on the basis of the original FTC findings. The order 
should not prohibit conduct which is in fact lawful, or conduct whose 
legality is governed by standards significantly different from those 
governing the original conduct. These criteria are not of course 
absolute. The order must be also precise and understandable, and 
this calls for some leeway in drafting. Unduly detailed standards, or a 
multitude of exceptions, may make the order wholly unworkable. 309 
The reviewing court must insure that these criteria have been 
309. Several of the FTC's most recent decisions formulate standards quite similar 
to these, although given past practices and the fact that disagreement exists between 
the commissioners it is not clear that they will be generally applied. See especially 
Forster Mfg. Co., Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 17,304 at 22,455 
(FTC 1965), afj'd, 361 F.2d 340 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967). 
Apart from Commissioner Elman's call for affirmative orders and his emphasis on 
the role of advisory opinions (see text accompanying notes 181 and 282 supra), these 
standards are also, I believe, largely in accord with those which he has proposed, but 
which have not always been adhered to by the FTC. These opinions cannot be analyzed 
in detail, but the reader's attention is directed to them. See especially National Dairy 
Prods. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 18,027 at 20,430 (FTC 1967) (dissenting); Forster 
Mfg. Co., Inc., supra, at 22,456 (concurring); Ace Books, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer 
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17,273 at 22,380 (FTC 1965) (separate statement) and All· 
Luminum Prods., Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16,665 (FTC 
1963) (for the Commission). But see Foremost Dairies, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1344 (1963), afj'd, 
348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965) (for the Commission). 
See also Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 
17,303 (FTC 1965) (concurring), afj'd, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966); Dean Milk Co., 
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 17,357 (FTC 1965) (dissenting, but 
concurring on order), set aside in part, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1968); J.A. Folger & Co., 61 
F.T.C. 1166 (1962) (dissenting); Transograni Co., 61 F.T.C. 629 (1962) (for the Com-
mission); Quaker Oats Co., 60 F.T.C. 798 (1962) (dissenting); Vanity Fair Paper Mills, 
Inc., 60 F.T.C. 568 (dissenting), modified, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962). 
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applied. I£ there is no substantial evidence to support a finding of 
anticipated recidivism, the order should be confined to the original 
practice. I£ such a finding is supported by substantial evidence, the 
FTC should be given discretion within the confines suggested above. 
If the standards of the order prohibit lawful conduct, or conduct 
clearly not governed by the FTC findings, the court should modify 
the order unless it is demonstrated that such conduct must be pro-
scribed in order to prohibit, effectively and in an understandable 
manner, repetition of violations substantially similar to the original. 
In the latter· case, the court must balance the need for effective 
enforcement, including consideration of the magnitude of public 
injury likely to be caused by repetition of the original violation, 
against the dangers of overbroad prohibition. Recognition of draft-
ing realities, and of the practical difficulties in formulating vague 
statutory standards into workable ones, will result in approval of 
some orders which on their face encompass conduct significantly 
different from the original violation. In such a case, the ultimate 
safeguard must rest in the ability of the enforcement court, within 
the "changed circumstances" formula of Ruberoid, to apply statutory 
standards to such conduct.310 
There is nothing radical about these standards; they are only a 
reformulation of those tersely set out in Express Publishing. One 
purpose in stating them is to focus attention on a deficiency in exist-
ing standards. A broad order cannot be justified simply by showing 
that respondent is likely to engage in the conduct prohibited. There 
also must be a demonstration that such conduct is illegal. 
The balance of this study will consider the usefulness of these 
standards with respect to three particular aspects of cease and desist 
orders: the type of conduct prohibited, product coverage, and territo-
rial coverage. 
3. The Orders Examined-A Study and Criticism of Adminis-
trative Practices 
Separate examination of each of three particular aspects of Clay-
ton Act orders--the type of conduct prohibited and the products and 
territory covered-is likely to be somewhat misleading, for these are 
310. The use of orders prohibiting the original conduct in narrow, precisely defined 
ways and then, in addition, prohibiting "like or related" practices may also be an 
effective means of preventing evasion. It has been suggested that such orders, while 
somewhat vague, are preferable to broad orders of the usual type in at least some 
cases. See Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 487 (1962); Louis, supra 
note 284, at 477. It does not seem likely that the FTC will return to the practice of 
entering such orders. And if it is to go beyond narrow prohibition of the original 
conduct.at all, it seems pref~rable to have it do so in more precise terms. 
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not three separate problems at all. The over-all impact of an order 
must be assessed on the basis of all of its features. An order narrowly 
defining the prohibited conduct but covering all of respondent's 
products may work a greater restraint than an order limited to one 
product but prohibiting a wider variety of conduct.311 The reverse 
may also be true. Nevertheless, separate treatment of each aspect 
serves to focus on each order in a more detailed way and provides an 
analytic structure for the discussion. 
a. Conduct prohibited. Section 2(a)-price discrimination. Sec-
tion 2(a) prohibits only those discriminations in price which have 
specified adverse competitive effects.312 Such effects may be at the pur-
chaser (secondary) level, if the discrimination is between competing 
purchasers, or at the seller (primary) level, if, for example, the seller 
charges different prices in different areas for the same product.313 
The nature of the FTC's order will vary depending upon which type 
of injury is established. When the requisite injury is only at the secon-
dary level, the FTC has consistently limited its orders to discrimina-
tions between competing purchasers. Orders based on findings of 
primary level discrimination have been markedly different. For this 
reason, each will be separately considered. 
Section 2(a) orders predicated on secondary level injury. Most 
early FTC orders under section 2(a) based upon findings of secondary 
level injury were in one of three forms: (1) prohibition of "the un-
lawful discriminations in price" found in specified FTC findings;314 
(2) prohibition of discriminations found in specified findings or "sim-
ilar discriminations in price ... under substantially like circumstances 
and conditions" between competing purchasers;315 (3) prohibition of 
variant forms of discrimination where the effect was to injure com-
311. The FTC has been more inclined to enter broad orders limited to a particular 
product or products, apparently in the belief that a respondent is more likely to use 
variations on the same theme with the original product than to repeat the same con-
duct with other products. See Louis, supra note 284, at 477-78. 
312. See note 4 supra. 
313. In a very few cases, where the seller is engaged in dual distribution (e.g., sells 
both to wholesalers and retailers), injury may be found on the tertiary level (competi-
tion among customers of the supplier's customer). See generally, F. ROWE, supra note 
293, at 195-205. 
314. E.g., Agricultural Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.T.C. 296, 301-02 (1938); Christmas 
Club, 25 F.T.C. 1116, 1127-28 (1937). 
315. E.g., National Biscuit Co., 38 F.T.C. 213, 222 (1944); Vonnegut Hardware Co., 
32 F.T.C. 512, 515-16 (1941); American Crayon Co., 32 F.T.C. 306, 313-14 (1940); Nutrine 
Candy Co., 30 F.T.C. 115, 127-28 (1939); Hollywood Hat Co., 25 F.T.C. 555, 562-63 
(1937). See also Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25, 71-75 (1943); Simmons Co., 29 
F.T.C. 727, 747-48 {1939). 
Significantly, the National Biscuit order was subsequently modified on the motion 
of FTC counsel to conform to the Ruberoid order, i.e., to prohibit all discrimination 
between competing purchasers. National Biscuit Co., 50 F.T.C. 932, 936-37 (1954). 
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petition, the order simply reciting the statutory language, and making 
the order subject to statutory defenses. Some orders of the latter type 
covered virtually all forms of price discrimination,316 some only dis-
crimination between competing purchasers,317 and still others dealt 
with conduct even more narrowly defined.318 But with a few excep-
tions,319 orders reaching discriminations differing in any significant 
way from those initially found unlawful were conditioned upon a 
showing of anticompetitive effect and subject to statutory defenses.3~0 
Following the approval by the Supreme Court of the Ruberoid 
order, albeit with the statutory defenses implicit in the order, that 
order became the model for virtually every order entered in secon-
dary level injury cases to the present time.321 Orders prohibiting all 
316. E.g., National Grain Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 684, 691-92 (1941); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 31 F.T.C. 986, 993-94 (1940); United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 
1503-06 (1939); American Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. 169, 183-85 (1939). Such orders were 
also entered at a somewhat later date, but with less frequency. E.g., Ferro Enamel 
Corp., 42 F.T.C. 36, 52-55 (1946). In a similar vein, the FTC on occasion entered orders 
directing respondent not to discriminate in price "in any manner prohibited by Sec-
tion 2(a)." E.g., Samuel H. Moss, Inc., 36 F.T.C. 640, 649-50 (1943), afj'd, 148 F.2d 378 
(2d Cir. 1945); C.F. Sauer Co., 33 F.T.C. 812, 828-29 (1941). 
317. E.g., Booth Fisheries Corp., 40 F.T.C. 690, 695 (1945); Clinton Co., 34 F.T.C. 
879, 889-90 (1942); Williams 8: Wilkins Co., 29 F.T.C. 678, 681-82 (1939); Master Lock 
Co., 27 F.T.C. 982, 993 (1938). 
318. E.g., American Oil Co., 29 F.T.C. 857, 866-67 (1939) (limited to discrimination 
between General Finance Co. and its competitors); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 
F.T.C. 1228, 1259-63 (1937). See also Standard Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121, 159-60 (1939), 
enforced in part, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951) (limited to discriminations predicated 
upon volume purchased). 
319. E.g., Life Savers Corp., 34 F.T.C. 472, 478-79 (1941). 
320. In a few cases, the prohibited conduct was narrowly defined, without reference 
to FTC findings, anticompetitive effect, or statutory defenses. The best example is 
Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232, 332-34 (1936), where the order is limited 
to discriminations between Sears, Roebuck and other retail customers and defines the 
prohibited conduct in detailed terms. 
321. Orders similar to the Morton Salt order, note 259 supra, with similar exempting 
clauses, were issued in Curtiss Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237, 274-78 (1947) and Standard Oil 
Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 284-85 (1945). The Standard Oil order was modified by the FTC by 
striking the exempting provisos for differentials less than 0.5 cents per gallon, and adding 
provisos exempting discriminations "not found under the facts herein" to injure com-
petition or which were cost justified. Standard Oil Co., 43 F.T.C. 56, 57-59 (1946). After a 
remand of the case on the merits, the FTC again entered an order, this time in Ruberoid 
form. Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923, 954 (1953), set aside, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), 
affd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958). The Curtiss Candy order was also modified by striking the 
provisos exempting small differentials. Curtiss Candy Co., 48 F.T.C. 161 (1951). 
During the interim betweeµ the decisions of the Supreme Court in Morton Salt 
and Ruberoid, the FTC's practice varied. In Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 
F.T.C. 351, 388-90 (1948), set aside, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), the order was similar 
to that in Ruberoid but set out the cost justification defense. In other cases, the order 
set out the cost justification defense but prohibited only discriminations between 
competing purchasers in excess of stated percentages. U.S. Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998, 
1012-13 (1950); F 8: V Mfg. Co., 46 F.T.C. 632, 639-40 (1950). See Jacques Kreisler 
Mfg. Corp., 45 F.T.C. ~36, 143-44 (1948). Still other orders prohibited only particular 
types of discrimination between co~petitQrs. E.g., Ideal Cement Co., 47 F.T.C. 221, 
228-~9 (1950). 
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discrimination between competing purchasers have been entered in 
literally scores of cases.322 There have been no major differences be-
tween litigated and consent orders. Ruberoid orders have been en-
tered in cases where the initial violation was in the use of regular 
quantity discount schedules, nonsystematic off-list pricing, functional 
discounts, and differentials between products bearing the manufac-
turer's advertised label and those bearing the private brand labels of 
the purchasers.323 Only rarely has the FTC attempted to tailor the 
order more narrowly to the precise type of discrimination adjudged 
unlawful.324 Nor have the courts insisted that it do so.325 There has 
been virtually no demonstrable change in FTC practice, or in the at-
titude of reviewing courts, as a result either of FTC v. Henry Broch 
& Co.326 or the change in enforcement procedures. 
322. One common variant employed in cases where the "indirect purchaser" doc-
trine has been or could be employed is to define purchaser to encompass "indirect 
purchasers.'' E.g., Purolator Prods., Inc., 29 Fed. Reg. 6278 (1964); Perfect Equip. 
Corp., 58 F.T.C. 65, 70 (1961) (purchaser shall include "any purchaser buying directly 
or indirectly from respondent by means of group buying or any related device"); E. 
Edelmann &: Co., 51 F.T.C. 978, 999 (1955), afj'd, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. 
denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 51-53 (1953). 
Other orders have prohibited discrimination among competing purchasers as well 
as the charging of higher prices to purchasers whose customers compete with the 
favored purchasers. E.g., Arrow Food Prods., Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1771, 1779-80 (1962) 
(consent); Allen v. Smith, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 967, 970-71 (1958) (consent). 
323. E.g., National Dairy Prods. Corp., 31 Fed. Reg. 11,719 (1966), affd, - F.2d 
- (7th Cir. 1968) (quantity discount schedule); Purolator Prods. Inc., 29 Fed. Reg. 
6278 (1964) (functional discount), affd, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965); Borden Co., 
62 F.T.C. 130, 195 (1963), set aside, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967) (private label sales); 
American Oil Co., 60 F.T.C. 1786, 1826 (1962), set aside, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963) 
(short-term price reduction during price war); Mueller Co., 60 F.T.C. 120, 133 (1962) 
(functional discount), afj'd, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963); Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 59 
F.T.C. 674, 677-78 (1961), set aside, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962) (quantity discount 
schedule). 
324. E.g., Clairol, Inc., 29 Fed. Reg. 13,655 (1964) (consent order-covering only sales 
to competing beauty salons or distributors supplying them); Inland Rubber Corp., 62 
F.T.C. 728, 733 (1963) (consent order-limited to discrimination between competing 
purchasers where those receiving lower prices "are permitted to combine their pur-
chases with those of other purchasers .•• .''); Southwestern Sugar &: Molasses Co., 61 
F.T.C. 525, 532-33 (1962) (consent); Thompson Prods., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1252, 1278 (1959). 
325. Ruberoid orders have nearly always been upheld, often with little discussion 
apart from citation to other cases upholding them. E.g., Purolator Prods., Inc., 352 
F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1967); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 348 
F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1965); Mueller Co., 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963); E. Edelmann &: Co., 
239 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958). But see William H. 
Rorer, Inc. v. FTC, 374 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1967), directing that Ruberoid order be 
limited to discrimination between competing "retail druggists." 
326. 368 U.S. 360 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 91-94 supra. The 
only case to suggest a closer scrutiny of Ruberoid orders as such is William H. Rorer, 
Inc., 374 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1967). Respondent had, over an eight-year period, dis-
criminated between retail druggists classified as "chains" and those classified as "inde-
pendents.'' It asked that the order be limited to discriminatiorts based on such clas-
sifications. In rejecting the request, the court stressed the magnitude, duration and 
clear illegality of the violation, which in tum suggested a likelihood of other viola-
tions. Hence, the order was justified to prevent easy evasion, although the court 
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The crucial question, then, is the propriety of the Ruberoid order 
in given cases. The FTC position, in the few cases where it has felt 
called upon to explain the entry of such an order, is that it has the 
responsibility for determining the likelihood of anticompetitive ef-
fect, a responsibility which it cannot delegate to an enforcing court, 
and that where the discrimination is between competing purchasers 
such a likelihood exists. Within this framework, the order must pre-
vent easy evasion. The FTC clearly feels that orders limited to use of 
quantity discount schedules, or to discriminations based on classifi-
cations as "chains" or "independents," are too easily evaded.327 
In assessing the Ruberoid order, it should again be noted that it 
really is not vague, except insofar as it has been made so by recog-
nition that statutory defenses are implicit. Objection to such an order 
can be made on two levels. First, it can be suggested that the order 
either prohibits lawful conduct-that not all discriminations between 
competing purchasers will injure competition--or that the order pro-
hibits conduct which is not sufficiently related to the original to be 
governed by the same legal standards. Second, the FTC ought not in 
any event to prohibit conduct dissimilar in any significant way unless 
there is a demonstrated likelihood of evasion, a standard which the 
FTC has not adequately applied. 
Both criticisms have some validity. The FTC has seldom demon-
strated that there is a reasonable basis for believing that the respon-
dent will repeat its initial violation in a different manner. In some 
cases, it probably could not do so. But in most secondary level cases 
some repetition of conduct in different forms is likely. Such discrim-
ination often reflects pressure from large buyers, who are likely to 
expect and demand price concessions in some form even after the 
order is entered. In secondary level cases, violations are often clear 
and have continued over a long period of time. The record often does 
reveal use of variant forms of discriminatory pricing favoring partic-
ular purchasers. But these are simply generalizations, and the FTC 
should be called upon to support to a greater degree than it has in the 
past the alleged need for an order broader than the original violation. 
But should the FTC, upon a showing of need for a broader order, 
always use the Ruberoid model? Does the order unduly prohibit law-
indicated it would examine Ruberiod orders more carefully in the future. The order 
was modified in a different way, as indicated in note 325 supra. 
327. See, e.g., Purolator Prods., Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 
1[ 16,877 (FTC 1964), affd, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); 
United Biscuit Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 16,799 (FTC 1964), 
affd, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1344 (1963), aff'd, 
348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1965); Fruitvale Canning Co., 52 F.T.C. 1504 (1956). 
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ful conduct, even with the statutory defenses implicit in it? It has 
been said that the order is an "inaccurate partial paraphrase" of the 
statute,328 and therefore that it prohibits discriminations which are 
not unlawful. But so long as the substantive standards of Morton 
Salt320 and its progeny prevail, the "paraphrase" is accurate for most 
cases. Much of the real quarrel, if there is one, is with the substantive 
standard under which injury to secondary level competition is estab-
lished when a producer sells at different prices to competing retailers 
whose markups or profit margins are small.330 This so-called Morton 
Salt formula may have been somewhat eroded, but it is still with us. 
And it is the formula which the Ruberoid order reflects. 
Yet the Ruberoid order does cover some lawful conduct, for even 
Morton Salt does not condemn all discrimination between competing 
purchasers. Temporary, sporadic, or insubstantial discriminations 
often do not injure competition.331 Similarly, the order covers con-
duct the legality of which depends on consideration of dissimilar 
factors: for example, functional discounts.332 Neither type of conduct 
should be prohibited unless prohibition is necessary to insure com-
pliance in the face of demonstrably likely evasion, either because the 
exemption of such discriminations will provide a vehicle for evasion 
or because the order otherwise becomes unduly complex or imprecise. 
The ease of granting price concessions to favored buyers in a 
variety of ways in itself suggests that the FTC in many cases is justi-
fied in using the Ruberoid order if evasion can be anticipated at all. 
For example, respondent can easily change from use of a quantity 
discount schedule to discounts which although described as "func-
tional" really are not. While the Ruberoid order is thus appropriate 
in many cases, it is not legitimate when evasion cannot reasonably be 
anticipated, or when the anticipated evasion can itself be prohibited 
in narrower terms. In my judgment, the FTC should be required to 
make greater use of clauses exempting differentials of less than stated 
amounts, or exempting types of discrimination substantially dif-
ferent from those litigated. Evasion thus can be barred through the 
broad prohibitions, while legitimate conduct is still permitted. The 
FTC should not be excused from the use of such clauses because 
respondent has not established that the conduct it wants exempted 
will not injure competition. The FTC should be required to estab-
lish a reasonable basis for the belief that it will. Similarly, Ruberoid 
328. Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 343 U.S. 470, 492 (1952) (dissent of Justice Jackson). 
329. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47, 50 (1948). 
330. See generally F. RowE, supra note 293, at 181-95 (1962). 
331. See, e.g., FTC v. American Oil Co., 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963). 
332. See note 260 supra. 
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orders should more frequently be limited to specified classes of com-
peting purchasers. If a seller has discriminated only among compet-
ing direct-buying retailers; there is ordinarily no justification for an 
order covering wholesalers as well.333 
Section 2(a) orders predicated on primary level injury. Although 
price discriminations in various forms may injure competition at the 
seller (primary) level, the practice most commonly challenged on this 
basis is the charging of different prices to purchasers in different geo-
graphic areas. The basic assumption underlying these cases is that 
sustained area price discrimination by a large seller can severely in-
jure competition in the low price area while higher prices are main-
tained elsewhere, particularly if the low prices are at or below cost. 
Simultaneously, it has been recognized that area price discrimination 
may be a strong and desirable competitive force.334 Hence in cases 
where secondary level injury is absent, the FTC and courts have ap-
plied more rigorous standards of injury to competition than those 
governing discrimination among competing purchasers. Findings of 
333. William H. Rorer, Inc. v. FTC, 374 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1967). The Rorer order, 
together with the order in American Motors Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE 
REG. REP. ,T 17,297 (FTC 1965), set aside, 384 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 36 
U.S.L.W. 3390 (April 8, 1968), contain additional features which may represent a signi• 
ficant development and warrant brief discussion. Both cases involved established 
discount practices among specified classes of purchasers. In both cases, cost justification 
was unsuccessfully attempted. The order in American Motors prohibited respondent 
from discriminating between customer groups by means of any price system or schedule 
which "purportedly" reflected cost differences unless a written statement in support of 
the cost justification, together with evidence that purchasers were advised of the basi~ 
of the discrimination, was submitted to the FTC in advance and FTC approval was 
secured. The FTC explained that such an order was desirable in order to enable 
respondent to pass on cost savings and at the same time to prevent relitigation of issues. 
Notification to purchasers was necessary to permit the FTC to determine whether they 
were really victims of discrimination. The advance-approval requirement was disap• 
proved by the reviewing court as beyond the FTC's enforcement powers; the FTC may 
not require advance approval to do that which is lawful. 
The Rorer order was a standard Ruberoid order with a proviso that if respondent 
adopted a discriminating price schedule in the belief that it was cost-justified, the 
FTC was to be notified and the basis of the differentials was to be publicized to pur-
chasers. The court of appeals upheld this portion of the order, though indicating that 
it might not where the underlying violation was less clear or of lesser magnitude. The 
American Motors order was distinguished on the ground it called for advance approval. 
Both decisions seem correct to me. Notification of the FTC is not unlike the filing 
of a compliance report, and serves a legitimate function. But a requirement of advance 
approval, which is presumably an attempt to circumvent the "changed circumstances" 
rules of Ruberoid, is unwarranted, particularly if notification can be required. 
334. See generally F. RowE, supra note 293, at 141-71 (1962); Austern, Presumptio11 
and Percipience About Competitive Effect Under Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 81 HARV. 
L. REv. 773, 775-93 (1968). Note, Unlawful Primary Line Price Discriminations: Predatory 
Intent and Competitive Injury, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 137 (1968). The standards discussed 
in the text are much more fully developed, with citation to supporting authorities, in 
these sources. For a penetrating analysis of the area price discrimination problem, the 
reader should also see the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Elman in Dean Milk Co., 
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,T 17,357, at 22,554 (FTC 1965). 
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violation have usually rested on direct or indirect proof of predatory 
intent, which has been broadly defined as "the intent to destroy one's 
competition with resort, if necessary, to means not justified by one's 
short-term self interest."335 While such intent has on occasion been 
established by the seller's own statements, it is more commonly in-
ferred from the fact that the seller's low prices are below cost or con-
siderably below those of his competitors. In the absence of predatory 
intent, actual competitive injury at the primary level must be estab-
lished. This determination rests on factors such as the relative size of 
the discriminating seller, significant changes in the structure of the 
local market, and the duration and amount of the discrimination.336 
Such standards, resting as they do on examinations of particular 
markets and sellers, are necessarily uncertain. 
The FTC's orders in primary level cases reflect this uncertainty. 
In recent years, the FTC has been cautious about the entry of broad 
orders and has experimented a good deal with several different kinds 
of prohibitions. A number of early FTC orders, most entered by 
consent, prohibited the seller from discriminating in price "where 
respondent, in the sale of such products, is in competition with any 
other seller."337 There is no conceivable justification for an order of 
such breadth, which permits discrimination only where the seller is 
a monopolist. When such an order in an area pricing case was first 
attacked,338 the FTC itself proposed that the order be modified to 
prohibit discrimination only where the "lower price undercuts the 
price at which the purchaser charged the lower price may purchase 
335. Note, supra note 334, at 141. 
336. The effect on these standards of the recent unilluminating decision in Utah 
Pie Co. v. Continental Pie Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), the Court's first primary line case 
in recent years, is unclear. All three defendants had sold in the local market below 
cost, although one had done so for only two weeks. The Court's suggestion that injury 
to competition could be found in the fact that respondents had contributed to "a 
drastically declining price structure" (386 U.S. at 703) may mark a significant departure 
from existing standards, but only time will tell. See reliance on Utah Pie in National 
Dairy Prods. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ~ 18,027 at 20,419-21 (FTC 1967). The Utah Pie 
case is severely criticized in Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The 
Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967); Note, supra note 334. 
337. Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395, 399 (1953). Another example is Aeration 
Processes, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 994, 1004-05 (1954) (consent). If secondary level injury was 
also alleged, such orders often further prohibited any discrimination between competing 
purchasers. E.g., Graham Co., 58 F.T.C. 77, 80-81 (1961) (consent); General Natural Gas 
Corp., 57 F.T.C. 85, 92 (1960) (consent); Empire Plastic Corp., 55 F.T.C. 103, 106 (1958) 
(consent); Western Grain Co., 49 F.T.C. 983, 988-89 (1953) (consent). 
338. Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957). Respondent had 
employed a twenty-five per cent price reduction in the area in which a smaller com-
petitor did business, with the purpose of driving him out. In an earlier case of a 
similar nature, the order prohibited sales in one "general trade area" at prices different 
from those "in any other trade area." The order was upheld on appeal. FTC v. E .B. 
Muller&: Co., 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944). See also American Brake Shoe Co., 52 F.T.C. 
484, 489 (1955) (consent). 
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... from another seller."339 On this basis, the order was affirmed, the 
court noting that it did not require nationwide uniform prices. Sim-
ilar orders have been entered in a number of subsequent cases.340 
Such orders are clearly preferable to the earlier broad orders for in-
jury to competition is surely more likely when prices undercut those 
of competitors than when there is simply price discrimination with 
competitors in the same market. But they are still too broad, at least 
in area price discrimination cases. The particular evil of area price 
discrimination is the ability of a seller operating in a number of 
markets to reduce prices in one to the detriment of competitors 
whose operations are more closely confined to the low price market. 
But the simple "undercutting" order is not confined to that practice, 
and can be violated by any discrimination which "undercuts" com-
petitors, large or small. For example, such an order would prohibit 
a respondent from selling goods under private label at a lower price 
than the same goods bearing its advertised label, whenever the lower 
price undercut the prices of the seller's competitors. While such a 
discrimination may in some cases injure competition at either the 
primary or secondary level, this practice-and the factors determina-
tive of its legality-bears little resemblance to area price discrimina-
tion.341 Similarly, an "undercutting" order prohibits sporadic or non-
systematized discriminations which are not geographic in nature, and 
which do not entail injury to geographically confined competitors. 
Finally, an "undercutting" order is most easily complied with simply 
by being a price follower, initiating price reductions only when the 
seller can do so on a uniform nationwide basis. These severe handi-
caps on the seller's pricing flexibility can hardly be justified by the 
need to prevent area price discrimination.342 
Some of these deficiencies in the simple "undercutting" order 
have been remedied in the most recent area pricing cases, in which 
the orders condemn only discrimination among purchasers at the 
same level of distribution343 where the lower price "undercuts the 
339. Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir. 1957). 
340. E.g., Faber Bros., Inc., 58 F.T.C. 513, 516-17 (1961) (consent); Kelly Creamery 
Co., 57 F.T.C. 1460, 1464 (1960) (consent); Arkansas City Cooperative Milk Ass'n, Inc., 
54 F.T.C. 246, 251 (1957) (consent). 
341. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967). 
342. The Maryland Baking, or simple "undercutting'' order, is criticized in Shnider-
man, The Impact of the Robinson-Patman Act on Pricing Flexibility, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 
173, 182-83 (1962). 
343. This makes the order inapplicable to most bona fide functional discounts. 
Forster Mfg. Co., f1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17,304 at 22,455 (FTC 
1965). Cf. the order originally entered in Forester Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852, 920-21 
(1963), reversed on merits, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), where the FTC expressly declined 
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lowest price offered to that purchaser by any other seller having a 
substantially smaller annual volume of sales" of the covered products 
than respondent.344 The FTC thereby prohibits discrimination only 
where the seller has undercut all of its smaller competitors in a given 
market, claiming that in such a case, it is "virtually certain" that 
competition will be injured.345 
These more sophisticated orders, the prototype for which was 
found in Forster klfg. Co.,346 are not expressly limited to area price 
discrimination, although most cases involving undercutting of a 
smaller competitor's lowest price will in fact be that. But the order 
could also be violated by selling at a low price to any purchaser or 
purchasers for whom other smaller national sellers also compete. 
Similarly, the use by a national seller of a single quantity discount 
schedule in all markets would violate the order if the lowest price on 
the schedule were lower than the lowest price of a smaller competitor 
in one or more local markets. In neither of these cases is the respon-
dent systematically attacking a particular competitor or group of com-
so to limit the order, on the theory that respondent could injure small competitors by 
selling primarily to wholesalers at one price, but selling directly to retailers or users 
served by the smaller competitor at a much lower price. 
344. Forster Mfg. Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17,304 at 
22,455 (FTC 1965), afj'd, 361 F.2d 340 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); 
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,f 17,303 (FTC 
1965), aff'd, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966). Both orders were upheld against attack on re• 
view. Similar orders were entered in Dean Milk Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE 
REG. RI:P. ,I 17,357 (FTC 1965), set aside,-F.2d-(1th Cir. 1968) and National Dairy 
Prods. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 18,027 (FTC 1967). The Dean order was further 
limited to discrimination among purchasers in different "market areas" or within a 
single "market area" by "the same processing plant." (Dean had a number of plants, but 
was not charged with interplant discrimination.) In National Dairy, where the violation 
consisted of giving a free case of goods with each case purchased in certain areas but not 
in others, the order prohibits discrimination between purchasers in different trading 
areas unless the lower price (1) does not undercut "the lowest price concurrently 
offered throughout the same trading area" by any smaller seller or (2) was the result 
of a "promotional" offer which did not undercut a promotional offer made by a com-
petitor to the same purchaser within the twelve preceding months. 
Compare the orders in Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 303 (1957), set aside, 289 
F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961) (prohibiting price reduction in market ·where respondent 
competes with others unless accompanied by proportional reduction everywhere else) 
and Borde.n Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16,776 (FTC 1964) 
(prohibiting discrimination between purchasers at the same level of trade in different 
"trading areas," but permitting sales at any price "not less than the regularly estab-
lished price of any competitor in that area'). The Anheuser-Busch order is severely 
criticized in Shniderman, supra note 342, at 180-82. 
345. Forster Mfg. Co., (1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17,304 
at 22,455 (FTC 1965). The FTC explained that its order was not "a substitution of 
another and arbitrary standard of competitive injury for the standard set forth in the 
Act; it is, instead, an express embodiment of that statutory standard into an order 
narrowly tailored to the facts of this particular case." 
846. (1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17,304 (FTC 1965). 
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petitors who are regionally confined. The order might therefore more 
appropriately prohibit only systematic discrimination between pur-
chasers in different trading areas, where the lower price undercuts, 
and so forth.347 But it must be recognized that the trading area con-
cept interjects a good deal of ambiguity into the order: what is a 
"trading area" to one seller is not to another. 
Is it reasonably certain that the conduct prohibited by the Forster 
order violates the statute? Short-term or insubstantial discriminations 
within the order will not. But the exemption of such discriminations 
may be more difficult in area pricing cases than in secondary line 
cases. Hopefully the FTC and courts will read some element of sub-
stantiality into the order. Systematic, discriminatory undercutting of 
a smaller competitor's lowest prices, where not cost-justified or done 
to meet competition, is likely to be anticompetitive under existing 
standards, except where done for promotional purposes in entering 
a new market or where prices in a particular market, including those 
of smaller competitors, are at monopolistic levels. Even in the latter 
instances, where entry by respondent at lower prices is desirable, 
undercutting of all smaller competitors may not be necessary.348 
Nevertheless, the order in such instances should either recognize the 
propriety of undercutting smaller competitors' prices to some extent, 
or it should be clearly recognized from the outset that in such cases 
the respondent is in a new competitive situation and can require the 
FTC to prove anticompetitive effect anew. The latter seems to me to 
be the better course; not all promotional pricing can be exempted, 
and the order can hardly attempt to define markets which are monop-
olistic.349 
347. Cf. the order in Borden Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 
~ 16,776 (FTC 1964), supra note 344. 
348. The difficulties with the Forster order are thoroughly considered by Commis-
sioner Elman in Forster Mfg. Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 
~ 17,304 at 22,456-59 (FTC 1965) (concurring opinion). He apparently finds the FTC's 
order acceptable, though preferring an order prohibiting discrimination intended to 
injure or destroy a competitor. At the time the commissioner expressed the view that 
Forster would not need to undercut all of its competitors to enter new or monopolistic 
markets, and that the order was not therefore too broad. He has apparently changed 
his mind. See National Dairy Prods. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ~ 18,027 at 20,436 
(FTC 1967) (dissenting opinion). 
349. In National Dairy Prods. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ~ 18,027 (FTC 1967), the 
violation was in the use of a promotional offer in specified areas. Apart from what-
ever use of such offers is permitted by the provision permitting discrimination when 
the lower price does not undercut the price of all smaller competitors, the order 
permits such an offer only if it meets or is above a similar offer made by any other 
seller to the same purchasers within the twelve prior months. This proviso surely does 
little to recognize the desirability of the use of such promotional devices to enter new 
markets, for it makes respondent a follower. If this is the best the FTC can do, it is 
better off in cases like Forster not to deal with promotional offers at all. In National 
Dairy, where the order had to deal with the subject, any of the creative alternatives 
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These difficulties can be avoided, at least in cases where respon-
dent has engaged in predatory pricing, by orders which prevent area 
price discrimination designed to injure, cripple, or discipline com-
petitors. While this may seem vague, most respondents will un-
doubtedly know what it means. But where a seller's area price differ-
entials are found in violation irrespective of predatory intent, a dif-
ferent order may be necessary. The Forster order is perhaps the best 
accommodation of conflicting goals we can expect in such cases, al-
though a predatory pricing order would have been more appropriate 
in the Forster case itself.350 
Section 2(c)-brokerage. Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman 
Act prohibits the payment of "brokerage" or "any allowance or dis-
count in lieu thereof" to the buyer, its agent, or other intermediary 
subject to the control of the buyer, "except for services rendered" 
with respect to the purchase or sale.351 As a practical matter, the 
statute, at least until very recently, has been held to prohibit any such 
payment to the buyer or any agent or intermediary controlled by 
him.352 Violation does not rest on proof of anticompetitive effect, 
suggested by Commissioner Jones would clearly have been preferable. Id. at p. 20,442. 
See Austem, supra note 334, at 797-99. 
350. One member of the FTC has been sharply critical of the Forster order, asserting 
that it is "ineffective" because not broad enough. His views, originally expressed in 
terse terms in separate statements in Forster and Fry, have since been amplified. Dean 
Milk Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder) TRADE REc. REP. 1[ 17,357 at 22,552 (FTC 1965) 
(separate statement of Commissioner Madntyre); Madntyre, The Federal Trade 
Commission's Antitrust Functions: Some Practical Problems in Enforcement, 14 UCLA 
L. REv. 997, 1023-26 (1967). Specifically, objection is made to the fact that the order 
in Dean is limited to discrimination by single processing plants, to the limitation in 
all three orders to purchasers at the same level of distribution, and to the "under• 
cutting" provisions. Commissioner Madntyre suggests that these orders require proof 
that respondents knew or should have known that they were undercutting smaller 
competitors. Even if this is so, such proof would probably not be difficult. He also 
fears that a national seller with a brand-name preference for its product could destroy 
smaller competitors without actually undercutting them. But surely if a brand premium 
in fact exists, that factor can be considered in determining whether a competitor has 
been "undercut." 
He suggests use of an order requiring respondent to keep records demonstrating 
that its discriminations are cost-justified. Apparently such an order would prohibit any 
discrimination not so justified, without any consideration of anticompetitive effect. 
351. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964), which provides in full: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of 
such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a 
commission, brokerage or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in 
lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase 
of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or 
to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therin where such intermediary 
is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of 
any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation 
is so granted or paid. 
352, See generally F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN 
Acr 331, 350 (1962). Until 1960, most of the standards of § 2(c) were thought perfectly 
clear, whatever else may be said about them. But the decision in Henry Broch &: Co., 
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and the cost justification and meeting competition defenses do not 
apply.353 If such a payment is made, the statute is violated, both by 
the seller, the buyer, and the intermediary. Hence the transaction 
may result in entry of an order against one or all of these parties. 
Most FTC section 2(c) orders have been entered either in cases 
where brokerage has been paid to brokers who as intermediaries took 
title to goods and thereby became "buyers," or to brokers who were 
in fact buyers' agents or controlled by buyers. Early FTC orders dis-
tinguished between these two transactions. In cases involving "buying 
brokers," the order prohibited only the payment of brokerage, or a 
discount in lieu thereof, on goods purchased for a buyer's mm ac-
count.354 Where brokerage was paid to a buyer's agent or controlled 
intermediary, the order typically prohibited, in addition, the pay-
ment of brokerage, or discounts in lieu thereof, to any "buyer's" 
broker.355 The distinction apparently no longer exists. Even in cases 
where the violation consisted of payments to firms buying for their 
mm account, recent FTC orders prohibit not only such payments 
but payments to brokers who are agents for or controlled by the 
buyer as well.356 The result has been the entry of scores of virtually 
identical orders which simply recite statutory language.357 Most are 
consent orders. 
Th~re have been some variations in these patterns, primarily in 
cases involving either cooperative buying organizations owned or con-
363 U.S. 166 (1960) has made these standards less clear, by raising doubts about the 
long-accepted dogma that a buyer or buyer's agents cannot perform services for the 
seller within the "for services rendered" clause, and by suggesting that it was concerned 
with discriminatory brokerage. The case is discussed in detail in F. ROWE, supra, ch. 12. 
353. F. RowE, supra note 352, at 337, 
354. E.g., West Coast Packing Corp., 43 F.T.C. lll, ll6-16 (1946); B. F. Shriver Co., 
39 F.T.C. 397-400 (1944). Orders against the brokers were similar. E.g., Southgate 
Brokerage Co., 39 F.T.C. 166, 170 (1944), afj'd, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 
326 U.S. 774 (1945); Parker T. Frey Co., 31 F.T.C 1084, 1087 (1940). 
355. E.g., Thomas Page Mill Co., Inc., 33 F.T.C. 1437, 1440-41 (1941) (order against 
seller). Orders against buyers and brokers prohibited receipt in essentially the same 
terms. E.g., Robert Rosoff, 43 F.T.C. 232, 236-37 (1946); Harry M. Bitterman, Inc., 35 
F.T.C. 49, 57-58 (1942). 
356. E.g., Western Fruit Growers Sales Co., 61 F.T.C. 586, 595 (1962), affd, 322 F.2d 
67 (9th Cir. 1963); Florida Citrus Exch., 53 F.T.C. 493, 501 (1956). Orders prohibiting 
receipt of brokerage on purchases for the buyer's account are basically the same. 
E.g., Lannin Sales Co., 59 F.T.C. 1446, 1448 (1961) (consent); Eastern Canners, Inc., 55 
F.T.C. 1986, 1989 (1959). 
357. Thus the typical order now prohibits respondent from 
[r]eceiving or accepting, directly or indirectly, from any seller, anything of 
value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or 
discount in lieu thereof, upon or in connection with any purchase of . . • 
products for its own account, or where respondent is the agent, representative, or 
other intermediary acting for or in behalf of, or is subject to the direct or indirect 
control of, any such buyer-. · • • · 
D. L •. Piazza Co., 56 F.T.C. 611, 614 (1959) (consent). 
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trolled by groups of smaller buyers or other affiliated brokers. These 
orders tend to be far more complex, prohibiting in a number of cases 
receipt of commissions by the buying organizations or affiliated broker 
(often both on purchases for its own account and on purchases for 
any member or controlling party) and by the members or controlling 
buyers themselves.358 Orders against members have on occasion been 
limited to receipt of commissions through controlled intermedi-
aries.359 
Orders in cases where the initial violation was a price reduction 
or discount "in lieu of brokerage" have varied considerably from 
those previously discussed. The obvious difficulty in these cases is to 
determine when a concession is "in lieu of brokerage." The typical 
case involves a price reduction in the setting of a reduced brokerage 
payment. The FTC has responded to this technique by framing 
orders prohibiting sales at prices which reflect a reduction from the 
prices charged other purchasers in an amount approximately equal 
to brokerage paid brokers in effecting sales to such other pur-
chasers. 360 
Neither the FTC nor the courts have said much about section 
2(c) orders. A large number are consent orders. Few litigated orders 
have been reviewed. It is clear, however, that section 2(c) is regarded 
358. See, e.g., the orders involving cooperative buying organizations in Clover Farm 
Stores Corp., 52 F.T.C. 1140, 1145-46 (1956) (consent) (intermediary order limited to 
purchases for own account or for "stockholder members''); Carpel Frosted Foods, Inc., 
48 F.T.C. 581, 598-600 (1951) (intermediary order limited to purchases of "members" 
or for resale to "members''); Independent Grocers Alliance Distrib. Co., 48 F.T.C. 
894, 929-32 (1952), afj'd, 203 F.2d 941 {7th Cir. 1953); Modern Marketing Serv., Inc., 
37 F.T.C. 386, 407-09 (1943), afj'd, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945) (intermediary order 
limited to purchases by stockholders or jobber licensees). Such orders frequently 
prohibit transmission of brokerage, either directly or in the form of services, etc., 
from the intermediary to the buyer member. See, e.g., Modern Marketing Serv., Inc., 
supra; Quality Bakers of America, 29 F.T.C. 1328, 1346-47 (1939), afj'd, 114 F.2d 393 
(1st Cir. 1940). Orders involving other affiliated brokers are similar. E.g., Dixie-Central 
Produce Co., Inc., 61 F.T.C. 67, 73-74 (1962). 
359. In Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1208, 1248-49 (1962), set 
aside sub. nom. National Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc., 317 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963), 
the FTC modified the hearing examiner's order against buyer-members to cover only 
purchases made through agents or controlled intermediaries. The orders have not-
generally been confined to purchases through the specific intermediary involved in the 
litigation. 
360. E.g., Florida Planters, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 349, 352-53 (1953); Ramsdell Packing 
Co., 32 F.T.C. U87, 1191-92 (1941). Several later orders prohibit any reduction in the 
price charged other purchases where the reduction is accompanied by a reduction in 
the commission normally paid by the seller to its brokers. E.g., Haskins Canning Corp., 
53 F.T.C. 1160, 1163 (1957). And in Thomasville Chair Co., 58 F.T.C. 441, 443 (1961), 
set aside, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962), the other simply prohibited any price reduction 
reflecting any saving in all or part of a sales commission fee. 
See also orders in cases where a broker eliminates payment of customary fees of 
subbrokers, and quotes prices reflecting this fact. E.g., Puget Sound Brokerage Co., 
55 F.T.C. 1242, 1247 (1959); Albert W. Sisk &: Son, 31 F.T.C. 1543, 1549-50 (1940). 
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as "narrowly drawn" in itself, and this has been thought to justify 
the use of orders in statutory language.361 It is therefore somewhat 
surprising that it was the propriety of a section 2(c) order which 
triggered the observations about the effect of the Finality Act in FTC 
v. Henry Broch & Co.362 The order in Broch was based upon a find-
ing that the broker-respondent, a seller's broker, had secured a partic-
ular purchaser for one of its principals by reducing the amount of its 
normal brokerage fee from five per cent to three per cent. Broch was 
prohibited from selling for any principal to any buyer at prices re-
flecting a reduction from current prices where the reduction was ac-
companied by a reduction in the commission normally paid Broch by 
the principal. The second portion of the order barred Broch "in any 
other manner" from granting brokerage, or any discount in lieu 
thereof, to any buyer directly or through any intermediary controlled 
by the buyer. Broch's assertion that the order should be limited to 
transactions between the same seller-principal and buyer involved in 
the FTC findings, a limitation virtually never found in FTC 
orders,363 was summarily rejected by the Court. Objections to the 
breadth of the second portion of the order were also rejected, al-
though the Court never stated why an order of such breadth was 
proper in a case involving an isolated transaction and uncertain law. 
It only stated that modification was "premature," because under the 
applicable pre-1959 enforcement procedures the order could be 
"tailored" to meet the needs of the case. But in upholding the order, 
the Court indicated that the "for services rendered" clause, long 
thought a dead letter, might be read into section 2(c) orders.364 And 
its dictum intimated that the second portion of the order would not 
be upheld if Finality Act procedures were applicable. 
But what specifically is ·wrong with the order in Broch and other 
brokerage cases? First, while all of the acts condemned by section 2(c) 
361. See, e.g., Western Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 67, 69 n.8 (9th Cir. 
1963). 
362. 368 U.S. 360 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 91-94 supra. 
363. Such limitations are common in NLRB cases, particularly with respect to 
orders prohibiting secondary boycotts. Some courts have limited such orders to the 
exertion of pressure against the particular primary employer through the particular 
secondary employer involved in the dispute before the Board, in the absence of proof 
of a generalized scheme encompassing other secondary employers or a record of past 
violations. E.g., NLRB v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, Local 469, 300 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 
1962); Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 107 v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 
1959). Query whether such decisions, to the extent they limit the order to a particular 
secondary employer, are consistent with International Bhd. of Elec. '\Vorkers v. NLRB, 
341 U.S. 694 (1951). Decisions limiting orders only to the particular primary employer 
are far more common. E.g., NLRB v. Bangor Bldg. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 278 F.2d 
287 (1st Cir. 1960); NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 276 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1960). 
See also Communication Workers of America v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960). 
364. 368 U.S. at 367 n.8. 
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are related, it cannot automatically be assumed that a firm which has 
violated the statute in one way will do so in another. For example, 
where an independent broker receives brokerage on purchases for 
his own account, what basis is there for prohibiting him from receipt 
of brokerage as a buyer's agent? To some extent, the Broch order 
presents the same question: on the basis of a single violation, where 
even the existing "black and white" standards of legality were un-
certain, respondent was subjected to an order prohibiting virtually 
any violation of the statute. 
The primary justification for statutory language orders in broker-
age cases has been that the statute prohibits only one narrowly 
defined practice. While there may be different forms of violating 
conduct, they are all variants of the same theme, designed to do the 
same thing. Hence, unless all variants are prohibited, the order will 
be wholly ineffective. If a buyer cannot receive brokerage through 
an affiliate or "dummy" broker, he can, unless prohibited, simply 
receive a price reduction in lieu of brokerage. While there are 
obvious truths in these propositions if one assumes that such a buyer 
will attempt to evade the order, the FTC has seldom examined the 
question of intent to evade. 
Moreover, the FTC seems to have proceeded, at least until re-
cently, on the assumption that there was no reason not to use rela-
tively broad orders. The standards were in fact reasonably clear, 
despite the apparent vagueness and complexity of the statutory 
language. Perhaps more important, none of the conduct covered by 
the statute was thought competitively desirable. The statute, with its 
absolute prohibitions, was designed to force disguised price con-
cessions into the open, where they would be dealt with through 
section 2(a) on the basis of measured anticompetitive effect.365 But 
growing restiveness with the absolute standards applied by the FTC 
has changed all this. Doubts about some of these standards were 
expressed by the Supreme Court when it passed on the merits of 
Broch.366 It had suggested that the ban on price reductions "in lieu 
of brokerage" was limited to discriminatory reductions and intimated 
that even such reductions might be justified by demonstrated sav-
ings in distribution costs or rendition of services.367 The Court had 
muddied the statutory standards, and it is hardly surprising that it 
should subsequently suggest that an order in statutory terms might 
be unduly vague, at least where a civil penalty was the sanction for 
365. F. RowE, supra note 352, at 330-31. 
366. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960). 
367. 363 U.S. at 173, 176. 
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violation. As both the courts and FTC depart from pre-1960 stan-
dards,368 the need for more precisely formulated orders becomes 
greater. 
Sections 2(d) and 2(e)-promotional and advertising allowances 
and services. Section 2(d) prohibits a seller from paying any promo-
tional or advertising allowance to or for the benefit of a customer, un-
less the allowance is "available on proportionally equal terms" to all 
competing customers. Section 2(e) is violated if the seller directly 
furnishes such service or facilities "upon terms not accorded to all 
purchasers on proportionally equal terms."3611 Under neither section 
is illegality dependent upon adverse competitive effect. The meeting 
competition defense is applicable to both sections.370 These sections, 
like section 2(c), were intended to force secret and disguised price 
concessions into the open, where they could be judged under section 
2(a) standards. 
Both sections have been employed against a wide variety of co-
operative promotional and advertising practices, including payments 
for or furnishing of newspaper, radio and television advertising, in-
store advertising or promotional displays, handbills and catalogues, 
demonstrator services, and materials for promotional demonstra-
368. See Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 317 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963); 
Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962); Edward Joseph Hruby, 61 
F.T.C. 1437 (1962). In one way or another, all these decisions reflect increasing recogni-
tion of the propriety and desirability of price differentials based on genuine brokerage 
savings. 
369. Clayton Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964), which provides in full: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract 
for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such 
person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for 
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection 
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or com-
modities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such 
payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other 
customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities. 
Clayton Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1964) provides: 
It shall be unlawful 'for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser 
against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with 
or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by tontributing 
to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, 
handling, sale or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not 
accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms. 
While neither section specifically refers to "advertising" or "promotional" allowances 
or services, both have been regarded as so limited. See F. RowE, supra note !152, at !177 
(1962). 
370. The meeting competition defense expressly applies to "discrimination in ••• 
services or facilities furnished." Clayton Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § l!l(b) (1964). It is 
therefore clearly applicable in § 2(e) proceedings. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., !160 
U.S. ·55, 67 (1959). The defense has also been held available in § 2(d) cases, although 
the statute cis less clear-on this point. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, !101 F.2d 
499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962). The FTC now acknowledges the 
availability of the defense in§ 2(d). proceedings. E.g., Continental Baking Co., [1963-1965 
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1l 16,720 (FTC 1964). 
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tions.371 Not all inequalities in such allowances or services are con-
demned. The statute requires proportional equality only among 
competing purchasers. As a result, the seller may use special promo-
tional campaigns in particular local markets, so long as all purchasers 
within that market receive proportionally equal treatment.372 This 
usually raises two subissues: (1) the proper criteria for measuring 
proportional equality; (2) the steps to be taken in making allow-
ances "available." It is with respect to these questions that the 
statutory standards have been and remain most uncertain. 
The statute does not define the basis upon which proportional 
equality is to be measured. The clearest measure of course is volume 
purchased: a purchaser who buys twice as much as another may be 
given twice as much in promotional allowances. This is not the sole 
measure, however. The FTC has been willing to take into account 
other factors measuring the contribution by the purchaser as an 
outlet for the seller's goods, so long as the seller applies these stan-
dards evenhandedly. All competing customers must be given an 
opportunity to participate, even if this requires formulation of 
alternative promotional plans. For example, a promotional program 
whereby the seller would pay up to fifty per cent of television adver-
tising costs would be of no use to many small purchasers who cannot 
effectively use television advertising. To such smaller purchasers, 
these allowances are really not "available"; they must be given some 
alternative, on a proportional basis, in a form which they can use. 
Finally, the requirement of availability has been interpreted to 
require some form of notification to the purchaser about the terms 
of the promotional plan.373 
371. See cases referred to in F. ROWE, supra note 352, at 375-76. 
372. While the language of § 2(e) makes no reference to competing buyers, it is 
apparently thought to embody the same geographic standards in this respect as § 2(d). 
Another aspect of this same problem is whether allowances, etc., must be given to 
wholesalers whose purchasers compete with direct-buying retailers receiving such 
allowances. The FTC held that they must in Fred Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer 
Binder] TRADE R.Ec. REP. 11 16,368 (FTC 1963), b_ut was reversed. Fred Meyer, Inc. 
v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court resolved the issue by holding 
that such allowances must be given directly to competing retailers who buy through 
wholesalers. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968). 
373. The aspects of the "proportionate equality" standards set out in this paragraph 
·are discussed in far greater detail in F. RowE, supra note 352, at 399-414. 
The FTC's position on the availability of alternative, usable plans for smaller 
purchasers is apparently becoming more rigid. In House of Lord's, Inc.,· [1965-1967 
Transfer l3inder] TRADE REc. REP. 11 17,437, at 22,672 (FTC 1966), the FTC stated that 
respondent, having elected to give promotional money to one customer in a community, 
"has a duty ••• to devise and communicate to each of its other competing customers 
in that community a promotional plan with at least one feature that can be used 
by each of them." In the particular case, the promotional offer was interpreted as 
limited to newspaper advertising and was not, therefore, "available" to customers unable 
to afford newspaper advertising. 
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There was a remarkable sameness about FTC orders under sec-
tion 2(d) entered prior to 1962, without any noticeable difference 
between litigated and consent orders. With a few notable excep-
tions, 374 they incorporated statutory language simply to prohibit 
respondent from paying anything to or for the benefit of a customer 
as compensation for services or facilities furnished by the customer, 
unless such payments were "made available" on proportionally equal 
terms to competing customers.375 The only relatively common varia• 
tion from these recitations of statutory language has been to require 
the respondent "affirmatively" to offer or make available such pay-
ments.376 It is not clear that the latter requirement will be interpreted 
as requiring anything more than what the statute already requires, 
although it has been held that such a requirement is proper even if 
it is more stringent than the statute, at least when respondent's viola-
tion was attributable in part to its failure to notify competing pur-
chasers of allegedly "available" allowances.377 
Such statutory language orders are still entered in most section 
2(d) cases and are apparently still regarded as the norm to be followed 
unless there is a demonstrated reason for not doing so.378 Since 1962, 
374. E.g., Bymart-Tintair, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 290, 293 (1956) (consent) (limited to allow• 
ances for "radio or television advertising"); General Baking Co., 38 F.T.C. 307, 310 
(1944) (limited to "advertising services''); Curtiss Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237, 274-78 (1947) 
(limited to "advertising" and particularized "promotional activities"); Curtice Bros. 
Co., 30 F.T.C. 971, 978-79 (1940) (limited to "advertising services''). Other orders pro-
hibited only allowances in specified amounts although such orders genei;ally contained 
a catch-all paragraph in statutory language. E.g., Life Savers Corp., 34 F.T.C. 472, 
478-79 (1941); Lambert Pharmacal Co., 31 F.T.C. 734, 740-41 (1940). See also Henry 
Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535, 1544 (1956), permitting allowances only "in amounts 
determined by the same percentage of the same measurable base." 
375. Most of these orders are not expressly limited to "advertising or promotional" 
services or facilities, but simply recite the statutory language, set out in note 369 supra. 
E.g., Kerr Glass Mfg. Co., 57 F.T.C. 1251, 1254 (1960) (consent); Groveton Paper Co., 54 
F.T.C. 1490, 1501 (1958); Bulova Watch Co., 48 F.T.C. 971, 978 (1952); Holzbcierlein 
&: Sons, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 82, 85 (1944). Others are limited to "advertising or promotional" 
payments. E.g., Carpel Frosted Foods, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 581, 598-600 (1951). Still others 
prohibit payments for particular kinds of services, but then further prohibit payments 
in statutory terms. E.g., Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 1306, 1310 (1960); Hudnut 
Sales Co., 56 F.T.C. 1064, 1067 (1956); Grabosky Bros., 36 F.T.C. 477, 480-81 (1943). 
· 376. E.g., H.S.D. Publications, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1741, 1744 (1962) (consent) ("affirma-
tively offered and othenvise made available''); Marlun Mfg. Co., 56 F.T.C. 1232, 1235-36 
(1960) (consent) ("affirmatively offered"); Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565, 573 
(1956), set aside, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958) ("affirmatively offered or othemise made 
available''). 
377. Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1962). 
378. E.g., Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. ,i 17,643 
(FTC 1966) (consent) (order at 31 Fed. Reg. 11,750); National Dairy Prods. Corp., 
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,I 17,656 (FTC 1966) (order at 31 Fed. 
Reg. 11,719); United Biscuit Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f 16,799 
(FTC 1964) (consent) (order at 29 Fed. Reg. 3305); Abby Kent Co., 62 F.T.C. 1248, 
1250-51 (1963) (consent) (same order simultaneously entered against 162 other wearing 
apparel manufacturers). 
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however, a larger number of more narrowly and precisely drawn 
orders have been entered by the FTC, both on its own volition and 
at the insistence of reviewing courts. Although there had been little 
disagreement or litigation over the scope of these orders previously, 
most of the debate within the FTC since Broch has occurred in sec-
tion 2(d) cases. Out of these decisions, therefore, come many of the 
standards with respect to "anticipated recidivism" discussed earlier. 
Apart from questions of product, corporate unit, and geographic 
coverage, the issue in these cases has always been the same: should 
the order be limited to payments for particular kinds of advertising 
or promotional services? In the first cases where this issue was raised 
after the passage of the Finality Act, the FTC continued its routine 
practice of entering statutory language orders, stating that it found 
nothing in the history of the Finality Act to indicate "that Clayton 
Act orders should prohibit only the specific acts engaged in . . . 
rather than the practices condemned by the statute."379 But even 
before the decision in Broch, the FTC suffered a major rebuff in 
Swanee Paper Corp. v. FTC.380 Swanee violated section 2(d) by 
making payments, at the request of one customer, for advertising of 
its products on an electric sign which permanently displayed the 
name of the customer. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
directed that the FTC's statutory language order be limited to the 
"particular practice" found to violate the statute, emphasizing that 
the violation was not "flagrant or extensive," was in an "uncertain" 
area of the law, and had been discontinued. Though the court also 
noted the passage of the Finality Act, and the legislative history 
calling for more "definitive" orders, its primary emphasis was upon 
undue breadth. The decision in Swanee and several related cases 
involving inducement of discriminatory allowances,381 coupled with 
the dictum in Broch, provided the impetus for the dispute which 
followed. 
The FTC's initial response to Broch and Swanee was to continue 
379. Shulton, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 106, 111 (1961), set aside, 305 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962); 
cf, Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co., 59 F.T.C. 693, 704 (1961). 
380. 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). 
381. Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 
910 (1963): American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 
U.S. 824 (1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). In all these cases, 
the FTC had entered orders against the inducement of disproportionate allowances 
under § 5 of the FTC Act. In each case the FTC was ordered to modify the order to 
prohibit only inducement and receipt of allowances for particular types of services. 
Emphasis was placed on the uncertainty of governing standards, and on the fact 
the· violations were not deemed flagrant. (The Grand Union case involved the same 
transaction involved in Swanee.) Accord, R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d 
Cir. 1964). 
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its existing practices. In Vanity Fair,382 respondent's violation con-
sisted of making two 215-dollar payments to one purchaser for news-
paper advertising and in-store displays in connection with special 
customer-promoted sales events. Respondent's regular program of 
paying allowances on a per-case basis was not attacked. The FTC 
issued a statutory order stating that respondent had a defined policy 
of complying with requests for participation in such events and these 
requests might take variant forms. The FTC expressed the view that 
section 2( d) is itself "a very narrow definition of an illegal trade 
practice,"383 and that unlike that in Swanee, the violation here was 
clear. Commissioner Elman, in the first of his major dissenting opin-
ions on scope of orders, attacked the order on vagueness grounds and 
suggested an affirmative order requiring respondent to notify compet-
ing purchasers of its "policy" in particularized ways. The reviewing 
court ultimately modified the Vanity Fair order to encompass only 
payments for "advertising or promotional display services or facilities 
and like or related practices," but was unwilling to restrict it to 
newspaper advertising and in-store displays,384 since that would have 
made evasion easy. The court apparently viewed all advertising as 
fungible. 
Orders entered immediately after Vanity. Fair continued to be 
routinely broad.385 Commissioner Elman continued to dissent. But in 
Transogram Co.,386 with Commissioner Elman now writing for the 
FTC, a significantly narrower order was entered. Respondent toy 
manufacturers had unlawfully given allowances to wholesalers who 
published toy catalogues. The case was heard on a stipulated record, 
which divulged neither the magnitude of the violations nor whether 
382. Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 568 (1962). 
383. This same idea was expressed in P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439 (!Id 
Cir. 1959) in upholding a statutory § 2(d) order. 
384. Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962). The court 
placed heavy reliance on the availability of an advisory opinion from the FTC. See 
note 182 supra. 
385. This was particularly true of the order in Quaker Oats Co., 60 F.T.C. 798, 
820-21 (1962), where the FTC over objection entered a statutory language order on the 
basis of a single $250 payment to a customer in connection with a special promotional 
event. Respondent's regular program of promotional allowances was not attacked. The 
~rder was limited to the offending corporate division, however. Commissioner Elman's 
call for an affirmative order, made again in dissent along with an even more persuasive 
argument that no order should be entered at all, was rejected categorically. See also 
J. A. Folger&: Co., 61 F.T.C. 1166, 1191-92 (1962); Nuarc Co., '61 F.T.C. 375, 404 (1962), 
set aside, 316 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1963) (order was limited to "advertising," but the 
FTC reiterated its view that in any case wliere the practice is clearly illegal, a statutory-
language order was proper); Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, 60 F.T.C. 1134, 1182-83 (1962), 
set aside, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964). These orders are discussed in much greater 
detail in Long, The Administrative Process; Agonizing Reappraisal in the FTC, 3!1 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 671 (1965). 
386. 61 F.T.C. 629, 703-04 (1962). 
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respondents ever gave other kinds of allowances. The type of allow• 
ance given was "unusual." There was no basis, therefore, for a 
finding of reasonable likelihood of violations in other forms. The 
order was accordingly limited to payments for advertising furnished 
by the customer in a catalogue or other publication "serving the 
purpose of a buying guide" distributed by the customer. At the same 
time, however, the FTC refused to limit the order to payment to 
wholesalers. 
Subsequent section 2(d) cases have amplified the Transogram 
standards. In All-Luminum Products, Inc.,381 a case involving cata-
logue and trade show payments, the FTC, again through Commis: 
sioner Elman, entered an order similar to that in Transogram, 
explaining that where the record "does not show a danger that the 
specific illegal practice will recur in some other difficult-to-define 
forms"388 a narrow order may be sufficient. A dissenting commissioner 
suggested that the FTC was now asserting that unless the record 
affirmatively suggested an expectation of future violations in other 
forms, the order should be limited to the specific practice before the 
FTC. Whether this generalization is accurate depends on what is 
meant by affirmative evidence. The FTC has continued to enter 
broad orders over objection where respondent has given allowances 
on a regular basis to favored customers over an extended period of 
time, as well as in cases where the initial violation took more than 
one form.389 But the unusual, inadvertent, or isolated violation is 
no longer likely to result in a statutory order.390 In section 2(d) cases, 
at least, it can no longer be said that such orders are "routinely" 
entered. 
Although the FTC has been both required and increasingly 
387. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1f 16,665 (FTC 1963). 
388. Id. at p. 21,544. 
389. E.g., House of Lord's, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17,-
437 (F.T.C. 1966) (order at 31 Fed. Reg. 4397); Lovable Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder) 
TRADE REG. REP. 1f 17,282 (FTC 1965) (order at 30 Fed. Reg. 12.351);, Ace Books, Inc., 
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. f 17,273 (FTC 1965); Joseph A. Kaplan 
&: Sons, Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. ,i 16,666 (FTC 1963), modi-
fied, 347 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also Atlantic Prods. Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer 
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1J 16,676 (FTC 1963), terminated by declaratory order, id. at 
1l 17,193 (FTC 1965). 
The order in Ace Books is o,f interest because of Commissioner Elman's statement 
that the order, limited to payments to competing "customers," was too narrow, and 
that the order should require -equal treatment of all purchasers whether or not they 
bought directly from respondent. , 
390. See Joseph A. Kaplan &: Sons v. FTC, 347 F 2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Clairol, 
Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. ,i 17,594 (FTC 1966) (order at 31 
Fed. Reg. 10,262); Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. 
REP, 1J 17,657 (FTC 1966) (order at 31 Fed. Reg. II,753, limited to payments "pur-
suant to a specially tailored or negotiated arrangement." Id. at ll,754). _ 
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willing to narrow its section 2(d) orders in cases where repetition in 
variant forms is not likely, there has seldom been explanation. The 
reasons are the same as those for orders under any other section. A 
statutory order is not as likely to inhibit lawful conduct as an order 
reformulating statutory standards, perhaps inaccurately. But the 
standards of "availability" and "proportionate equality" are singu-
larly vague and difficult to apply, and for that reason alone a seller 
ought not be placed under threat of civil penalty any more than is 
necessary to prevent evasion. Here, as elsewhere, it is undesirable to 
place a seller in jeopardy with respect to conduct which has not been 
held unlawful, as the FTC has sometimes done. For example, there 
is little justification for placing a seller's regular promotional pro-
gram under order, when such a program has been lawfully conducted 
over an extended period, simply because it makes a payment to one 
purchaser for a special promotional event. Nor should the civil 
penalty court be required to resolve statutory factual questions 
different from those passed upon by the FTC, unless there is strong 
justification for doing so. The proportionate equality standard is 
elusive and may well involve different determinations depending 
upon the type of service or facility for which the payment is made. 
To the extent precise definition is possible, therefore, the order 
should be limited to the specific kinds of payments held unlawful 
and, if the record indicates likely repetition in variant forms, to pay-
ments legally similar thereto. 
One recent development, of a considerably different nature, war-
rants further discussion, for the order may well become a standard 
pattern for the future. In House of Lord's, Inc.,891 the FTC found 
that some, but not all, competing purchasers had received advertising 
allowances, rejecting testimony that such allowances were orally 
offered to all. In addition, allowances were given only for newspaper 
and magazine advertising, without alternative programs for smaller 
purchasers who could not purchase such advertising. The FTC's 
order prohibited any payment for promotional or advertising services 
unless all competing purchasers are advised, in writing, of the terms 
of the plan under which the payments are made, the availability of 
such payments on a proportionally equal basis, and alternative ser-
vices which the buyer can provide and be paid for if it would not be 
feasible for all competing purchasers to furnish such services. This 
order is a radical departure from earlier practices and seems, to some 
extent, to be the type of affirmative order suggested earlier by Com-
391. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 17,437 (FTC 1966) (order at 
31 Fed. Reg. 4397). 
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missioner Elman. The requirement that notification to purchasers 
be made in writing is justified by the peculiar facts in the case, but 
should not automatically become part of every order since, as the 
FTC itself recognized, an allowance program can properly be ad-
ministered orally. The prescribed content of the notification presents 
greater difficulty, for it is not at all clear that the statutory standards 
which the order purportedly embodies are accurately paraphrased. 
The order does, however, demonstrate one more attempt by the 
FTC to make its orders more precise, at the possible price of undue 
breadth. 
Orders under section 2(e) have paralleled those under section 2(d) 
and should be governed by the same considerations. While a few 
section 2(e) orders have been limited to specific services or facilities,392 
most have simply recited the language of the statute.393 This is clearly 
inappropriate in many cases, just as it is with respect to section 2(d) 
orders.304 
Section 2(/)-buyer's liability. Section 2(£) makes it unlawful 
"knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is 
prohibited by this section."395 This provision, dealing with buyers 
rather than sellers, is far more complex than it appears. For not only 
must the discriminatory price received be illegal, but the buyer must 
also have known or had reason to know of its illegality.396 Thus, no 
liability can be imposed if the price discrimination has no adverse 
competitive effects, is cost-justified, or is within another statutory de-
fense. Nor can the buyer be held liable unless he knew, or should have 
known, that the discrimination existed, that it was likely to injure 
competition, and was not cost-justified or otherwise within a statutory 
defense. How these questions are resolved depends in many cases 
upon who has the burden of coming fonvard with evidence and the 
ultimate burden of persuasion. These are the issues with which 
392. E.g., Yardley of London, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1086, 1090 (1956) (consent) ("demon-
strator services'); Simplicity Pattern Co., 53 F.T.C. 771, 775 (1957), affd, 360 U.S. 55 
(1959) ("counter catalogs, cabinets or other equipment or facilities"); General Foods 
Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 818 (1956) ("products packaged in containers of a certain size and 
style'). A particularly detailed order under both §§ 2(d) and (e) was entered in Ameri-
can Greetings Corp., 49 F.T.C. 440, 452-55 (1952). 
393. E.g., Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REc. 
REP. 1f 16,753 (FTC 1964) (order at 29 Fed. Reg. 2451), afj'd, 360 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 
1965); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 59 F.T.C. 785, 789 (1961) (consent); Helena Rubin-
stein, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1267, 1270-71 (1956) (consent). 
394. See Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 347 F2d 785, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 
directing modification of a § 2(e) order to cover only the specific practice engaged in by 
the seller and pointing out that § 2(e) "embraces an unusually broad range of pro-
hibited services.'' 
395. Clayton Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (f) (1964). 
396. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). 
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section 2(£) cases have become preoccupied, and any generalization 
is likely to be oversimplified. But for the present, it is enough to 
recognize that the FTC must initially establish that the price dis-
·crimination was prima facie illegal, as it must· in any case against the 
seller, and must introduce some evidence that the discrimination 
was not justifiable and that this fact should have been known by 
respondent. The buyer seeking to escape liability must then establish 
the legality of the price received, or that he had no reason to believe 
the price to be illegal.ao1 
Orders under section 2(£) have followed a pattern similar to 
those under section 2(a). Several early orders prohibited inducing 
or receiving discriminations substantially similar to those adjudicated 
unlawful in the case before the FTC.398 Some in addition prohibited 
"knowingly inducing or receiving" any discrimination in price 
prohibited by section 2(a).399 By 1950, the pattern had changed. 
Orders entered at this time prohibited knowingly inducing or re-
ceiving a net price from any seller known to be below the price at 
which such products ·were being sold to other customers in any case 
where ilie seller was competing with others for the respondent's 
business or where the respondent was competing with other cus-
tomers of the seller. Such orders further provided that respondent 
could defend a charge of order violation by establishing that the 
seller's low price was cost-justified.400 These orders embodied the 
simple evidentiary standard proposed by the FTC and rejected by 
the Supreme Court in the Automatic Canteen case401 that violation 
was established by proof of knowing receipt .,of a price concession 
which was prima facie illegal-that is, likely to injure competition-
unless the buyer could establish the actual legality of the concession 
397. For general discussion of these standards, see F. RoWE, supra note ll52, at 4ll8-
51 (1962) and id., (1964 Supp.) 104-11; Frey, The Evidentiary Burden on Affirmative 
Defenses Under Section 2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman A.ct: Automatic Canteen Re• 
visited, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 347 (1967). 
398. See Golf Ball Mfrs.' Ass'n, 26 F.T.C. 824, 848-51 (19ll8). Cf. Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co., 25 F.T.C. 1228, 1259-63 (1937). 
ll99. E.g., Curtiss Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237, 274 (1947); E.J. Brach&: Sons, ll9 F.T.C. 
535, 548 (1944); A.S. Aloe Co., 34 F.T.C. 363, 376-77 (1941). All these orders also pro-
hibited receipt of discriminatory prices "substantially similar" to those adjudicated un-
lawful. This portion of the order in Curtiss · Candy and Brach also contained the 
scienter requirement. In Aloe it did not. See also American Oil Co., 29 F.T.C. 857, 866-
67 (1939), which contained a general prohibition in the language of § 2(a) with a proviso 
covering the cost justification defense. 
400. Atlas Supply Co., 48 F:T.C. 53, 67-71 (1951); Automatic Canteen Co. of 
America, 46 F.T.C. 861, 889-91 (1950), rev'd, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). See also National Tea 
Co., 46 F.T.C. 829, 834-35 (1950). The Atlas order contained a further proviso permitting 
respondent to defend by establishing that the seller's conduct was within the meeting 
competition defense. 
401. Automatic Canteen Co~ of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). 
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under one of the statutory defenses. More curious •is that the order 
was applicable even to price concessions among noncompeting 
purchasers. 
'While one might have expected a change in the terms of section 
2(£) orders after the holding in Automatic Canteen that the statute 
prohibits only inducement of discriminatory prices which the buyer 
knows or should know are unlawful, no such change has occurred. 
The recent series of consent orders against groups of small buyers 
in the automobile parts industry are exactly the same as the Auto-
matic Canteen order, except that no reference is made to cost justifi-
cation or the other statutory defenses, on the apparent assumption 
that these defenses are implicit in the order anyway.402 In addition, 
the litigated orders against similar groups have generally prohibited 
the members from maintaining or operating the existing buying 
organization or any like organization as a means knowingly to induce 
or receive any such discrimination in price.403 
Two questions should be asked about section 2(f) orders. First, is 
the order limited to the inducement and receipt of discriminatory 
prices which are in fact unlawful? Second, does the order properly de-
fine the additional elements of the buyer's liability? With respect to the 
former, most section 2(£) orders are unduly broad, even under the 
assumption that they include implicitly all statutory defenses, because 
they prohibit the receipt of discriminatory prices even wfien the 
purchaser paying the higher price does not compete with respondent. 
Perhaps section 2(£) can be violated by inducement of a discrim-
inatory price injuring competition at the primary level, but most 
cases rest on a demonstration of prima fade illegality through injury 
at the secondary level. In such cases, the order should be limited to 
receipt of prices known to be below those charged competing pur-
402. E.g., Evergreen Warehouse Distribs., Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE 
R.Ec. REP. 11 17,563 (FTC 1966) (order at 31 Fed. Reg. 9345); Nor-Cal Distribs., Inc., 
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 17,524 (FTC 1966) (order at 31 Fed. 
Reg. 7960); Automotive Jobbers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 19, 33-35 (1962); Warehouse Distribs., 
Inc., 55 F.T.C. 188, 198-200 (1958). The only variation is in Automotive Supply Co., 56 
F.T.C. 192, 199-200 (1959), where the- order applies only if respondent is competing 
with other customers of the seller. See also March of Toys, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 486, 496-97 
(1960) (consent order against group membership buying organization in toy industry); 
Fred Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 16,368 (FTC 1963), 
modified, 359 F.2d 351 {9th Cir. 1966), affd in part, rev'd in part, 390 U.S. 341 (1968). 
403. E.g., Southern California Jobbers, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. 
REP. 11 17,410 (FTC 1962) (order at 31 Fed. Reg. 3339); National Parts Warehouse, 
[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 16,700 (FTC 1963), afj'd sub nom. 
General Auto Supply, Inc., v. F.T.C. 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
923 (1965); D &: N Auto Parts Co., 55 F.T.C. 1279, 1296 (1959), affd sub nom. Mid-
South Distribs., 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961). See 
also the more specific prohibitions in Associated Merchandising Corp., 40 F.T.C. 578, 
m~~~ . 
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chasers. The FTC has come to recognize this overbreadth problem 
and in two recent cases has so limited its order.404 The net effect is 
to make the order in this respect the same as the Ruberoid order. 
There are seldom instances when the order must be more narrowly 
confined to receipt of particular kinds of allowances, as suggested with 
respect to some Ruberoid orders, for the FTC is usually entitled to 
assume that a buyer who has "knowingly induced" a price concession 
in one form is likely to do so in a different form unless restrained.40G 
Section 2(£) orders make virtually no attempt to reformulate the 
additional elements of the buyer's liability, contenting themselves 
with simple statutory prohibition of "knowing" inducement or 
receipt. This is the only practical way of dealing with the problem. 
The order cannot effectively set forth the variety of circumstances in 
which the buyer should know of the illegality of the price received. 
This question must be left to the enforcing court.406 
Section 3-tie-ins and exclusive dealing arrangements. An ex-
clusive dealing arrangement-a sale or lease of goods on the condition 
that the buyer or lessee will not purchase or deal in the goods of a 
competing seller-may assume a number of different forms. These 
include the simple promise not to handle competing goods, require-
ments contracts, and tying agreements. Such arrangements are 
prohibited by section 3 of the Clayton Act whenever their effect 
"may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly in any line of commerce."407 
404. National Parts Warehouse, [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE R.Ec. REP. 
,r 16,700 (FTC 1963), affd sub nom. General Auto Supply, Inc., v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 
(7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 923 (1965); Fred Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer 
Binder] TRADE R.Ec. REP. 1[ 16,368 (FTC 1963), modified, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), 
affd in part, rev'd in part, 390 U.S. 341 (1968). 
405. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, 390 U.S. 341 (1968); Southern California Jobbers, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] 
TRADE R.Ec. REP. ,r 17,410 (FTC 1966) (order at 31 Fed. Reg. 3339) (order limited to 
"warehouse distributor discounts or similar price differentials.") 
406. Section 2(f) orders may be compared with orders now entered under § 5 of the 
FTC Act in cases involving the knowing inducement and receipt of discriminatory 
promotional and advertising allowances. Such orders prohibit the inducement and re-
ceipt of any such allowance [defined in the language of § 2(d)] when the buyer knows 
that such allowances have not been made available to its competitors on proportionally 
equal terms. The first of these orders entered by the FTC were modified on review to 
prohibit receipt of only specific types of allowances. See cases cited in note 381 supra. 
Subsequent FTC orders have generally been so limited. E.g., Individualized Catalogues, 
Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE R.Ec. REP. ,r 16,873 (FTC 1964), But see Fred 
Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE R.Ec. REP. ,r 16,368 (FTC 1963), where 
the order was not so limited and the reviewing court directed that it be modified. 359 
F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966). 
Reviewing courts have also limited such orders to "inducement and receipt," barring 
the condemnation of "inducement" alone. Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d 
Cir. 1962). The FTC has apparently agreed. Fred Meyer Co., supra. 
407. Clayton Act§ 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), which, in more complete form, provides· 
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Tying arrangements are virtually per se illegal under section 3 
as well as under section I of the Sherman Act.408 The per se term-
inology must be used cautiously, for the courts have not categorically 
condemned all tie-in arrangements. Illegality is commonly said to 
rest on proof (1) that the seller has some degree of market power 
with respect to the tying product, either by virtue of his position in 
the market or because of the distinctiveness of the product, and (2) 
that a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce is affected.409 But 
these standards are easily met in most cases. And while there has 
been some expressed willingness to permit a seller marketing a new 
product to insist that the product be used only in conjunction with 
services or other products purchased from him if the tying product 
will not function properly without proper servicing or if products 
used with it are defective, such cases are unusual.410 Hence, under 
prevailing standards most tie-in agreements can be condemned out 
of hand. 
This is not the case with the other exclusive dealing arrangements, 
particularly requirements contracts, where legality has come to de-
pend upon a more detailed examination of relevant markets, the 
strengths and needs of the parties, and the percentage of the market 
foreclosed to competition of the seller by the arrangement.411 Such 
arrangements may be of long or short duration and may embrace all, 
some, or very little of the relevant market; they may involve new 
products, new firms, or purchasers with a peculiar need for assured 
It shall be unlawful for any person .•. to lease or make a sale or contract for 
sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities, 
whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption or resale • • • or fix 
a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the 
condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall 
not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other 
commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect 
of such lease, sale or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understand-
ing may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any 
line of commerce. 
408. 15 U.S.C. § I (1964). 
409. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-46 (1962). While Loew's in-
volves § 1 of the Sherman Act, it now appears that the standards under § l and 3 of the 
Clayton Act have in large part coalesced. See generally Ferguson, Tying Arrangements 
and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB. 552 (1965); Pearson, 
Tying Arrangements and the Antitrust Laws, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 626 (1965); Turner, 
The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50 
(1958). 
410. This so-called "integrity of the product" defense is discussed in detail in Note, 
Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises, Territorials and Exclusives, 
18 ST,\N. L. REv. 457 (1966); Comment, Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws: 
The "Integrity of the Product" Defense, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1413 (1964). 
411. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). See generally Bok, 
The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the 
Clayton Act, 1961 SUP, CT. REv, 267. 
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supply. Pressure for such an agreement may have been ex,ert~d by 
either the buyer or the seller. These are all relevant factors, although 
the primary emphasis continues to be on the share of the relevant 
market represented by the goods sold subject to the exclusive dealing 
arrangement. About all that can be said with confidence is that such 
an arrangement is suspect if it covers a substantial share of a properly 
defined market. 
-Orders in tie-in cases have generally prohibited only repetition of 
the specific practice adjudicated unlawful: tie-in sales involving the 
same tying and tied products.412 Such orders have never been condi-
tioned upon any showing of anticompetitive effect, but given the 
virtual per se illegality of tie-ins and given that these orders have been 
confined to the products involved in the original findings, such an 
omission is unobjectionable. The FTC is obviously entitled to assume 
that repetition of the same conduct with the same products is un-
lawful. 
The FTC's orders in other exclusive dealing cases have been as 
broad as its tie-in orders have been narrow. From the FTC's very 
first orders to its most recent ones, these orders simply prohibit re-
spondent from making any sale or contract for sale on the condition, 
agreement, or understanding that buyer will not sell or deal in the 
goods of any competitor of the respondent, and from enforcing any 
such existing contract.413 Many of these orders further prohibit the 
fixing of any price or the granting of any discount on such a condi-
tion.414 Thus, most section 3 orders simply recite the language of the 
statute without reference to the statutory anticompetitive effect re-
412. E.g., Underwood Corp., 49 F.T.C. 1123, 1130-31 (1953); Judson L. Thomson 
Mfg. Co., 38 F.T.C. 135, 142-43 (1944); A.B. Dick Co., 1 F.T.C. 20, 28-29 (1917). See Min-
neapolis-Floneywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 388-90 (1948), aff d in part, rev'd in 
part, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); R.T. Vanderbilt 
Co., 34 F.T.C. 378, 392-93 (1941). 
Several FTC orders contain express provisos permitting respondent to insist that 
the buyer not handle or sell certain products or service which would adversely affect 
the operation of respondent's primary product. E.g., Culligan, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 1072, 1073 
(1957) (consent); Flarley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047, 1061 (1954); Automatic 
Canteen Co. of America, 46 F.T.C. 861, 889-91 (1950); General Motors Corp., 34 F.T.C. 
58, 84-86 (1941). 
413. E.g., International Staple &: Mach. Co., 59 F.T.C. 1080, 1088-89 (1961); My-
tinger &: Casselberry, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 717, 738-40 (1960), enforced, 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 
1962); Anchor Serum Co., 50 F.T.C. 681, 693-94 (1954), enforced 217 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 
1954); Dictograph Prods., Inc., 50 F.T.C. 281, 290-92 (1953), afj'd, 217 F.2d 821 (7th 
Cir: 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Standard Elec. Mfg. Co., 5 F.T.C. 376, 
382-84 ·(1923). Several orders also prohibit specific means of policing or implementing 
exclusive dealing arrangements. E.g., Flarley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 10471 1061 
(1954); R.B. Semler, Inc., 42 F.T.C. 372, 383-85 (1946). 
414. E.g., Cross Baking Co., 52 F.T.C., 54, 57-58 (1955) (consent); Champion Spark 
Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 51-53 (1953); Horlicks Corp., 47 F.T.C. 169, 175-76 (1950); Na-
tional Biscuit Co., 28 F.T.C. 99, 106-07 (1939); Fleischmann Go., 1 F.T.C. 119, 135-38 
(1918). 
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quirements. In the latter respect, they resemble orders now entered 
under section 2(a). But unlike section 2(a) orders, orders entered 
under section 3 do not reformulate anticompetitive effect standards 
in any other terms: they simply condemn all exclusive dealing ar-
rangements with respect to the covered products. 
There are obvious difficulties with such orders, which on their 
face condemn absolutely conduct which is not absolutely unlawful. 
If upon a proper showing of changed circumstances or new competi-
tive conditions a seller subject to a section 2(a) order can require the 
enforcing court to examine anew the question of anticompetitive 
effect, the same should be true when a section 3 order is involved. But 
even if this is so, this ultimate safeguard does not justify the use of 
such orders in the first instance, as noted earlier in the section 2(a) 
context.415 Such orders are unduly broad not only because they con-
demn conduct irrespective of anticompetitive effect, and thus may 
prohibit lawful and perhaps competitively desirable conduct, but 
because they prohibit all types of exclusive dealing arrangements, 
whether or not they are similar to that found unlawful. For example, 
a firm which violates section 3 through exclusive dealing arrange-
ments with its entire network of dealers is prohibited as well from 
entering individual requirements contracts tailored to the needs of 
particular dealers or other purchasers. Such individual contracts 
might be unlawful, but such a conclusion hardly follows as a logical 
inference from the FTC' s original findings. Much the same may 
be said about the duration of the agreement. Should the FTC 
condemn all exclusive dealing arrangements, whatever their dura-
tion, on the basis of a finding that five-year arrangements are anti-
competitive?416 
The problems inherent in these section 3 orders are similar to 
those discussed with respect to area price discrimination orders. In 
both kinds of cases, the governing statutory standards are flexible and 
highly uncertain. But in area pricing cases the FTC's orders have 
been far more narrowly drawn and have attempted to prohibit only 
those discriminations which are likely to be anticompetitive. The 
same can and should be done in section 3 cases. 
b. Product coverage. Any FTC order can proscribe conduct with 
respect to one, some, or all products sold by the respondent. Obvi-
ously the fewer products covered, the narrower the total restriction 
placed upon the respondent's operations. It is not my purpose to 
415. See discussion at pages 1169-70 supra. 
416. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), an ex'.-
clusive dealing case brought under § 5 of the FTC Act, where the order prohibited only 
those contracts exceeding one ye;ir in duration. 
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catalog what FTC orders have done in the past,417 for this would be 
an interminable and valueless task. Hence this discussion will be con-
fined to an examination and criticism of the FTC's stated standards 
with respect to product coverage, as those standards have developed 
in litigated cases. 
The problem is easily identified. A seller has engaged in unlawful 
conduct with respect to product X. The record contains evidence 
that respondent sells other products, but there is either no finding 
that the seller has engaged in the same conduct with respect to such 
other products or, if there is, there is no finding that such conduct is 
unlawful. To what extent can or should the order cover any or all of 
the products other than those involved in the findings of illegality? 
The FTC has asserted in several recent section 2(a) cases that its 
authority to "frame its order broadly enough to prohibit a respon-
dent from using identical illegal practices in the sale of any and all 
products" is "clearly established."418 If this means that such an order 
is always permissible, in the sense that it should not be modified on 
review, and that any decision with respect to product coverage is a 
matter solely within the discretion of the FTC, the assertion is an 
unwarranted generalization from a group of section 5 cases upon 
which the FTC has persistently relied but which involve somewhat 
different considerations.419 And even if the assertion is accurate, the 
rule which it recites is unacceptable. 
The question of product coverage is really no different from the 
questions of conduct prohibition already discussed. Where a seller 
markets a line of products in the same manner to the same purchasers, 
an order prohibiting specified pricing conduct on but one product 
within the line can easily be circumvented by engaging in the same 
conduct, with the same effect, on another product. When an order 
covering products other than those involved in the original findings 
is considered, the first question must be whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that respondent will engage in the same activity with other 
products. This is simply another facet of the "anticipated recidivism" 
standards developed by the FTC in determining the appropriate 
breadth of conduct prohibitions, and it involves consideration of the 
417. See F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON PATMAN Acr 147, 
n.174(e) (1964 Supp.) for some examples of FTC practice. 
418. National Dairy Products Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 18,027 at 20,429 (1967). 
See also United Biscuit Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 16,799 at 
21,750 (1964), afj'd, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965). Reviewing courts have on occasion said 
much the same thing. See id., 350 F.2d at 623; Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44, 47 
(7th Cir. 1963). 
419. Primary reliance has been placed on Niresk Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 
337 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960), and also upon FTC v. Colgate• 
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 {f965); Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 
1944); Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941). 
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same factors. The question is not whether the order can be circum-
vented if limited to a particular product or products: respondent 
ought not be placed under restraint unless there is a reasonable like-
lihood that such circumvention would occur. The second and perhaps 
more important question is whether the FTC may reasonably infer 
from its original findings that the conduct which it has prohibited on 
the basis of its findings involving one product would be unlawful even 
if a different product were involved. If the FTC fails to apply these 
standards properly, the order should be modified. 
Some FTC decisions limiting orders to particular products seem 
virtually unprincipled, representing simple compromises to take the 
sting out of orders that prohibit types of conduct in very broad 
terms.420 It is of course easier to narrow an order in product terms 
than by redefining prohibited conduct. A respondent may in fact be 
more likely to commit different violations with respect to the same 
product than the same violation with other products. If the reverse 
were true, an order prohibiting only the specific types of violation but 
covering all products would be appropriate. But the FTC seldom 
explains its orders on such grounds. Obviously, the breadth of the 
prohibitions in conduct terms and product coverage are related ques-
tions. This does not mean, however, that these two factors are simply 
to be balanced off against each other. 
When the FTC has actually addressed itself to the problem, the 
determinative factor has been the relationship between the product 
involved in the findings of violation and the other products sold by 
the respondent. The same basic standards have been applied by re-
viewing courts.421 If other products are marketed through the same 
distribution system to the same purchasers, the order will normally 
cover those products.422 Conversely, if the FTC record fails to reveal 
that respondent makes other products, or it contains no data about 
420. The order in Nuarc Co., 61 FTC 375, 403-04 (1962) seems to represent such a 
compromise. 
421. Orders covering products other than those involved in the original violation 
have been consistently upheld by the courts. Some of these cases suggest that the ques-
tion is completely in the discretion of the FTC. See United Biscuit Co. of America v. 
FTC, 350 F.2d 615,623 (7th Cir. 1965); Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44, 47 (7th Cir. 
1963). Other cases emphasize the fact that all products covered are marketed through 
the same distribution channels to the same customers or are otherwise "similar." See 
Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); Moog Industries, Inc. v. 
FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), ajfd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). 
422. E.g., National Dairy Prods. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. Rll'._ ,r 18,027 at 20,429 
(1967); National Dairy Prods. Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 
,I 17,656 at 22,930 (FTC 1966), ajfd, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1968); Atlantic Prods. 
Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,I 16,676 at 21,590 (FTC 1963), 
terminated by declaratory order, id. at ,r 17,192 (FTC 1965); Moog Indus., Inc., 51 
F.T.C. 931 (1955), ajfd, 238 F.2d.43 (8th Cir. 1956), ajfd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). See United 
Biscuit Co. of America, [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1f 16,799 at 21,750 
(FTC 1964), ajfd, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965). 
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the marketing and pricing practices, orders have been confined to the 
particular products involved in the violation.423 The same has been 
true when other products are marketed through different corporate 
divisions with different distributions systems, or through different 
channels to different purchasers.424 
The relationship between products is of considerable importance, 
as the FTC's own decisions recognize. For if products are wholly un-
related, evasion of an order by repeating the same conduct with 
another product is not likely to occur. But it does not follow that such 
evasion is likely if products are related. If respondent has acted in 
good faith in an uncertain area of the law, or the basic violation is 
isolated or aberrational, there is no more justification for extending 
the order to related products than there is for an order prohibiting 
every possible type of violative conduct. Nevertheless, the FTC drafts 
its orders to cover related products almost automatically, apparently 
on the assumption that the relationship alone establishes a reasonable 
likelihood of circumvention. Seldom is the question examined.425 
But now let us suppose that the FTC determines that respondent, 
having discriminated in the price of product X, is likely to discrimi-
nate in the price of product Y. Does it automatically follow that the 
order should cover product Y? The FTC clearly believes it does.426 
The difficulty is that the same discrimination on sales of product Y 
may not be unlawful. This is seldom a problem with orders under 
section 2(c), (d), or (e), but sections 2(a) and 3 are violated only if the 
conduct in question has an anticompetitive effect. The original find-
423. E.g., Tung-Sol Elec., Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE R.Ec. REP". 
,r 16,562 (FTC 1963) (charges on other products dismissed); Vanity Fair Paper Mills, 
-Inc., 60 F.T.C. 568 (1962), modified, .311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962) (no evidence of other 
products). See Cairo!, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE R.Ec. REP. ,r 17,594 (FTC 
1966). 
424. In several cases, the FTC has limited its orders to products of respondent's 
offending division, when those products are marketed through separate distribution 
systems, with different trademarks and separate advertising, and the division is sepa• 
rately managed. National Dairy Prods. Corp., .3 TRADE R.Ec. REP. ,r 18,027 at 20,429 
(1967); National Dairy Prods. Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE R.Ec. REP. 
1f 17,656, at 22,930 (FTC 1966), aff'd, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1967); Royal Crown Cola Co., 
[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REc. REP. ,r 16,707 (FTC 1963); Quaker Oats Co., 
60 F.T.C. 798, 807-08 (1962). . . . 
. · 425. But see American Oil Co., 60 F.T.C. 1786 (1962), set aside, .325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 
1963).(order limited to gasoline because record did not indicate "that respondent may 
discriminate in the price of other products'). 
426. In United Biscuit Co. of America, [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE Ri:c. REP. 
,r 16,799 (FTC 1964), affd, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965), the FTC's order covered "food 
products," although respondent insisted that only "biscuit products" should be covered. 
The FTC explained that one of respondent's competitors sold potato chips, and it was 
therefore "not improbable that respondent might similarly expand its line." Id. at p. 
21,751. The FTC made no inquiry into the likelihood ·of discrimination in the price of 
.such a product, if: it- was introduced, or into the likelihood of anticomp~titiv.e effect 
1which might follow·from such a discrimination. It was enough that the product "might" 
be sold. . _ · ·. ..-. · · c· · 
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ings of violation often rest on the market power of the seller, the size 
and strengths of his competitors, or other facets of the market for the 
product in question. Even though other products may be related, the 
seller's position in the market for those products, the size and power 
of his competitors, and the needs and strengths of his customers for 
those products may all be markedly different. The FTC may there-
fore have no basis for inferring anticompetitive effect, . even if the 
conduct is similar. A standard based simply upon whether products 
are related is therefore erroneous. 
This same difficulty manifests itself in a somewhat dissimilar way 
in the relationship between the breadth of the conduct prohibition 
and product coverage. The FTC is entitled to make certain assump-
tions about the effect of conduct involving the original product, and 
its prohibitions may be based on these assumptions. But if other 
products are covered, such assumptions may be unwarranted, and the 
order must be drafted differently. For example, if respondent is the 
dominant seller, operating in all markets, it may be assumed that its 
conduct will have certain anticompetitive effects. The order need 
not be concerned with possible inhibition of entry into new markets, 
and so forth. But if the order covers other products, where respondent 
is not dominant or does not have market power, the conduct may 
need to be prohibited in different terms in order to assure that only 
anticompetitive conduct is prohibited.427 
The FTC has not considered such questions, relying as it does 
on section 5 cases where no such issues are involved. It is for this rea-
son that such reliance is misplaced. Niresk Industries,428 frequently 
cited by the FTC for the broad proposition that it has authority to 
extend its orders to all products, is a case in point. Niresk conduc~ed 
a mail order business and had misrepresented the price of a partic-
ular product. An order covering all products was upheld on review. 
No one would deny that misrepresentation of the same type with 
respect to other products would be just as deceptive. But, by contrast, 
the effect of a price discrimination, for ~xampl_~, may vary signifi-
cantly with the product involved. This is a. question to be examined: 
it will not go away nor is it answered by simply citing Niresk. 
c. Geographic and corporate unit limitations. The FTC has per-
sistently refused to confine its orders to the seller's operations in one 
or more defined geographic areas, although such limitations have 
been requested in a number of cases.429 As a practical matter,. any 
427. This problem was recognized by Commissioner Jones in National Dairy Prods. 
Corp., 3 TRADE REc. REP. f 18,027 at 20,442 (FTC 1967) (dissenting in part). 
428. Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 883 (1960). 
429. E.g., Lloyd A."Fry Roofing Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. ~-
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violation, however geographically confined, has resulted in an order 
nationwide in scope. The FTC and reviewing courts have not denied 
that such limitations might be appropriate or necessary in a given 
case, but such a case has apparently not come along.430 
The FTC clearly proceeds on the premise that its findings of 
specific violations are simply illustrative, reflecting the seller's con-
duct in all areas where .it operates. The burden is upon the respon-
dent to demonstrate that the violations found are not typical of its 
operations elsewhere.431 In most cases where this question has been 
raised, the FTC has not been hard pressed to justify its basic premise, 
for the record has contained affirmative evidence to justify a finding 
that repetition of the same type of conduct in other areas is likely, 
and respondent has offered little or no additional evidence to demon-
strate that its violating conduct was geographically atypical.432 
The critical question in these cases, then, is not whether respon-
dent is likely to repeat the same kind of conduct in other areas, al-
though cases may be envisaged where such a finding would not be 
justified and the order should be geographically limited for this rea-
son alone.433 The question is whether such conduct in other markets 
will be unlawful. This is primarily relevant to orders under sections 
2(a) and 3, where illegality rests on an assessment of competitive ef-
fects. While respondent's conduct may be typical of its conduct else-
,r 17,303 at 22,443 (FTC 1965), aff'd, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966); Universal-Rundle 
Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 16,948 at 22,009 (FTC), set aside, 
352 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 387 U.S. 244 (1967); Borden Co., [1963-1965 Transfer 
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 16,776 at 21,721-22 (FTC), set aside, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 
1964); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1344, 1362 (1963), afj'd, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), set 
aside, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961); Maryland Baking Co., 52 F.T.C. 1679 (1956), modi-
fied, 243 F .2d 716 _ (4th Cir. 1957). 
430. Since the text was originally written, the order in the Dean Milk case, insofar 
as it covered discrimination between competing purchasers, has been directed modified 
to cover only those markets in which the discrimination occurred, on the ground that 
there was no evidence of similar unlawful conduct in other markets. Dean Milk Co. v. 
FTC, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1968); cf. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, - F.2d -
{7th Cir. 1968). 
431. E.g., Universal-Rundle Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. 
,r 16,948 (FTC 1965). See generally Kintner, Scope of Federal Trade Commission Orders 
in Price Discrimination Cases, 14 Bus. LAWYER 1053, 1057-58 (1959). 
432. In some of these cases, there was evidence of similar conduct in other areas, 
although such conduct was either lawful or its legality not adjudicated. This was true 
in the Borden, Foremost and Lloyd A. Fry cases, cited in note 429 supra. In Maryland 
Baking, 52 F.T.C. 1679 (1956), modified, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957), the violation was 
particularly flagrant. 
433. The Anheuser-Busch case seems to me to present such a situation. Respondent 
had reduced its price in St. Louis, its home market, while maintaining higher prices 
elsewhere. The facts suggest that its conduct was peculiarly related to the fact that St. 
Louis was its home market, and hence such conduct afforded little basis for a finding 
of likelihood of repetition in other markets. But the FTC refused to limit the order 
geographically. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.~. 277 (1957), set aside, 289 F.2d 835 (7th 
Cir. 1961). 
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where, the market in which the violation occurred may not be. Find-
ings of competitive injury in a market with clearly peculiar charac-
teristics are not a legitimate basis for generalizations about all mar-
kets. The FTC cannot be required to examine all markets in which 
a seller operates. But where the violation rests on market conditions 
which are clearly unique, either as a matter of common sense or be-
cause respondent so demonstrates, or where similar conduct else-
where has been challenged and not found unlawful, limitation of the 
order to the area in which the violation occurred should be re-
quired. 434 
The FTC has been somewhat more willing to limit its orders to 
the products of the particular corporate division committing the 
original violation,435 although limitations to particular plants or 
management units are more common in NLRB orders.436 The FTC 
apparently views such limitations as a form of product limitation, 
appropriate in cases where the products of a given corporate division 
or plant are marketed through separate distribution channels, using 
different trademarks, and so forth. But more may be involved than 
simple product limitation. Within a given corporate structure, re-
sponsibility for pricing decisions may be placed in the manager of a 
particular plant or division. Where it is clear that the offending plant 
or division has autonomy in pricing matters, and there is nothing to 
suggest that similar practices have been used by other plants or divi-
sions (even plants making the same products), there may be little 
basis for believing that such other corporate units are likely to en-
gage in such conduct, and an order limited to the offending unit 
434. In the few instances where the FTC has discussed the problem, it has rested 
on the fact the record failed to establish anything unique about the market or com-
petitive conditions where the violation occurred. See Borden Co., [1963-1965 Transfer 
Binder) TRADE REG. REP. ,I 16,776 at 21,722 (FTC), set aside, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 
1964); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1344, 1362 (1963), afj'd, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965). This finding seems debatable in the Borden case, 
where the primary line order was predicated solely upon a two-week period of reduced 
and below cost prices in a small Indiana community and the primary party injured 
was both an independent seller and a distributor for Borden. (At this point, I should 
note that I was one of several counsel for Borden in this litigation.) 
435. See cases cited in note 424 supra. 
436. See, e.g., NLRB v. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 
1962); Perry Coal Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 949 
(1961); Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1952); Reliance Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 
125 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 119 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1941). 
Orders against unions have on occasion been geographically limited. See, e.g., NLRB 
v. Miscellaneous Drivers 8e Helpers Local 610, 293 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1961); cf. NLRB 
v. United Mine Workers, 202 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1953); NLRB v. United Mine Workers, 
195 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 920 (1953), where the courts refused 
such geographical limitations. The Third Circuit apparently no longer follows the 
views expressed in the former of these two cases. See NLRB v. Lexington Elec. Prods., 
283 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1960). 
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would be appropriate.437 It is of course true that corporate structures 
can be changed, and that managerial personnel can be transferred. 
But the FTC is capable of ~sessing the likelihood of such changes. 
It has not done so in the past; it should do so in the future. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Calls for a thorough re-examination of the Robinson-Patman Act 
have become increasingly frequent during the past two years. The 
FTC's enforcement of the Act has been severely criticized. During 
the same period, and perhaps at least in part because of these out-
cries, the FTC has issued few Robinson-Patman complaints. It would 
be irrational to believe that this reflects full compliance. But what-
ever _the reason for the moratorium, the fact that it exists may suggest 
that the present study is only of historical interest. Like others who 
have observed this phenomenon, I believe the existing moratorium 
will contim1e only if a thorough reconsideration of the statute and 
the economic and social policies which it purportedly implements 
results in significant statutory changes.438 Such a reconsideration is 
called for and must encompass questions of remedy and enforcement. 
It is easy enough to point out that the 1959 changes in enforce-
ment procedures are significant to the order-drafting process. The 
FTC itself has shown some recognition of this fact. It is equally easy 
to be critical of particular orders, as I have been, and broadly to ex-
hort the FTC to exercise greater care than it has in the past. Specific 
recommendations for changes do not come as easily. For if one as-
sumes that FTC enforcement is to continue, the number of practi-
cable alternatives is small. 
To the extent compliance can be secured without the use of 
formal adjudicative procedures, through the use of such devices as 
industry guides, trade regulation rules, advisory opinions, and volun-
tary compliance procedures, the dangers inherent in the use of cease 
and desist orders can and should be avoided.439 But for the most part, 
Clayton Act violations must be handled on a_ case-by-case basis. Ad-
visory opinions will not and cannot always be sought. The backbone 
of enforcement will continue to be adjudicative proceedings. The 
following suggestions, then, are directed toward such proceedings. 
437. Such arguments were rejected in Borden Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] 
TRADE R.Ec. REP. ,r 16,776, at 21,722 (FTC), set aside, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964) and 
in J. A. Folger &: Co., 61 F.T.C. 1166, 1189 (1962); cf. Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC, 297 
F .2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961) (§ 5 order). 
438. See Rowe, The Robinson-Patman Act-Thirty Years Thereafter, 30 A.B.A. 
ANTITRusr SECTION 9, 14-17 (1966), which includes figures on complaints filed . 
.439. The background, use, and utility of all these devices is described and discussed 
in detail in Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and 
Procedure, 48 MINN. L. R.Ev. 383, 449-65 (1964); Baum &: Baker, Enforcement, Volun-
tary Compliance, and the Federal Trade Commission, 38 IND. L.J: 322 (1963). 
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Initially the FTC must disabuse itself of the notion that a cease 
and desist order must be entered whenever a technical or isolated 
violation is found. This does not necessarily mean that the com-
plaint must simply be dismissed: the proceeding may be terminated 
by entry of a declaratory order, which is subject to no immediate 
sanctions but affords a basis for compliance reports. If further mis-
conduct occurs, the proceeding can be reopened and a cease and de-
sist order entered, primarily on the basis of the original findings.440 
Entry of a cease and desist order should be limited to those cases 
where repeated violation is demonstrably likely. Once it is deter-
mined that an order should be entered, the FTC is under a duty to 
enter the least restrictive order adequate to prevent evasion, within 
the standards suggested earlier. It is not wholly unreasonable to 
place some of this responsibility on the respondent, to require him 
to indicate why the order is improper and to suggest how it might be 
changed. But the basic responsibility is that of the FTC, which, after 
all, is supposed to be the expert at order-drafting. The FTC must also 
exercise particular care with consent orders, for the pressures to ac-
cept such orders may be very great, and be more willing than it has 
been to negotiate over their terms. 
The reviewing courts have been far too willing in the past to defer 
to FTC "discretion." Little change at the FTC level is likely to come 
about unless the courts insist upon it. Orders must be justified upon 
the record and not simply upon FTC predictions of impending dis-
aster, and it is the job of the reviewing courts to assure that this is 
so. Perhaps most important, reviewing courts must be impressed with 
the impact of the order itself as a restriction on conduct, both un-
desirable and desirable. 
The final question is whether the statutory enforcement pro-
cedures should be changed. There are several available alternatives. 
FTC orders could be enforced as NLRB orders are, through con-
tempt of the court of appeals after entry of an enforcement order 
secured by the FTC without proof that its order has been violated. 
This would interject the flexibility of the contempt procedure with-
out requiring the so-called "second bite at the apple." This is, in my 
440. Such a procedure. was followed in Atlantic Prods. Corp., where entry of a 
cease order was initially withheld pending industry-wide compliance proceedings. The 
case was ultimately terminated by entry of a declaratory order, with the explanation 
that the practices had been discontinued and were not likely to be resumed. [1963-1965 
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 16,676 (FTC 1963); id. 1f 17,192 (FTC 1965). See 
also Furr's, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17,352 (FTC 1965). 
On a few occasions, the FTC has simply dismissed complaints when there appeared 
to be no likelihood that the unlawful conduct would be resumed. See Louis, The Scope 
and Enforcement ·of Robinson-Patman Act Cease and Desist Orders, 10 VILL. L. REv. 
457, 485 n.186 (1965). · · 
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judgment, the most advisable course: while it would perhaps create 
fact-finding difficulties, since the court of appeals cannot operate ef-
fectively as a trial court, these are not insuperable. (These difficulties 
could be resolved by permitting the FTC to secure an enforcement 
order in district court, but this would create more problems than it 
solves, unless the district court is also to be made the reviewing court, 
which, in turn, would presumably add another possible step to the 
review process.) 
Second, the enforcement procedures could distinguish between 
orders which are reviewed and those which are not. As to the former, 
upon affirmance the court of appeals would enter an enforcement 
order, as it now does, and contempt of the court of appeals would be 
the only sanction for violation. Other orders would become final 
upon expiration of a stated period for seeking review, and violation 
would result in the imposition of civil penalties in district court. 
Third, the FTC might be given authority to impose relatively 
small administrative fines for violations of final orders. The only role 
of the judiciary in such an enforcement scheme would be to review 
the FTC sanction proceedings. Such fines, with accompanying pub-
licity, might have an important deterrent effect, and the procedure 
would eliminate many of the "administrative-judicial" difficulties 
inherent to the present system. In order to provide an effective deter-
rent to hard-core violators, the FTC might at the same time be per-
mitted to seek enforcement orders from the court of appeals. Any pro-
cedure permitting the FTC itself to impose fines would work a far-
reaching change and might also be deemed an improper delegation 
of judicial power to an administrative body. I would not favor such 
a proposal, for in my judgment it would strengthen the FTC's hand 
when it does not need strengthening. But it surely merits 'some con-
sideration. 
Finally, at a bare minimum the "$5,000 per day" penalty should 
be removed from the statute. There is no demonstrated need for a 
penalty which can, in the eyes of a given respondent, amount to an 
astronomical sum. Admittedly, a maximum penalty of $5,000 might 
not be much of a deterrent, and an increase in the maximum penalty 
would be necessary. If it is thought desirable to retain a penalty on a 
per-day basis, the figure should be substantially reduced. But some 
change must be made in order to reduce the bargaining strength of 
the FTC. 
Statutory changes in enforcement procedures are advisable. Ulti-
mately, however, reliance must be placed on the good judgment of 
the FTC. It has come a long way since 1962, and is to be commended. 
But it cannot rest on its oars: there is still a long way to go. 
